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Weathering Extremes demonstrates how seventeenth-century climate changes mingled with 
cultural, social, economic, agro-ecological, and geopolitical forces to catalyze three 
simultaneous, though geographically disparate, indigenous resistance movements between 1636 
and 1645. In Brazil, Curaçao, and the Hudson Valley, indigenous peoples deployed violent and 
non-violent means of resistance to confront the Dutch West India Company. This broadly 
interdisciplinary project utilizes natural proxy sources such as pollen samples, ice cores, and tree 
rings in conjunction with ethnohistorical and Dutch archival sources to reconstruct how early 
seventeenth-century extreme weather events catalyzed these movements. El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) events, volcanic eruptions, and reduced sunspot activity led to drought, 
heavy rain, and abnormally cold temperatures throughout the Americas. Extreme weather 
compounded the worst consequences of European colonialism on indigenous societies including 
disease epidemics, livestock destruction, and political instability. Harvest failures exacerbated 
the Company’s financial ills, decreased cash and subsistence crop production, and led to local 
abuses of indigenous groups. Indigenous peoples and the Dutch West India Company responded 
to climate-induced situations based on culturally, politically, and geographically contingent 
factors. The diversity of responses in each case study illustrates how climate is only deterministic 
in its ability to provoke human responses: the Wappinger of New Netherland responded to 
climatological changes and European colonialism through direct militant confrontation; the 
Tapuyas and Brasilianen of Dutch Brazil reacted via shifting diplomatic allegiances and 




 This project makes several contributions to environmental, early modern Atlantic, and 
indigenous peoples’ history. First, it draws attention to the impact of seventeenth-century climate 
on indigenous and Dutch interactions in the Americas. Next, it uses paleoclimatological sources 
to show how climate-induced vulnerabilities provoked diplomacy, negotiation, and/or conflict in 
colonial settings. It reverses common assumptions of indigenous dependency and demonstrates 
the importance of indigenous peoples, labor, and sovereignty in shaping European colonialism. 
Finally, it deploys an intercolonial analysis to move beyond local case-study and world-system 
examinations of the Dutch Atlantic to explore how the Dutch West India Company emerged as 
an interdependent and overlapping web of connections. This project argues that the three 
climatologically-induced indigenous resistance movements coincided with the Company’s 
territorial zenith and collectively led to the Company’s destabilization, 1674 bankruptcy, and 
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Between 1637 and 1645, indigenous groups in Brazil, Curaçao, and the Hudson Valley 
responded to the dual threat of climate and colonialism in three simultaneous, though 
geographically disparate resistance movements. These resistance movements reveal the truly 
mercurial relationships forged between indigenous groups and denizens of the Dutch West India 
Company (Geoctroyeerde Westindische Compagnie or WIC) in the early seventeenth-century 
Atlantic world. Dutch-indigenous relationships had qualities of eloquence, ingenuity, and even 
thievishness. They were established on the basis of negotiated commerce between land and 
seafaring partners. They were prone to rapid and unpredictable changes. And, finally, they were 
shaped by changing climatological conditions.1  
 Neither colonialism nor extreme weather events alone adequately explain the events of 
1637 to 1645.2 Instead, the forces of climate and colonialism worked together to catalyze 
historically-contingent events that fundamentally altered the geo-political, social, ecological, and 
cultural landscape of the Americas. Extreme weather events threatened Europeans and Natives 
alike and led each group to respond in culturally-contingent ways. Drawing connections between 
social, cultural, political, and climatological factors helps explain when and why colonial 
conflicts escalated into violent encounters. Episodic droughts, unseasonable deluges, and 
prolonged winters devastated indigenous and colonial food supplies alike. Facing famine and 
                                                            
1 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines mercurial as: 1) having qualities of eloquence, ingenuity, or 
thievishness attributed to the god Mercury (god of trade); 2) characterized by rapid and unpredictable 
changeableness of mood; 3) of or relating to the element mercury (as in thermometers), see: “Mercurial,” Merriam-
Webster, accessed March 1, 2017, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mercurial. 
2 The use of the term extreme weather event(s) in contradistinction to terms like weather or climate throughout 
the dissertation is grounded in the elastic definition of each. Weather is the condition of the atmosphere in the short-
term and is usually defined in terms of temperature, precipitation, wind, and solar radiation. It is the current 
conditions outside right now. Climate generally refers to the average course or condition of the weather over a long 
period of time, typically at least ten to thirty years, in a specified region using the same measurements. Extreme 
weather events are anomalous, periodic, or intermittent changes in climate and can include droughts, deluges, 
hurricanes, and regionally atypical seasonal conditions like abnormally cold summers or warm winters. 
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death, both colonists and indigenous peoples deployed diplomacy, decrees, non-violent forms of 
resistance, and violence to protect their friends, kin, and families. 
 The dual threat of climate and colonialism created a context ripe for indigenous resistance 
and violent conflict. Extreme weather events posed a serious threat to the availability of 
subsistence crops. The settlement of Europeans along rivers and coasts also posed a threat to 
indigenous food supplies. Colonial settlements blocked indigenous peoples from sites of 
alternative riverine and marine food supplies used when crops failed to grow. As a result of crop 
failures and blocked access to alternative food supplies, indigenous peoples could fall into 
periods of famine conditions. Climate and colonial-induced famines then exacerbated common 
colonial tensions and problems. Malnourishment led to jeopardized immune systems and 
increased susceptibility to European diseases. Indigenous peoples, forced into servitude and 
labor, experienced exhaustion, malnourishment, and increased rates of sickness and death. 
Unfenced roaming livestock and the ongoing push for land threatened already diminished crop 
availability and renewed conflicts over pre-existing land disputes. And Europeans, also suffering 
from food shortages and famine conditions, pressured indigenous peoples to supply them with 
much needed calories by using threats, forced servitude, and violence.  
 The Dutch Republic chartered the Company in 1621 and within two years the Company 
had devised a “Grand Design” that laid out its ambitions for the Americas. The Company’s plans 
and policies shaped local Company leaders’ abilities to forge relationships with indigenous 
peoples and influenced how Company leaders responded to extreme weather, subsistence crises, 
and indigenous resistance movements. Specifically, the plan targeted Iberian possessions in 
North and South America, the Caribbean, and Africa. The Company’s successes and failures 
throughout the Atlantic drastically altered physical, political and cultural landscapes.  
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 Part I.1 of this project examines the connections forged by the Dutch West India Company. 
People, goods, and ideas moved throughout vast local, regional, and global webs. Collectively, 
these networks tied various nodes of the Dutch Atlantic together. Company officials believed that 
such connections would strength their investments, but these connections also made the web 
increasingly fragile. If one part of the web failed, the entire enterprise could go with it.  
 Part I.2 dives into the global climatic changes and local extreme weather events that shook 
the Company’s web. Between 1637 and 1645, shifting oceanic and atmospheric interactions 
resulted in periods of extreme weather in the form of droughts, deluges, and abnormally cold 
winters throughout the Americas. These abnormal weather patterns were consistent with the 
global phenomenon known as the Little Ice Age (roughly 1350-1750 CE). A wide-variety of 
local factors influenced the ability of both Europeans and indigenous peoples to respond this 
changing climate. The diversity of responses seen in Brazil, Curaçao, and the Hudson Valley, the 
subject of parts II through IV, speaks to the importance of culturally-contextualized contingency 
and human agency. 
 In Dutch Brazil (1630-1654), the subject of part II, Company expansionist efforts launched 
in 1641 coincided with a host of extreme weather events. Unseasonably heavy rains along the 
northeastern coast of Brazil washed away manioc groves, drenched sugar plantations and salt 
mines, and pummeled Company forts and Indian mission villages (aldeias) occupied by 
Brasilianen natives. Later, between 1643 and 1644, droughts in the Sertão (the arid backcountry 
of Brazil) drove Tapuya groups to coastal regions occupied by Company forces.3 The Tapuya and 
Brasilianen reacted to the combination of climate-induced famine and the Company’s 
expansionist ambitions via shifting diplomatic allegiances and the use of intermittent violence. 
                                                            
3 Report of Tapuyas from the Sertão, November 16, 1644, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 70; Report concerning the 
arrival of Tapuyas from the Sertão, November 23, 1644, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 70. 
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Tensions between the Dutch and Tupi-speaking Brasilianen first erupted in Maranhão, the 
northwestern border of Dutch-controlled territories in Brazil. Dutch forces seized Fort São Luís 
in November of 1641 from Portuguese defenders. Wide-spread shortages of food provisions, 
ammunition, and soldiers across Dutch Brazil caused perpetual headaches for Company forces in 
Maranhão. Tensions between local Natives and the Company rose as Maranhão’s Company 
leaders responded to supply shortages by pressuring local Natives to share subsistence crops and 
to work longer hours at Company salt mines and sugar plantations. Tensions grew further after 
the Company failed to pay promised wages to Brasilianen warriors from the neighboring 
missions in Ceará who served as auxiliary troops and then were refused their petitions to return 
home. The final straw came in April 1642 when a smallpox epidemic arrived that devastated the 
indigenous population in Maranhão and the nearby captaincy of Ceará. When Portuguese troops 
surreptitiously began inciting Brasilianen to join a revolt against Dutch occupation, many agreed 
to fight. On October 5, 1642, a combined force of Brasilianen and Portuguese troops fired the 
opening salvos of a revolt that led Company leaders to abandon Maranhão in April 1644. The 
conflict soon boiled over into neighboring Ceará despite the Company’s attempt to appease 
Brazil’s indigenous populations by issuing a proclamation of freedoms and exemptions. By the 
following year the indigenous resistance movements had erupted into a colony-wide Portuguese 
revolt against Dutch occupation known as the Planters’ Revolt. Hostilities finally ended in 1654 
when the Company completely withdrew from Brazil.  
 On Curaçao, the subject of part III, the indigenous Caquetios responded to Dutch 
vulnerabilities and a three-year drought between 1642 and 1645 by deploying prototypical 
“weapons of the weak.”4 Spanish slave traders began exploiting Curaçao’s indigenous population 
                                                            
4 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 1987). 
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in the sixteenth century and, as a result, the Native population had dwindled to approximately 
400 when the Dutch seized the island in 1634. Once the Dutch solidified their control, they 
deported 300 “unruly” Natives who they deemed inhospitable to the Dutch and friendly to the 
Spanish. The Company used the remaining Caquetios as forced laborers. A few were kept near 
the main Dutch fort as house servants and the Company enlisted many more to wrangle the 
island’s Spanish-introduced livestock population. Steer, cows, sheep, and wild horses all proved 
valuable calorie sources during times of dearth. Forced into submission and diminished in 
number, the Caquetios could not overcome the well-armed Company militia through violence. 
Instead, they employed threats of Spanish collusion, foot-dragging, desertion, and false 
compliance as a means of resistance. Caquetios’ resistance proved fruitful when a three-year long 
drought (1642-1645) plagued the island’s European inhabitants. Company leaders feared a 
looming famine and the possibility that the Caquetios might alert the Spanish of the Company’s 
tenuous position on the island. Company leaders gave into Caquetios demands for greater 
freedoms and the return of a number of their kin in order to appease the Caquetios, gain access to 
their food supply, and prevent them from alerting and aiding the Spanish. If the Dutch had been 
better supplied or the island had proven more agriculturally productive, it is uncertain the 
Caquetios’ demands would have been so readily met, if at all.  
 Part IV moves away from the Caribbean and South America to the Hudson Valley. In 1609, 
Henry Hudson, an English sailor serving the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie or VOC), sailed up his namesake river. He claimed the region for the Dutch 
Republic based on first discovery despite the presence of a diverse population of Algonquin- and 
Iroquois-speaking groups.5 It took the Dutch Republic another 12 years, mostly due to the 
                                                            
5 Adriaen Van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, ed. Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna, 
trans. Diederik Willem Goedhuys (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 2. 
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ongoing Dutch Revolt (1564-1644), before the States General formally incorporated the Hudson 
Valley into the Dutch West India Company.6 Early Dutch colonists named the region New 
Netherland for its supposed climatic, agricultural, maritime, and mercantile similarities to the 
Netherlands.7 New Netherland, however, proved a difficult place to reap crops regardless of what 
early Dutch boosters claimed about the region’s ripe agricultural possibilities. As a result, at least 
initially, the colony attracted more traders than farmers. The arrival of traders and increased 
Company efforts to promote trade and settlement in the region corresponded with episodic 
droughts (1624-25, 1627-35, 1644-45, 1647-50, 1652-54, 1660-63) and prolonged winters (1633, 
1637-38, 1641-42).8 In addition to the threats extreme weather posed for the Hudson Valley’s 
indigenous and European inhabitants, on-going inter-tribal conflicts between the Mohawk and 
Mahican to the north and diminished trade opportunities with the Munsee-speaking Lenape to 
the south also shaped the relationships between Dutch traders and indigenous peoples. New 
Netherland’s leaders responded to extreme weather events, concomitant harvest failures, and 
declining trade with Lenape based on their perception of the region’s changing ecological and 
political landscape. As the Mohawk solidified political control in the north and the Munsee’s 
trade value diminished in the south, private traders and Company leaders shifted their priorities. 
Their policies shifted so as to appease the Mohawk in order to ensure steady trade. The Company 
decreed the Munsee had to pay a tribute either in pelts, wampum, and maize to compensate for 
                                                            
6 The States General (Staten-Generaal) was the governing body of the Dutch Republic. It began as an assembly 
of provincial states loyal to the Spanish Habsburg’s. However, in 1576 during the Dutch Revolt, the States General 
rebelled against the Spanish crown. In 1579, the southern provinces agreed to return to Spanish rule. The northern 
provinces, united by the Union of Utrecht, continued the rebellion. The Dutch Republic began targeting Portuguese 
colonies in addition to Spanish colonies between 1580 and 1640 as a result of the Iberian Union – a dynastic union 
of crowns that united Portugal and Spain.  
7 Van der Donck, Description, 2. 





the Company’s expenses in ensuring the Munsee’s protection. The Munsee refused to submit. An 
epidemic, likely smallpox, brought devastation in 1633 that drought and a bitter winter made 
worse. Survivors later recounted that nine out of ten Munsee died. In addition to being 
numerically weakened, the cultural shock and knowledge loss led to the Munsee’s continuous 
decline.  
 When Willem Kieft (1597-1647), the Company’s director of New Netherland since 1638, 
issued a tribute demand in September of 1639, the Munsee and Wappinger formed an inter-tribal 
alliance and launched targeted attacks on Dutch settlements. Their attacks demoralized the 
Company and decreased the flow of settlers into the colony but ultimately failed to push the 
Company to abandon the colony. In 1644, Kieft asked Captain John Underhill, leader of the 
deadly Mystic Massacre against the Pequot in Connecticut in 1637, to reprise his assault, this 
time on the Tankiteke who resided in modern-day Stamford, Connecticut. Underhill’s assault left 
somewhere between 600 and 700 Munsee dead. By the following year, peace treaties had been 
signed with nearly all warring parties. Additional conflicts associated with extreme weather 
erupted in the Hudson Valley over the next several decades, most notably the Peach War that 
occurred in 1655 and the prolonged Esopus War that lasted from 1659-1663. While New 
Netherland’s residents succeeded in suppressing the region’s indigenous populations, the 
conflicts ultimately weakened the Company’s position in the region. When a fleet of English 
ships arrived off the coast of Manhattan in 1664, Peter Stuyvesant, appointed director after 
Kieft’s controversial leadership during the conflict, signed an agreement to relinquish control of 
the colony. Its new English rulers moved quickly to rename the region New York.  
 Part V chronicles the three indigenous resistance movement’s collective consequences, 
places the events in a global context, and offers a few lessons regarding what climate history can 
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teach us about today’s unfolding climate crisis. The resistance movements marked a significant 
watershed moment in the history of the Dutch West India Company. Historian Jonathan Israel 
has pointed to the year 1646 as a standout year in the Dutch West India Company’s history. 
According to Israel, after several years of declining share prices due to Portuguese competition 
and fissuring of the Company’s hold in Brazil, the Company’s “directors accepted the 
transformation of the Company from a trading war-machine into a non-belligerent commercial 
organization.”9 In pointing to explanations based on economic ends, however, Israel misses the 
subtle, yet transformative power of local social movements. Indigenous peoples, in his 
estimation, end up mattering less (if at all) than share prices despite the strong ties that connected 
them.  
 The Company’s territorial expansion project reached a zenith in 1641 when climate-related 
indigenous resistance movements raised a formidable obstacle to further expansion. By 1645, the 
Brasilianen and Tapuya of Brazil had shifted their allegiances to support the Portuguese revolt 
against the Dutch. The Company attempted to maintain their indigenous alliances, but a failure to 
do so contributed to the Company’s 1654 withdrawal from Brazil. In New Netherland, the 
Company continued to fight off indigenous attacks on dispersed agricultural communities until 
they were forced to cede the colony to England in 1664 (though the Dutch briefly regained 
control of the colony from 1673 to 1674). In contrast to the loss of Brazil and the Hudson Valley, 
the Company maintained control of Curaçao after placating the Caquetíos and as of 2016 the 
island remained a constituent country of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. However, the 
Company ceased their plans to expand their Caribbean empire by 1645.  
                                                            
9 Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 170. 
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 The Company’s experiences between 1637 and 1645 precipitated a fundamental shift in 
Dutch perceptions of indigenous peoples and settlement colonialism in general. In 1674, the 
Company went bankrupt and was re-chartered a year later as the New or Second Dutch West 
India Company. The restructured Company abandoned the First Company’s efforts to establish 
settlement colonies in the Americas, with the exceptions of Surinam (which the Company 
received in 1667 as a result of the Second Anglo-Dutch War) and Sint Marteen (which the 
Spanish abandoned after the Dutch Revolt and the Dutch regained in 1648), and focused instead 
on maintaining the Netherlands’ remaining colonies including Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, St. 
Euastatius, and Saba in the Caribbean and Berbice, Essequibo, Demerara, Pomeroon in South 
America. The Second Company insisted on using those islands, most notably Curaçao, as part of 
their growing influence in the trans-Atlantic slave trade.10 The threat and heavy tolls associated 
with negotiating with the indigenous peoples contributed to the Company’s reconfiguration.   
 Weathering Extremes contributes to three historiographies: environmental history, 
ethnohistory, and Atlantic World history. The boundaries between these fields, as evidenced by 
the most recent scholarship coming out of each, are fluid and porous. In analyzing the 
increasingly globalized world of the seventeenth century what becomes increasingly clear is that 
strict historiographical boundaries – whether geographic or thematic – do more to obfuscate the 
complexity of the past than bring clarity to its constantly changing social, economic, political, 
and environmental dynamics. Placing an environmental and climatological interpretation of the 
case studies presented into conversation with other interpretative frameworks brings clarity to the 
yet-examined connections between conflict, climate, and colonialism in the Dutch Atlantic.  
                                                            
10 Gerrit Knaap, Henk den Heijer, and Michiel de Jong, Oorlogen Overzee: Militair Optreden Door Compagnie 
En Staat Buiten Europa, 1595-1814 (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Boom, 2015), 280-281. 
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 As a work of climate history, Weathering Extremes strives to answer three interconnected 
questions.11 First, what was the climatological context of the region and period under study? 
What was happening with the climate both on average and in the short-term? Were long-term 
abnormalities or short-term extreme weather events occurring? Or was the climate and weather 
stable and average? Answering these questions requires archival and natural sources. Climate 
historians have looked to artwork, paintings, diaries, and correspondences as well as records for 
grape harvests, religious ceremonies, indigenous petitions, and Nile floods to build climate 
reconstructions. Yet, traditional historical observations and references to weather events need to 
be corroborated with less biased sources. A colonist might passingly refer to the worst winter in 
the last ten years, but this type of observation is subject to observer bias and unreliable cultural 
memory. To better contextualize first-person weather reports, historical climatologists are 
working to create ever-more reliable climate reconstructions using proxy sources such as tree 
                                                            
11 Environmental and climate history are relatively young disciplines. While each has antecedents in classic 
texts, the generally recognized foundational works of each field, such as Donald Worster’s Nature’s Economy and 
Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie’s Times of Feast, Times of Famine, respectively, tend to date to the 1970s, see: Donald 
Worster, Nature’s Economy: The Roots of Ecology (San Francisco, California: Sierra Club Books, 1977); Emmanuel 
LeRoy Ladurie, Times of Feast, Times of Famine: A History of Climate Since the Year 1000 (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, 1971). Despite the two fields’ proximate ages, environmental history has attracted far more 
acolytes than climate history. As such, climate history has generally assumed a place as a subfield within the general 
field of environmental history. However, in recent years climate history has seen a surge of interest as a result of the 
growing threat of global climate change. While a “climate history association” does not yet exist, the subfield has 
made in-roads to establish its interpretative importance. Small, thematic conferences have been convened, climate 
history panels have been assembled at national and international conferences, special thematic issues of top flagship 
journals have been dedicated to climate history research, and a growing online network has moved to consolidate 
interest. There is no agreed-upon definition of climate history and climate historians have examined the subject 
through a variety of temporal, geographic, and thematic lenses. Some are focused on the intellectual roots of climate 
and examine how climate as a scientific and cultural construction has been used and abused. Others are more 
concerned with the materiality of climate such as the ways in which climate shapes the human experience and vice 
versa. Still others are devoted to using written archival sources to reconstruct past climates. Temporally, climate 
historians have examined everything from short-term extreme weather events to centuries-long climate changes 
while, geographically, studies range from global to regional in focus. For one of the most recent overviews of 
climate history, see: Mark Carey, “Climate and History: A Critical Review of Historical Climatology and Climate 
Change Historiography,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 3, no. 3 (May 2012): 233–49.  As a sign 
of the field’s growing acceptance, two academic journals have recently dedicated issues to climate history, see: 
Mark Carey et al., “Forum: Climate Change and Environmental History,” Environmental History 19, no. 2 (April 1, 
2014): 282–364; “The Little Ice Age: Climate and History Reconsidered,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 44, 
no. 3 (Winter 2014): 301–68. 
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rings, pollen samples, ice cores, speleothems (stalagmites and stalactites found in caves), and 
coral reefs. While constantly-improving methods and practices have increased the reliability of 
these sources, they are still prone to sampling and statistical errors. The most reliable indication 
of past climates exists where archival and natural sources correspond. 
 Secondly, each chapter analyzes contemporary observers’ awareness of their own 
climatological surroundings. Did contemporaries notice changes in weather or climate, and if so, 
how did they understand those changes? What did they see as the causes of extreme weather 
events, natural disasters, or abnormal climatic periods? Were droughts or deluges divine 
retribution for sinful practices? Were hurricanes, typhoons, and other natural disasters 
eschatological warnings of the end-of-days? Or, were these events simply the product of natural 
forces? An historical answer to these questions is typically easier for societies with written 
records. Extensive scholarship on the Little Ice Age in Europe has revealed the shifting 
understanding of natural disasters away from divine retribution towards a scientific analysis of 
natural phenomenon concomitant with the Scientific Revolution. For indigenous societies in the 
Americas, the answers to these questions becomes more difficult. I have leaned heavily on 
ethnohistorical methods to answer questions regarding the attitudes and perspectives of 
indigenous groups. These methods often involved side-streaming – using information from one 
group to gain insights into other, culturally-related groups – or up-streaming – working 
retroactively using ethnographic information from the same cultural group, but from later 
periods. In these cases, I have tried to indicate the source and time period of this information.  
 Thirdly, Weathering Extremes focuses on how people and populations responded to 
climate-related phenomenon and how and why these responses might have changed over time. 
Human responses to extreme weather could be shaped by a number of factors including political 
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and physical geography, past experiences, individual temperament, institutional policies and 
practices, and constraints imposed by extreme weather. Several concepts have emerged to 
categorize and assess societal responses to climatic events including: vulnerability, resilience, 
adaptive capacity, and transformability.12 Social groups’ capacities to respond to changing 
climates and extreme weather events along with their unique cultural attributes influenced the 
ways in which they ultimately chose to respond. The wide variety of responses outlined in each 
case study and the ways in which colonialism influenced these responses points to the contingent 
impact of climate on societies. Some groups changed their subsistence practices and strategies to 
meet the demands of a changed ecosystem. Others responded through more violent and 
militaristic means in order to steal from or solidify control over nearby food supplies. And, still 
others required complete cultural transformations in order to adapt to an altered context created 
by the dual-threat of climate and colonialism.  
 Scholars have explored the relationship between climate and human history in a variety of 
time periods and places stretching from before the Roman Empire to the present. However, this 
dissertation contributes to two specific debates within the expanding field of climate history. 
First, it contributes to scholarship on the Little Ice Age (~1350-1800). Secondly, it contributes to 
understandings about the impact of El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events on human 
history.  
                                                            
12 Vulnerability suggests a society is at risk of climate-related disturbances. Societies that lived on the edge of 
their environment’s carrying capacity or who relied predominately on a single source of food might be classified as 
vulnerable populations. Resilience has been defined as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and 
reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and 
feedbacks.” Adaptive capacity or adaptability is the ability of actors to influence or manage resilience or to enact 
resilience strategies. Transformability is the ability of a society to “create a fundamentally new system when 
ecological, economic, or social structures make the existing system untenable,” see, Georgina H. Endfield, 
“Exploring Particularity: Vulnerability, Resilience, and Memory in Climate Change Discourses,” Environmental 
History 19, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 303–9. For definitions, see Brian Walker et al., “Resilience, Adaptability and 
Transformability in Social–Ecological Systems,” Ecology and Society 9, no. 2 (2004): 5. 
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 The Little Ice Age provided fertile ground for the earliest climate histories including 
Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie's classic Times of Feast, Times of Famine and the work of Christian 
Pfister.13 These works argued that abnormally cold climate wreaked havoc on Europe’s 
agriculturally-based economies. Scholars of the Dutch Republic, however, offered a counter-
thesis. While the Dutch Republic might have experienced similarly abnormal cold temperatures 
during this period, it also experienced a Golden Age.14 In some respects, the Dutch Republic was 
the great beneficiary of the age’s troubles when compared to other European powers. It escaped 
the seventeenth century relatively unscathed by the ills of harvest failures and warfare and 
emerged as a successful and independent state after an 80-year revolt against the Spanish empire 
(1568-1648). Arguments for Dutch exceptionalism and resilience during the Little Ice Age point 
to the Republic’s strong Baltic grain trade that dated to the late fifteenth century and sheltered 
Netherlanders from climate-related harvest failures, an influx of wealth that poured into the 
Netherlands’ northern cities (most notably Amsterdam) following the Sack of Antwerp (1576), 
and trade embargoes with Spain (1585-1590; 1598-1609; 1621-1647) that fueled investment in 
overseas expansion.15 Together, these events financed the Dutch Golden Age; Johannes 
Vermeer’s and Frans Hals’ portraits; Hendrick Avercamp and Pieter Saenredam’s landscape 
paintings; and naval expeditions led by maritime heroes like Michiel de Ruyter and Piet Hein. 
 Historians such as Dagomar Degroot have complicated the Dutch Republic’s relationship 
to the Little Ice Age. While the Baltic grain trade did insulate the Republic from some of the 
age’s worst effects, Degroot argues that storms, floods, and ice had noticeable impacts on the 
                                                            
13 Ladurie, Times of Feast; Christian Pfister, “Climate and Economy in Eighteenth-Century Switzerland,” 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 9, no. 2 (1978): 223–43. 
14 Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1-11. 
15 Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the 
Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 195-210, 350-376, 396-402. 
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strength of the trade. The Baltic trade stagnated as a result of increased frequency of storms and 
prolonged presence of sea ice in which ships found themselves stuck on multiple occasions. 
Climate-induced food shortages in the Republic, in other words, could not always be reliably 
supplemented by imported Baltic grain. Yet, the Republic could still benefit from Baltic delays 
by leveraging its position as a middleman in the bulk trade.16  
 Weathering Extremes contributes to the critique of seventeenth-century Dutch 
exceptionalism. The attention devoted to the Republic’s domestic resiliency during the Little Ice 
Age has at times overshadowed the troubled waters of its overseas investments that were battered 
by extreme weather events and indigenous resistance movements. I complement Degroot’s 
skepticism by contending that the impacts of climate-induced ecological change on Dutch 
colonial outposts paints a drastically different picture of the Dutch Golden Age. In the Americas, 
ecological changes wrought by climatic fluctuations mingled with colonial policies to threatened 
the Company.  
 Focusing on climate history in the Americas helps fill a glaring gap in climate history. The 
earliest works of climate history were distinctly European in their focus, mostly due to the 
relative availability of both human and natural archival material specific to Europe. In recent 
years, as proxy data for non-European locales has increased, climate historians have begun to 
reconstruct globally-oriented histories of climate. Yet, there still remains unexplored questions 
regarding the Little Ice Age’s impact on European colonization in the Americas. In Global 
Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century, Geoffrey Parker 
examines the global fate of humanity during the so-called “General Crisis” of the seventeenth 
                                                            
16 Dagomar Degroot, “The Frigid Golden Age: Experiencing Climate Change in the Dutch Republic, 1560-
1720” (PhD Diss, York University, 2014), ch. 3. 
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century.17 While Parker emphasizes that unprecedented violence during the seventeenth century 
was a global phenomenon, he concluded that the impact of global cooling in the Americas 
“remains obscure.”18 Yet, colonial America is ripe for additional research that can take advantage 
of colonial records, proxy records, and climate reconstructions.19  
 This dissertation adds to a burgeoning interest in the Little Ice Age’s impact on European 
colonialism by examining how peoples in places touched by Dutch overseas expansion 
responded to climate and colonialism.20 Georgina Endfield spearheaded this endeavor in her 
investigation into the intersection of climatic change and society in colonial Mexico. Endfield 
proves how important it is to pay nuanced attention to societal process such as demography, 
economics, and politics in examining these relationships. Endfield concludes that the mingling of 
climatic change, European colonial policies, and pre-existing indigenous worldviews led to 
broadly disparate sets of responses to a changing world.21 Individuals in the Americas 
experienced the Little Ice Age in slightly different ways than individuals in Europe. Whereas 
Europe experienced temperatures approximately a half to one-and-a-half degree Celsius below 
normal on average, the Americas experienced not only colder winters and cooler summers, but 
                                                            
17 For an introduction to the General Crisis of the seventeenth century, see: Jack A Goldstone, Revolution and 
Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Geoffrey Parker, Global 
Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 2013). 
18 Parker, Global Crisis, 445. 
19 Christian Pfister, “The Vulnerability of Past Societies to Climatic Variation: A New Focus for Historical 
Climatology in the Twenty-First Century,” Climatic Change 100, no. 1 (May 1, 2010): 25–31. 
20 Environmental historians have contributed excellent works to the relationship between nature and 
colonialism. The classic works include Alfred Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural 
Consequences of 1492 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003); Alfred Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The 
Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and John 
F. Richards, The Unending Frontier: An Environmental History of the Early Modern World (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 2003). 
21 Georgina Endfield, Climate and Society in Colonial Mexico: A Study in Vulnerability (Malden, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2008). 
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also periodically long, dry conditions. This distinction has led some to substitute the term Little 
Drought Age to describe this period in the Americas.22  
 Peripheral zones and colonial regions are especially fruitful locations to examine climate 
history. Alan Mikhail, a leading authority on climate and the Ottoman Empire, argues and I 
concur that extreme weather events have the potential to create vulnerabilities and opportunities 
in peripheral zones where central authorities maintained a tenuous hold. According to Mikhail, 
the 1783/84 eruption of Iceland’s Laki volcano contributed to reduced Nile floods, harvest 
failures, plague epidemics, and the emergence of local Egyptian elites who exerted independence 
from the central power of the Ottoman. Collectively, these events catalyzed Egypt’s transition 
towards semi-independence by the end of the eighteenth century.23 The geographical distance 
between Brazil, Curaçao, and New Netherland from the Netherlands offers interesting case 
studies to build upon the questions of peripheral vulnerability raised by Mikhail. This 
dissertation demonstrates that the inability of the Dutch West India Company to resupply its 
colonies due to financial constraints and geographic distance made the Company’s colonies 
vulnerable to extreme weather and indigenous resistance.24  
 Sherry Johnson has proposed using transition periods when climate shifts from one norm to 
another, known as pivot phases, to identify particularly fruitful time periods for climate histories. 
Extreme weather events can become increasingly prevalent during pivot phases and can be a 
“catalyst for historical processes.”25 Zooming in on peoples and regions that experienced pivot 
                                                            
22 Georgina H. Endfield and Sarah L. O’Hara, “Conflicts Over Water in the ‘The Little Drought Age’ in Central 
Mexico,” Environment and History 3 (1997): 255–72. 
23 Alan Mikhail, “Ottoman Iceland: A Climate History,” Environmental History 20 (2015): 262–84, 
doi:10.1093/envhis/emv006, 271-273. 
24 Sam White has identified similar difficulties with colonial provisioning in his study of the Ottoman Empire’s 
collapse in the early seventeenth century, see: Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman 
Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
25 Sherry Johnson, “When Good Climates Go Bad: Pivot Phases, Extreme Events, and the Opportunities for 
Climate History,” Environmental History 19, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 329–37. 
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phases allows climate historians to highlight the importance of human contingency in responding 
to extreme weather. Johnson proves the need for careful analysis of societal responses during 
pivot phases in her brief, yet insightful examination of extreme weather conditions in English 
Carolina and Spanish Florida in the late 1730s. The 1630s and 1640s offer another pivot phase in 
climate history.   
 The 1630s and 1640s experienced turbulent variability in El Niño-Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) events. As such, Weathering Extremes adds to a growing literature that seeks to examine 
the impact of ENSO events on human history. In 2001, two foundational climate histories of El 
Niño were published. César N. Caviedes’s El Niño in History: Storming Through the Ages was, 
according to the author, “the first comprehensive account of the history of El Niño that shifts the 
research focus from the physical mechanisms of the phenomenon to its past and present impact 
on humans.”26 As an early contribution to a burgeoning field, Caviedes’s work identified possible 
connections between ENSO events and human history. His observations stretched from 
Napoleon’s siege of Moscow in 1812 to the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942 to centuries of drought 
in Sahelian Africa, northeast Brazil, and India. Mike Davis’s Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño 
Famines and the Making of the Third World took a narrower geographic and temporal focus to 
explore the Third World’s vulnerabilities to the El Niño drought-induced famines between 1876 
and 1878 that left millions dead in China, India, and Brazil.27 His work is not a case of 
environmental determinism, however. Davis judged harshly Europeans driven to these regions as 
well as Africa during the Age of New Imperialism (1888-1902). In his estimation, while Western 
powers were capable of responding to these crises in helpful ways, they instead leveraged their 
                                                            
26 César Caviedes, El Niño in History: Storming Through the Ages (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of 
Florida, 2001). 
27 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World (London and 
New York: Verso, 2001). 
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lofty ideals based on free trade liberalism to justify the exportation of life-saving crops back to 
Europe. Thus, El Niño droughts alone did not that kill millions in India, China, and Brazil, but 
rather the policies of Western capitalists. ENSO events in the 1630s and 1640s similarly did not 
determine the fate of European and Native encounters. Rather, Native and Europeans responded 
in culturally-contingent ways to deteriorating environmental conditions. 
 The causes of historical droughts are complex, but ENSO events are one of their leading 
causes in many regions of the world. As such, they have proved attractive to climate historians. 
Most early histories of ENSO events were based on archival material calibrated with one of two 
early El Niño chronologies, either one created by William Quinn in 1987 or an improved and 
revised chronology by Quinn and Neal published in 1992.28 These early chronologies were based 
primarily on hydrological phenomenon in Peru and Egypt. As new climate data has become 
available, calls for reevaluation and revision of Quinn’s work have grown.29 In 2009, Joëlle L. 
Gergis and Anthony M. Fowler published an updated and more refined chronology of El Niño 
events since 1525 CE based on multiple proxy records.30 Though this new chronology 
contradicts previous chronologies and is subject to criticism as well, it provides the most up-to-
date, methodological sophisticated, and nuanced analysis. 
 In 2011, building on the updated ENSO chronologies of Fowler and Gergis, Sherry 
Johnson published Climate and Catastrophe in Cuba and the Atlantic World in the Age of 
                                                            
28 For an example of a work that relied upon Quinn’s 1987 chronology, see: Richard Grove and John Chappell, 
eds., El Niño: History and Crisis (Cambridge, UK: White Horse Press, 2000). William Quinn, “El Nino Occurrences 
over the Past Four and a Half Centuries,” Journal of Geophysical Research 92, no. C13 (1987): 14449–63; William 
Quinn, “A Study of Southern Oscillation-Related Climatic Activity for AD 622-1900 Incorporating Nile River 
Flood Data,” in El Niño: Historical and Paleoclimate Aspects of the Southern Oscillation, ed. H. Diaz and V. 
Markgraf (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
29 Luc Ortlieb, “The Documented Historical Record of El Niño Events in Peru: An Update of the Quinn Record 
(Sixteenth through Nineteenth Centuries),” in El Niño and the Southern Oscillation: Multiscale Variability and 
Global and Regional Impacts, ed. Henry F. Diaz and Vera Markgraf (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 210-211. 
30 Joëlle L. Gergis and Anthony M. Fowler, “A History of ENSO Events Since A.D. 1525: Implications for 
Future Climate Change,” Climatic Change 92, no. 3–4 (February 2009): 371. 
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Revolution and swung the pendulum of environmental determinism back away from Davis’s 
focus on human responses.31 Johnson contended that the United States’ War of Independence, the 
French Revolution, and the Haitian Revolution, “events that have been attributed to political, 
economic, and/or social forces were impacted by, and often caused by, weather-induced 
environmental crises.”32 Johnson provided a reasonable argument for the role of droughts and 
hurricanes in shaping these events, but stretched the importance of weather in ultimately forcing 
the outcome of events. Where Davis might be criticized for underplaying the role of extreme 
weather, Johnson overplayed it. My ambition is to find a moderated position between the two 
where climate and weather neither loses nor overwhelms its role in history.  
 As the works of Caviedes, Davis, and Johnson suggest, the historiography of ENSO events 
has primarily been concerned with El Niño, ENSO’s warm phase, and to a large extent has 
ignored El Niño’s sister event, La Niña (ENSO cold phase).33 This has been especially true for 
northeastern Brazil. Yet, both El Niño and La Niña events led to drought and intense rains in 
different regions, intensities, and years. In other words, La Niña events also have historical 
importance. As climate reconstructions become more sophisticated and refined, historians should 
examine the impact of reconstructed La Niña events on human history in more depth.  
 Extreme weather has the potential to play an influential role in history by creating unstable 
social conditions.34 Indeed, famines have long been recognized as “engines of historical 
                                                            
31 Sherry Johnson, Climate and Catastrophe in Cuba and the Atlantic World in the Age of Revolution (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
32 Ibid., 2. 
33 Caviedes devotes an entire chapter to La Niña, but the bulk of his work is devoted to an examination of El 
Niño’s role, specifically, see: Caviedes, El Niño in History, 146-171. 
34 The connection between droughts and famines has been perceived as a primary driver of such instability. The 
popular works of Jared Diamond, Brian Fagan, and others have created an association between drought and societal 
collapse, see: Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin Books, 
2005). In the Americas, Fagan relied upon a host of historical climatology research to attribute the collapse of the 
Maya, Moche, and Ancestral Pueblo to prolonged periods of drought, see: Brian M. Fagan, Floods, Famines, and 
Emperors: El Niño and the Fate of Civilizations, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 143-168. New climate 
research in the southern Levant has suggested that a drought episode between 1250-1100 BCE could be responsible 
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transformation.”35 B.J. Barickman, in his examination of subsistence production in the 
Recôncavo region of Bahia, Brazil, argues for the importance of food scarcity in understanding 
the history of rebellion.36 Yet, the connection between climate change, famine, and violence has 
been subject to increased scrutiny. Specifically, historians have challenged the tendency to see a 
predetermined connection or causal mechanism between climate change, famine events, and 
rebellion. These recent critiques state that famine events do not necessarily go “hand-in-hand 
with climatic changes and anomalies.”37 Such a causal relationship is and should be prone to 
critiques of environmental determinism. If such a causal mechanism was at work, one would 
expect famine to always follow climatic shifts. Of course, that is not the case. Deploying a two-
prong explanation of famines that examines both internal/endogenous and external/exogenous 
mechanisms provides a more holistic and accurate explanation of such events.38 In the case of the 
seventeenth-century Dutch Atlantic, diverse factors were at play. The Dutch West India Company 
                                                            
for the collapse of Late Bronze Age civilizations, see: Dafna Langgut, Israel Finkelstein, and Thomas Litt, “Climate 
and the Late Bronze Age Collapse: New Evidence from the Southern Levant,” Tel Aviv 40 (2013): 149–75. Drought, 
however, is not the only extreme weather event associated with societal collapse nor does it deterministically 
presage collapse. The decline of the Greenland Norse by the fifteenth century has correlated to a cooling climate that 
blocked Norse sea passages, relocated key fishing holes, and wreaked havoc on agriculture. Climate reconstructions 
for Eurasia based on tree-ring samples from the Russian Altai and European Alps has correlated societal disruptions 
in Europe and Asia with a prolonged cooling episode from 536 to about 660 CE. The authors of this study identify 
the period as the “Late Antique Little Ice Age” and suggest colder temperatures contributed to “the establishment of 
the Justinian plague, transformation of the eastern Roman Empire and collapse of the Sasanian Empire, movements 
out of the Asian steppe and Arabian Peninsula, spread of Slavic-speaking peoples and political upheavals in China,” 
see: Ulf Büntgen et al., “Cooling and Societal Change during the Late Antique Little Ice Age from 536 to around 
660 AD,” Nature Geoscience 9, no. 3 (March 2016): 231–36. For alternative perspectives on societal collapse that 
stress resilience see: Patricia A. McAnany and Norman Yoffee, eds., Questioning Collapse: Human Resilience, 
Ecological Vulnerability, and the Aftermath of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Karl W. 
Butzer and Georgina H. Endfield, “Critical Perspectives on Historical Collapse,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 109, no. 10 (March 6, 2012): 3628–31; Brian Walker et al., “Resilience, Adaptability and 
Transformability.” 
35 David Arnold, Famine: Social Crisis and Historical Change (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988), quoted in 
Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, 15. 
36 B.J. Barickman, A Bahian Counterpoint: Sugar, Tobacco, Cassava, and Slavery in the Recôncavo, 1780-1860 
(Stanford: California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 77. 
37 Philip Slavin, “Climate and Famines: A Historical Reassessment,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate 
Change 7, no. 3 (May 1, 2016): 433–47. 
38 Tim Newfield and Inga Labuhn, “Towards a Messy History of Crisis and Climate in Carolingian Europe,” 




suffered from internal economic hurdles and disagreements as well as external climatic concerns 
and diplomatic obstacles. A thorough examination of all contributing factors provides a less 
deterministic and more accurate understanding of the connections between climate, indigenous 
resistance, colonial violence, and the Company’s 1674 bankruptcy.  
 Global climate events manifested themselves in diverse, regional, and at times incredibly 
localized ways. The diverse ways in which climate manifests itself is equal only to the diverse 
ways in which humans could and have responded. Local perspectives can provide nuanced 
understanding to the interplay between climate change and human responses by demonstrating 
the roles of adaptation, vulnerability, and resilience that can be overshadowed in larger, global 
histories of climate change.39 The three case studies of this dissertation draw attention to the need 
for local perspectives on global events and illustrate the diverse paths of response. Recognizing 
the diversity of societal responses to extreme weather not only complicates questions of 
environmental or climatic determinism, but also provides a more holistic understanding of 
historical change. Indigenous resistance, colonial violence, and history in general are complex 
and often multi-causal events. Just as economics, politics, and culture matter in shaping history, 
so do climate and extreme weather. In this dissertation, my contention is not that climate matters 
more than culture but rather that each is but one of many causative agents in human history. Put 
simply, extreme weather and people matter in the history of Dutch-indigenous relations in the 
Americas.  
 Connections between environmental and indigenous peoples history during the colonial 
period were forged early on in environmental history’s inchoate years and important work 
                                                            
39 Sherry Johnson, “When Good Climates Go Bad,” 304-305. 
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continues at the intersection of these fields.40 Climate history, however, has not always been a 
welcomed contribution to the fields. Indeed, arguing for climate’s role as a causal agent is often 
met with skepticism. David Nichols reinforced such skepticism in a recent blog post in which he 
argued that while climate might have influenced seventeenth-century European events, the 
“internecine strife in eastern North America,” including the slaving wars of the Iroquois, 
Cherokee, and Chickasaw, were “a second-order consequence of European invasion rather than 
of climatic stress.”41 Nichols’ critiques reveal the need for additional examinations into how 
climate shaped European and indigenous relationships in early America as well as how these 
relationships affected pre-existing inter-tribal conflicts.  
 Katherine A. Grandjean began to fill the gap between climate history and indigenous 
peoples history in her 2011 article “New World Tempests: Environment, Scarcity, and the 
Coming of the Pequot War.” Grandjean argued that the Pequot War was partially caused by a 
1635 hurricane that destroyed that year’s crops and then an abnormally cold winter that caused 
crops to fail and cattle to perish.42 While Grandjean does not position her argument within the 
larger historiography of climate history, she is clearly making contributions to the field. As 
Grandjean’s work demonstrates, climatic frameworks can offer new insights into old questions. 
Climate history can also complicate new arguments. For example, Virginia Anderson’s 
compelling work Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America 
demonstrates the ecologically destructive nature of colonial livestock and the potentially 
conflict-inducing consequences of allowing pigs and cows to roam free and trample indigenous 
                                                            
40 Two classic and defining works include William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists and the 
Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983); Crosby, The Columbian Exchange. 
41 David Nichols, “Slightly Vaster Early America,” H-AmIndian, The Turtle Islander Examiner, May 8, 2016, 
https://networks.h-net.org/node/2718/blog/turtle-island-examiner/123927/slightly-vaster-early-america. 
42 Katherine A. Grandjean, “New World Tempests: Environment, Scarcity, and the Coming of the Pequot War,” 
The William and Mary Quarterly 68, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 75–100. 
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agricultural plots.43 Weathering Extremes builds a bridge between the work of Grandjean and 
Anderson. The destruction wrought by extreme weather events like Grandjean’s 1635 hurricane 
had the potential to exacerbate the tensions caused by Anderson’s domestic livestock. 
Additionally, extreme weather events had the powerful potential to create famine conditions that 
could weaken indigenous peoples’ immune systems in the face of epidemic diseases. The 
accumulation of ecological destruction and climate-induced famines created tense situations that 
if handled poorly could erupt in episodes of colonial violence. 
 Colonial violence was not inevitable but rather a final resort. Richard White’s The Middle 
Ground challenged a singular focus on colonial violence by encouraging historians to examine 
themes of diplomacy, negotiation, cultural accommodation, acculturation, and cultural 
persistence in the context and aftermath of European colonization. Company leaders in the Dutch 
Atlantic often evoked processes of negotiation and diplomacy, but the threat of violence 
remained a constant reality and, perhaps more than hopes of peace, the fear of violence informed 
everyday decisions of cultural interaction.44  
 Narratives of violent encounters between the Dutch West India Company and indigenous 
peoples have emerged alongside the literature’s growing emphasis on colonial violence.45 Central 
to this dissertation is not only the attention paid to colonial violence, but explanations for 
violence. Evan Haefeli began his examination of violence during Kieft’s War (1640-1645) in 
                                                            
43 Anderson, Creatures of Empire. 
44 For example, see: Tom Arne Midtrød, The Memory of All Ancient Customs: Native American Diplomacy in 
the Colonial Hudson Valley (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2012); and Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a 
Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century America (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1993). For the role of negotiation and diplomacy in other regions, see: Kathleen DuVal, The Native 
Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006); and James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the Pennsylvania 
Frontier (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999). 
45 For examples of renewed emphasis on colonial violence, see: Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How 
Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008); and Ned Blackhawk, Violence 




New Netherland by recognizing that “violence is not just a random or inhuman act…but can also 
be a vivid expression of cultural values…conditioned by a group’s history, cultural, and social 
structure.” While many Dutch colonists openly opposed the conflict, Willem Kieft, the war’s 
chief perpetuator and namesake proponent, fiercely defended violent acts. But what were the 
causes of so much bloodshed? In Haefeli’s estimation, “economics was the proximate cause” of 
the conflict.46 Donna Merwick’s The Shame and the Sorrow: Dutch-Amerindian Encounters in 
New Netherland returned to the subject of violence and brutality in New Netherland by analyzing 
cross-cultural interactions through a postcolonial lens. Merwick attempted to judge the actions of 
New Netherland’s colonists and ultimately declared that the violence they perpetuated was the 
result of a betrayal of “themselves – their ideal and values – and the indigenous peoples.”47  
 The studies of violence in early American history and the Dutch Atlantic has provided a 
host of explanations for brutal and bloody encounters. Andrew Lipman argues in his Bancroft 
Prize-winning work The Saltwater Frontier: Indians and the Contest for the American Coast that 
a new spatial understanding of the eastern seaborne can help explain the basic question: “Why 
was the first century of colonization so violent?”48 Lipman answers that is was the physical shore 
                                                            
46 Evan Haefeli, “Kieft’s War and the Cultures of Violence in Colonial America,” in Lethal Imagination: 
Violence and Brutality in American History, ed. Michael A. Bellesiles (New York: New York University Press, 
1999), 18. 
47 Donna Merwick, The Shame and the Sorrow: Dutch-Amerindian Encounters in New Netherland 
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 3. Mark Meuwese has examined the role of 
violence in Dutch Brazil, see: Mark Meuwese, “Fear, Uncertainty, and Violence in the Dutch Colonization of Brazil 
(1624–1662),” in Fear and the Shaping of Early American Societies, ed. Lauric Henneton and L. H. Roper (Leiden, 
the Netherlands: BRILL, 2016), 93–114. Moving away from violence in the context of the Americas, Alison Games 
and Mark Meuwese have sought to explain violent encounters in the Dutch East Indies. In a comparative work, 
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Amboyna, the Dutch East India executed twenty-one employees of the Dutch East India Company after they were 
found guilty of conspiring with the Japanese to seize the trading post, see: Alison Games, “Violence on the Fringes: 
The Virginia (1622) and Amboyna (1623) Massacres,” History 99, no. 336 (July 1, 2014): 505–29. More recently, 
Mark Meuwese has been working to re-conceptualize violence perpetuated by the Dutch against indigenous peoples 
in both the East and West as acts of genocide, see: Mark Meuwese, “How and Why Did the Dutch East India 
Company Commit Genocide on the Banda Islands in 1621?” (Forum on European Expansion and Global 
Interactions, Irvine, California, 2016). 
48 Andrew Lipman, The Saltwater Frontier: Indians and the Contest for the American Coast (New Haven and 
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along with “its geological quirks, economic resources, and ecological changes” that “shaped the 
fates of those who inhabited it in the seventeenth century.”49 Cultural, economic, political, and 
even spatial explanations, however, fail to provide an explanation for the timing and excessive 
nature of the violence they describe. Climate-induce food scarcity helps explain not only the 
timing of colonial violence, but also why indigenous peoples were willing to participate and 
persist in such violent struggles in the midst of declining populations.50  
 Indigenous peoples turned to spiritual leaders to understand dramatic population loss and  
extreme weather events.51 The decision by indigenous peoples to turn to violence as a means of 
resistance has been connected to spiritual renewal movements across the Americas. After all, as 
Lipman suggests, for most Natives, “killing on a large scale was a wasteful and dangerous act,” 
that “only served to perpetuate violence.”52 Prophetic messages by charismatic spiritual leaders 
warned Natives that the acceptance of European beliefs and customs had eroded indigenous 
cultures and the only recourse was the resistance of foreign influence and a return to traditional 
ways.53  Similar spiritual beliefs motivated indigenous resistance movements in New Netherland 
and Brazil, though a paucity of evidence for the indigenous peoples on Curaçao precludes similar 
analysis. Though, one can reasonably assume a similar spiritual context existed there. Spiritual 
beliefs alone, however, do not explain the timing of such movements – extreme weather events 
do. Extreme weather can also help explain the ferocity of resistance. These were not simply 
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movements to restore a cultural pastime, but instead to ensure the future survival of entire 
cultures.  
 Finally, this dissertation deploys an intercolonial analysis to contribute to Atlantic and 
Dutch Atlantic history specifically.54 Benjamin Schmidt has argued that the Dutch West India 
Company’s territorial claims were the literal embodiment of what is meant by the Atlantic 
world.55 Yet the majority of work framed within the concept of the Dutch Atlantic has been 
focused on the Netherlands’ role in Atlantic trade and the trans-Atlantic slave trade.56 More often 
than not, Dutch Atlantic histories are more comparative than connective in their examinations. 
Mark Meuwese’s Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade falls into this comparative framework.57 
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This is not to say that comparative histories cannot provide fruitful insights. Meuwese 
demonstrated as much in his analysis of cultural go-betweens in New Netherland, Brazil, Angola, 
Congo, and the Gold Coast as has Jeroen Dewulf in his prize-winning article on Dutch slave 
policies in Brazil and New Netherland.58 While recognizing the important contributions 
indigenous peoples made to the Dutch Atlantic enterprise, as unearthed by Meuwese, this project 
explores what happened when good relations turned bad. Weathering Extremes also seeks to 
demonstrate the connections between various nodes in the Dutch Atlantic. Susan Shaw Romney 
deployed entangled history in New Netherland Connections to uncover the “webs of 
connections” between New Netherland, Brazil, Africa, and the Netherlands.59 These “intimate 
connections,” she argued, stitched together the “vast geographic and cultural distances” they 
spanned.60 In The Saltwater Frontier, Lipman built on entangled history in his study of European 
and indigenous relations along the northeastern coast of today’s United States. By viewing the 
Hudson Valley from the sea rather than from the land, Lipman offers “a new way of thinking 
about Indian history and a new way of understanding this all-too-familiar region.”61 This 
dissertation uses a new array of sources to complement these new entangled and intimately 
connected histories. In doing so, it reveals how three simultaneous, though geographically 
disparate resistance movements could collectively begin to unwind the Dutch Republic’s Atlantic 
empire.  
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 Weathering Extremes draws on two sorts of archives: the traditional ‘human’ archives of 
states, peoples, and institutions as well as proxy data – what Geoffrey Parker has referred to as 
the ‘natural’ archives of trees, bogs, and ice.62 Neither is a perfect record of the past. Each has its 
own interpretive, analytical, and sampling errors, dilemmas, and challenges. Deploying both and 
finding commonalities between them, however, can help in separating signals from noise.63 Each 
case study required its own set of ‘human’ and ‘natural’ archival documents. The majority of 
‘human’ archival material came from colonial records kept by the Dutch West India Company, 
while the unique landscape and geology of each region required a unique mix of ‘natural’ 
records.  
 In the case of Dutch Brazil, I relied upon the incoming letters of military and colonial 
officials to the Company Council in Brazil and the Council’s outgoing letters and minutes of the 
Council to the States General in the Dutch Republic. These documents were organized in Brazil 
and then shipped to the States General where they were kept as bijlagen or attachments alongside 
copies of the States General’s responses back to Brazil. For a regular, day-to-day accounting of 
activities in Brazil, including information regarding weather and indigenous resistance 
movements, I relied upon the Notes and Secret Notes of the High and Secret Council of Brazil, a 
group that consisted of the governor and his council. A published English translation of Casper 
van Baerle’s The History of Brazil under the Governorship of Count Johan Maurits of Nassau, 
1636-1644, originally published in the Netherlands in Latin in 1647, proved an invaluable 
resource for the contemporary narrative of Dutch Brazil’s history while C. R. Boxer’s classic The 
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Dutch in Brazil introduced and guided me through Brazil’s longer history with the Dutch.64 
Climate reconstructions of the circum-Caribbean by Gerald Haug, long recognized as one of the 
region’s leading historical climatologist, provided necessary counterbalances to the biased 
weather reports of Dutch Brazil’s colonists and officials.65 
 Curaçao’s archival record for the period under study is relatively limited compared to those 
for Brazil and New Netherland. In addition to the limited archival material found in the Dutch 
National Archives, I leaned heavily on two published works. Johannes Hartog’s 1968 history of 
the island pointed me in the right direction to search for archival material pertaining to the 
Netherlands’ conquest of the island in 1634 and the subsequent relations between the islands 
Native Caquetios and denizens of the Dutch West India Company.66 The translation of 
documents pertaining to Curaçao found in the New York State Archives in Albany, New York by 
the New Netherland Institute’s Charles Gehring and Janny Venema was an indispensable volume 
and provided crucial evidence for the period between 1640 and 1665, including direct mentions 
of prolonged drought between 1641 and 1644.67 While the written record was clear about what 
contemporaries perceived as abnormally dry conditions on the island, the Cariaco Basin provided 
much needed collaboration for what might simply be perceived as erroneous reporting about 
what is naturally a semi-arid island. The Cariaco Basin is located off the north-central coast of 
Venezuela and has been a key source of proxy data for the Caribbean. It is an anoxic basin, 
meaning it is depleted of dissolved oxygen, and as such, sediments deposited in the basin 
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accumulate without bioturbation (disruption by animals or plants). An analysis of titanium and 
iron concentration in samples drawn from the Cariaco Basin can be used to reconstruct 
precipitation levels dating back fourteen-thousand years and indicate that Dutch officials were 
not exaggerating. Indeed, during the Little Ice Age the region was experiencing the worst period 
of drought since the Younger Dryas some 12.6 to 11.5 thousand years ago.68 
 The written archives of New Netherland can be found in partial fragments at the New York 
State Archives in Albany, New York and the Dutch National Archives in The Hague. Much of the 
archival record from the Netherlands’ States General were copied and sent to Albany and the 
pencil markings of the archivist searching for documents pertaining to New Netherland can still 
be seen on the pages of seventeenth-century documents in The Hague. Both archives experienced 
fires that destroyed and badly damaged the extant sources – one in the Netherlands in 1844 and 
one in Albany in 1911. Documents related to Willem Kieft’s War were lost to the sea along with 
Kieft and 85 other passengers out of 107 when the ship carrying them wrecked off the coast of 
Wales in 1647. Where the written record has succumbed to one disaster after another, the natural 
archives of the Hudson Valley are well documented and continue to grow. The North American 
Drought Atlas, an online database based on 835 annual tree-ring chronologies assembled into 
286 location-specific drought reconstructions dating back nearly 2,000 years offered a beautiful 
visualization of the droughts experienced by New Netherland’s earliest farmers and colonists.69 
Pollen samples from various marshes along the Hudson River including the Piermont Marsh on 
                                                            
68 Haug, “Southward Migration of the Intertropical Convergence Zone Through the Holocene,” 1304–8. 
69 “Grid Point 267,” North American Drought Atlas. For more on droughts in the Hudson Valley in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century see: Neil Pederson et al., “Is an Epic Pluvial Masking the Water Insecurity of the 




the western shore of the Hudson River approximately 40 miles north of Manhattan provided 
evidence for cooler conditions associated with the Little Ice Age.70 
 In addition to the ENSO chronology by Gergis and Fowler previously mentioned, 
paleoclimatological evidence for global climatic shifts came from ice core sediments. T.J. 
Crowley’s reconstruction of volcanic forcing based on sulphate records in Antarctica and 
Greenland indicated powerful volcanic eruptions in 1640.71 These sulphate deposits appear to 
have come from the eruption of Komaga-take, a volcano located on the Oshima Peninsula of 
southern Hokkaido, and Mount Parker located on the Mindanao island in the Philippines.  
 Jan de Vries quipped in 1981 that, “Through climatic history, economic history, or at least 
agrarian history, is reduced to being ‘one damn thing after another.’”72 I tend to agree with De 
Vries, but only in so far that climate has played a powerful role in the bulk of human events. This 
is as true today as it was 400 years ago. The weather was at work when Hendrick Avercamp 
painted Winter Landscape with Skaters (1608) in Kampen, Overijssel, the Netherlands and 
Rembrandt van Rijn worked away on his infamous Nightwatch (1642) in his Amsterdam studio. 
Weather was also at work when Henry Hudson piloted what would become his namesake river in 
1609 and the Brasilianen attacked the rain-crumbled Dutch fort in Maranhão in 1642. Climate, 
however, was not the only thing at work. So were histories of individuals, cultures, economics, 
and politics. 
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Part I: Context 
 
“The climate is changing. The climate has always changed. How we react to it is a 
cultural question, and a knowledge of history can be of some help.”73 
                                                            
73 Wolfgang Behringer, A Cultural History of Climate (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 217. 
 
 33 
1. Connections in the Dutch Atlantic 
The creation of the Dutch West India Company forged a web of local, regional, and global 
connections that shaped Dutch relations with indigenous peoples throughout the Atlantic. These 
webs first began to take shape in the Low Countries during the Dutch Republic’s 80-year 
struggle for independence against Spanish rule but quickly became entangled in global events. 
Dutch connections in the Atlantic followed in the mold of Dutch webs in the East.74 Investors 
concerned over profits and losses protected their interests by pulling on strings and ensnarling 
themselves in debates and conflicts. The Company’s policies guided colonial interactions and 
local leaders assumed wide latitude in handling pressing matters. Collectively, these 
circumstances catalyzed Dutch expansion, shaped the Company’s "Groot Desseyn" or “Grand 
Design” for the Americas, and influenced Company responses to extreme weather and 
indigenous resistance.  
 Prior to the seventeenth century, the Low Countries existed as a loose confederation of 
seventeen provinces organized under the Hapsburg Empire and known as the Spanish 
Netherlands. Over the course of the Dutch Revolt, the predominantly Catholic southern 
provinces broke ties with the Protestant northern provinces. In 1585, a successful Spanish siege 
on Antwerp, then Europe’s trading and economic center, pushed the Southern Netherlands to 
abort their role in the Revolt and reunite with Spain. At the same time, Spain’s victory at the 
Siege of Antwerp resulted in a massive northward migration of that city’s wealthy population. 
The Dutch Golden Age and the Dutch Republic’s overseas expansion owes much to this regional 
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web of connections and the influx of people, wealth, and skills which settled in the provinces of 
Holland and Zealand in the wake of Antwerp’s decline.75  
 While the United Provinces fought the Spanish king in order to become an independent 
nation, private Dutch merchants simultaneously built the foundation of the world’s most far-
reaching and prosperous trading powers. By the end of the sixteenth century, sailors and 
merchants had traveled both east and west reaching Southeast Asia and the Americas. In 1602, 
the inchoate Dutch government consolidated the East Indies spice trade by granting a 21-year 
monopoly to the newly formed Dutch East India Company. A monopoly, its advocates had 
argued, would provide the necessary military power to suppress Portuguese attacks and reduce 
the conflict and competition that threatened Asian trade. Arguments for a similar institution to 
govern Atlantic trade shortly followed. Willem Usselincx, an Antwerp-born merchant, became 
the leading advocate for an Atlantic monopoly and championed the idea as early as 1592. 
Usselincx gained support for his proposal from influential Calvinist leaders in Gouda and 
Amsterdam in large measure because he advocated for a “joint-stock company that would pursue 
trade, organize Dutch colonization, and support a program of Christian education of the 
indigenous peoples.”76 The States of Holland, despite provincial disagreements regarding the 
purposes and reach of a monopolistic trade entity, acted on his plan in 1606.77 In their decision 
they agreed to form a committee to conduct a feasibility study on a single Atlantic trading 
company.  
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 Peace talks with Spain aimed at ending the Dutch Revolt began the same year and derailed 
the realization of Usselincx’s plans. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1546-1619), the executive 
administrator of Holland, reached an armistice with the Spanish in April 1607. As part of the 
deal, though, he agreed to abandon plans to create an Atlantic trading company. The Spanish 
believed that such a company posed a threat to Iberian power in the Americas. In the final 
Twelve Years’ Truce (1609-1621), the Dutch agreed not to sail in areas under Iberian control. In 
1618, however, the more hawkish, pro-royal Orangist faction within the Dutch Republic ousted 
Oldenbarnevelt from office. With the Orangist faction in charge, the States of Holland moved 
forward with Usselincx’s original 1606 plans.78   
 On June 3, 1621, the States General, the Dutch Republic’s governing body, chartered the 
West India Company (Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie or WIC). The charter granted 
the Company a 24-year monopoly over all lands stretching from Africa to the West Indies. The 
purpose of the monopoly was straightforward: it would maintain the “prosperity of this country 
and the welfare of its inhabitants” and ensure “that their commerce may be increased as much as 
possible.”79  
 The charter created a hybrid institution that historian Philip Stern has called the Company-
State. The Company relied upon private financing but was granted diplomatic and militaristic 
powers typically held by the state alone.80 The States General conferred upon the Company the 
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power to “make contracts, leagues and alliances with the princes and natives of the 
countries…build any fortresses and strongholds…appoint, transfer, discharge and replace 
governors, troops and officers of justice…promote the settlement of fertile and uninhabited 
districts, and do all that the service of this country and the profit and increase of trade shall 
require.” The States General also agreed to furnish enlisted troops as necessary for the 
“establishment, security and defense of this trade…provided they be paid and supported by the 
Company.” If the Company ever found itself cheated, either “under the pretense of friendship or 
badly treated,” the Charter allowed that “they may according to circumstances and the best of 
their ability cause the loss to be made good by all such means as can properly be employed.”81 
For any “native or inhabitant” of the United Netherlands this translated into the seizure and 
confiscation of their ships and goods, while foreigners like the Americas’ indigenous peoples 
could expect diplomatic measures followed by military force.  
 In return for granting the Company profit-making, treaty-making, and war-making powers, 
the States General requested a permanent seat in the Company’s governing body known as the 
Heren XIX (Lord’s Nineteen). As a member the board, the States General could be kept informed 
and yield their right to advise, consent and direct the affairs of the Company. The Heren XIX 
consisted of 19 board members drawn proportionally from the Company’s five chambers: 
Amsterdam (8), Maze (2), Noorder-quartier (2), Zeeland (4), and Friesland (2) with one 
additional seat set aside for a representative of the States General.82 The Heren XIX would 
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assemble, according to the charter, “so often as it shall be necessary,” which typically amounted 
to several meetings a year.  
 The policies and power structure of the Company set the broadest limits for Company 
leaders stationed throughout the Dutch Atlantic and influenced their ability to respond to threats 
of extreme weather or indigenous resistance. Vast distances and slow communication networks, 
however, often afforded local commanders wide-latitude to respond to situations as they saw fit, 
often to the dismay of Company officials back in the Dutch Republic. So while the Heren XIX 
could set forth the goals of the Company, local Company leaders were left to interpret and 
implement those plans.83 While extreme weather had the potential to create unstable ecological 
and social conditions, institutional policies set parameters around which Company employees 
responded.  
 The Company’s 1621 incorporation altered the pre-existing trade relationships that earlier 
traders had forged with indigenous peoples throughout the Atlantic world. Before the Company’s 
creation, private traders traveling to the Americas organized themselves into one-off companies 
that disbanded after the traders returned to the Low Countries. These individuals acted as private 
traders and traded with relative freedom, but they still solicited the support of the States General. 
The governing body granted the companies a charter and provided military support, tax 
exemptions, and formal diplomatic letters of introduction. State support was less important in 
uncontested regions like New Netherland and South America’s Wild Coast where traders forged 
independent relations with diverse, autonomous, and sovereign groups. As long as they abided 
by indigenous protocols they could typically be assured a certain degree of peace. In contrast, in 
places like the Gold Coast and West-Central Africa where an Iberian presence existed, traders 
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relied heavily upon the diplomatic and military support of the States General to conclude treaties 
and alliances.84 At least initially, traders in the Americas carried on relatively independent 
interactions. Though over time, as Company investors grew increasingly worried about their 
financial interests, they became less willing to remain unengaged in day-to-day diplomacy. 
Despite being an ocean away, their involvement in directing disputes grew as profits dropped off 
and indigenous hostility increased. 
 Dutch perceptions of the Americas’ indigenous peoples had largely been shaped before 
they set foot on the ships that carried them across the Atlantic. The experiences of early 
European explorers, the stories retold by early private traders, and European geo-politics 
influenced their thoughts, beliefs, and early encounters. According to historian Benjamin 
Schmidt, a belief in “American innocence and Spanish tyranny” combined to form Dutch 
perceptions of Americas’ indigenous peoples.85 In Schmidt’s estimation, the Dutch conceived of 
the indigenous peoples of America as suffering under the same tyrannical yoke of Spanish 
oppression. The Dutch thus had a moral responsibility to protect the “poor” and “innocent” 
natives of America and aid them in throwing off Spanish rule in the Americas, at the same time 
they were doing so in the Netherlands. Once the Dutch had unburdened their alleged kinsmen 
from Habsburg rule, they believed they could anticipate a “natural” and “easy” alliance to 
follow.86 Domestic rhetorical platitudes, however, differed from overseas colonial realities where 
profits trumped morals. By the 1640s, pamphlet literature in the Netherlands reversed its tone 
and recognized “innocent” Spanish colonists living beside “tyrannical” Dutch colonial rulers.87 
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Netherlanders living in the Americas discovered that indigenous peoples, despite assurances 
from patria, did not quickly ally with their supposed Dutch kin and instead used their relative 
freedom in their relationship with the Company to exert their sovereignty. Company officials, 
dissatisfied with what in their minds amounted to indigenous non-compliance and desperate to 
wrench profits and subsistence from the Americas during a period of extreme weather, turned to 
force to gain indigenous obedience. What they achieved in doing so, however, was an escalation 
of colonial conflict.  
 The history of the Dutch Atlantic is often told as a series of local and regional stories. This 
has a resulted in a rich, although geographically centered, historiography. Scholars focused on 
individual Dutch colonies have provided deep insights into each region’s commercial, religious, 
cultural, and even intellectual past. Yet, the history of the Dutch Atlantic as seen through the 
eyes of those who lived it would not have appeared so cordoned-off. Instead, it would have 
appeared deeply entangled, entwined, and interconnected.88 The peripheral nodes of the Dutch 
Atlantic connected not only back to patria, but also to one another. People, ideas, and goods 
moved fluidly throughout the Atlantic between the Dutch Republic, West Africa, the Caribbean, 
South America, North America, and beyond. Collectively these connections formed a web of 
empire that overlapped with multiple other webs of indigenous and European origin.89 When 
viewed through this interwoven lacing, the individual relationships between extreme weather 
events, indigenous peoples, and denizens of the Dutch West India Company take on a cumulative 
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importance. The waves of what might have seemed like marginal, inconsequential events in the 
distant peripheries of the Dutch Empire reverberated throughout the network. Just as a fly that 
lands on the corner of a spider web might seem distant, its movements and struggles can be felt 
throughout the entire intricate web and threaten the existence of the whole. 
 Networks abounded through the Dutch Atlantic. They linked traders in New Netherland to 
Iroquois and Algonquin tribes who traded with French and English merchants who shipped their 
goods back to Europe. Wood harvested in the Baltic built ships and grain grown there fed the 
workers who constructed them. The personnel who manned these ships came from not only the 
Low Countries but also from much of Western Europe including Germany, England, France, and 
Scandinavia. Many of these individuals found themselves posted in multiple peripheries in th 
East and West Indies before, if they survived, returning home.90 The history of the Dutch West 
India Company is thus both intimately local and expansively global.  
 A web of connections linked together Brazil, Curaçao, and New Netherland as well. New 
Netherland’s original key purpose as a provision colony is perhaps the most obvious connection 
between them. Company directors hoped that New Netherland’s fertile soils and temperate 
climate would provide sufficient agricultural surplus to feed both its settlers and the Company’s 
trade colonies in the Caribbean and South America. Peter Stuyvesant, as director of Curaçao 
from 1642 to 1645, frequently lamented New Netherland’s failures in this regard. In the face of 
an impending famine in 1643, he lamented that “our food supply dwindles daily and we believe 
that the pottage and bread cannot last more than 4 to 5 weeks, in which time we can expect relief 
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neither from the fatherland nor the Virginias [New Netherland].”91 New Netherland in fact only 
sent one provisioning ship to the Caribbean in its entire existence.92  
 New Netherland’s failure as a provisioning colony might be read as a lack of 
interconnectedness between the Company’s American colonies. However, it can also be read as 
an illustration of their perceived interdependence. In Stuyvesant’s mind, the two regions were 
bound to help each other. When New Netherland failed to live up to its side of the bargain, 
Curaçao and by extension Brazil had to find alternative methods for procuring life-sustaining 
provisions. While subsistence provisions did not move between New Netherland, Curaçao, and 
Brazil with a level of frequency directors had intended, trade goods, peoples, ideas, aspirations, 
fears, and disappointment did.  
 Merchants profited from the relative proximity and ease of navigation between the three 
regions and the overlapping trade networks of indigenous and European origin. Adriaen van der 
Donck had spoken directly to New Netherland’s prime location in his part memoir and part 
promotional material Description of New Netherland (1656). According to Van der Donck, 
Newfoundland fishing grounds, Virginian tobacco, and trade opportunities in Canada, New 
England, and the West Indies were all within New Netherland’s vicinity.93 Ample evidence 
attests to the realization of these trade opportunities. David de Vries, a Dutch sailor from Hoorn, 
frequently traded along the coast after spending time in Batavia under the command of Jan 
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Pietersz Coen. In 1643, Gerrit Schuit from Enkhuizen and Jaecop Ijsbrantsz. from De Streek 
reported that on their last trip to the West Indies they purchased two chests of white sugar and 
traded this for tobacco in New Netherland before returning to the Netherlands.94 Traders 
including Nicolaas Blancke in 1649 and Jacob Jansen Huys in 1658 followed suite. In Curaçao 
and the nearby English-controlled Leeward Islands, these two individuals traded diverse goods 
including serge and linen in exchange for horses, dyewood, and muscovado sugar.95  
 Curaçao’s naturally deep and defensible harbor made it a central hub in the Netherland’s 
Atlantic trade network and its purposes evolved accordingly. Originally conquered for its 
supposed salt, Curaçao transformed into a naval base and trade entrepôt by the 1640s. Over a 
dozen ships that plied throughout the Atlantic under the Company’s banner were stationed in the 
island’s harbor. The Swol, Bontekoe, and Swaluwe could be found carrying personnel, supplies, 
and news back and forth between Brazil, Curaçao, and New Netherland. The island also housed 
repair facilities for ships damaged in storms or attacks.96 
 Ships traveling between the Dutch Republic and the Americas also frequented Curaçao en 
route to their final destinations. Prevailing winds and currents in the Atlantic pushed ships that 
embarked from the Republic along a route that ended in the Caribbean.97 Once there, ships 
disembarked supplies and sick passengers, made necessary repairs, took on fresh water, and 
continued their voyage. Perhaps one of the most famous of these stopovers occurred in March of 
1647. After departing the Netherlands in December 1646, the Prinses Amelia sailed over three 
months through difficult waters carrying 100 passengers. Eighteen people perished on the 
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voyage. The survivors included people of modest means like Geertge Nanningsdochter who 
traveled as a widow alongside her son as well as Company leader Peter Stuyvesant.98  
 Company employees gained critical experiences to confront indigenous resistance 
movements as they moved throughout the Atlantic. Following the disastrous leadership of 
Willem Kieft during his namesake war, New Netherland’s investors and board members weighed 
various responses. New Netherland’s affairs could be improved, they argued, and profits gained, 
“by good orders from here, and better government there.”99 Repairing severed indigenous 
relations and slowing population loss lay at the center of their recovery strategy. They believed 
they could achieve their aims by recalling Kieft and replacing him with a tested successor 
equipped with the skills necessary to assuage mounting indigenous concerns and allay colonist’s 
growing unrest. Candidates “endowed with sufficient qualities to promote…the interests of the 
Company…the welfare of the Commonality, and to maintain…good correspondence…especially 
with the Indians” rose to the top of their list. Peter Stuyvesant and Joannes van Walbeeck, two 
long-time company employees, garnered special attention.100 Stuyvesant and Van Walbeeck had 
each proven effective leaders while stationed in the Caribbean and appeared logical candidates 
for New Netherland’s directorship. Van Walbeeck served as Curaçao’s first governor from 1634 
to 1638. During his tenure, he successfully negotiated an amicable though tense relationship with 
the Caquetio before being reassigned to Brazil as a member of Brazil’s High Council in 1639 – a 
position he retained until 1647 when he returned to the Dutch Republic.  
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 Peter Stuyvesant first landed on Curaçao in 1639. During his time on the island, Stuyvesant 
learned valuable lessons about diplomacy and indigenous peoples. He served as commissary of 
stores on the island until 1642 when the island’s director at the time, Jan Claeszoon van Campen, 
died suddenly the same year.101  Stuyvesant took over command of Curaçao shortly after and 
guided the island through a difficult drought-induced famine. His tenure as director came to a 
sudden end, however, after a cannonball struck and cost him his leg. Stuyvesant proceeded over 
one final crisis before returning to the Dutch Republic to heal – a crisis that further reveals the 
deep connections that existed in the Dutch Atlantic.  
 Sometime in April 1644, hungry and tired from two and one-half years of near-constant 
conflict, commander David Wiltschut gave the order to abandon the Dutch-controlled fort of São 
Luís in Maranhão, Brazil. He and 450 Company personnel had been forced out after a group of 
Brasilianen and Tapuyas, supported by the Portuguese, blockaded the fort and starved them out. 
The battered, bruised, and defeated Company soldiers boarded several ships and set sail for 
Curaçao where they hoped to find food, shelter, and rest. Stuyvesant reported the arrival of 
Wiltschut and his men a few days later. He could offer them little help, though. This small, semi-
arid island in the southern Caribbean was in the midst of its own indigenous resistance 
movement and supply crises. Stuyvesant worried the newly arrived soldiers would exhaust the 
Company’s supplies completely. In response, Stuyvesant and his council decided the best course 
of action was to send the majority of the Dutch refugees to New Netherland where there they 
could be “used against the rebelling Indians” there.102 Stuyvesant, for his part, returned to the 
Dutch Republic to heal. Back home, he voluntarily submitted several reports and proposals to the 
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Company on matters relating to Curaçao and New Netherland. He believed the only way the 
Company could yield a profit from the colonies would be to put them under the control of a 
unified director. His proximity and proposals swayed the Heren XIX. They appointed Stuyvesant 
as Director General of New Netherland, Curaçao, Aruba and Bonaire on July 28, 1646.103 This is 
how he found himself once again on Curaçao along with the Prinses Amelia’s other passengers. 
The Company ostensibly hoped to overcome the disconnectedness of these regions by combining 
their oversight into a single position. Though, after finally arriving in New Netherland on May 
11, 1647, Stuyvesant quickly became subsumed in that colony’s administrative affairs and rarely 
spent time managing the Caribbean. 
 By July 1644, 130 of the original 450 Dutch soldiers from Maranhão had reached New 
Netherland where they were to serve at the command of Willem Kieft, the colony’s director, in 
an ongoing conflict with several indigenous groups.104 The rest of the Maranhão soldiers 
including David Wiltschut planned on returning to Recife rather than head to New Netherland, 
but instead contrary winds blew them to the Coast of Guinea. In New Netherland, Kieft, who had 
only recently arrived to the colony from the Netherlands, had ignited an indigenous conflict in 
September of 1638 when he forced local Munsee tribes to pay the Dutch tribute in the form of 
wampum, corn, or pelts. He argued that the Dutch were owed the tribute for the protection they 
offered the Munsee and decreed he would use force to seize payment. The Munsee disagreed and 
went to war to protect their harvests.105  
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 The fate of the Maranhão soldiers would not end in New Netherland. On August 18, 1647, 
after the Dutch and local sachems agreed on what would turn out be only a temporary peace, an 
untold number of the soldiers boarded the Princes Amelia along with former director Kieft. They 
were heading back to the Dutch Republic. The soldiers had paid their time and Kieft was to face 
trial for his perpetuation of the war. Eighty-six men on board would die on September 27, 1647, 
however, when their ship ran aground off the coast of Wales after its captain mistook the Bristol 
Channel for the English Channel.106    
 The movement of Company personnel between multiple colonial outposts highlights the 
mobility of people in the early modern Dutch Atlantic. Cornelis Barentsz van Amsterdam 
exemplifies these complex itineraries. He “shipped out as gunner with the ship De Griffien to 
Curaçao” and then traveled to New Netherland aboard De Neptunus. He returned to Amsterdam 
in 1642 aboard the Eyckenboom. Historian Susanah Shaw Romney traced Van Amsterdam’s 
travels upon his return to patria and found that he had been gone so long and changed so much 
that the notary required him to provide proof that he was “the same person as Cornelis Barentsz 
as above and no other.” He found two witnesses that could attest to his identity. Jan Jans, also 
known as Jan de Wael, served as a cooper for a combined eight years in Brazil and New 
Netherland before nearly drowning off the coast of Wales when the Prinses Amelia sank.107 
Dozens of additional soldiers who had served in Maranhão, Curaçao, and New Netherland were 
aboard the ship when it sank.108  
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 Private citizens also frequently traveled throughout the Dutch Atlantic. Johannes 
Pelhemius, a Dutch Reformed minister, along with his wife, Catharyna van Werven, lived in 
Pernambuco during the 1650s, traveled back to the Amsterdam after the Portuguese’s successful 
revolt, and then sailed back across the Atlantic to settle on Long Island. In New Netherland, 
Pelhemius and Van Werven found company with Portuguese Jews who took refuge there after 
escaping Brazil.109 
 Indigenous peoples traveled along the Company’s transportation networks as well. In 1625, 
a Company fleet exploring northeastern Brazil’s coasts made contact with Tupi-speaking 
Potiguar peoples in Paraíba and Rio Grande. The Potiguars had a tenuous relationship with the 
Portuguese inhabitants of the region and welcomed the Dutch. As a result of this encounter, a 
delegation of Potiguars traveled back to the Dutch Republic with the Company fleet in order to 
negotiate a Dutch-Potiguar alliance. In patria, the delegates learned Dutch and became Protestant 
Christians. In 1629, these delegates returned to Brazil to act as intercultural mediators between 
the Dutch and other Tupi-speaking groups.110 In May 1641, a contingent of Brasilianen warriors 
aided the Company during an attack on the West African slave port of Luanda.111 
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 Indigenous peoples did not always travel freely throughout the Dutch Atlantic. More 
commonly, they traveled involuntarily as forced laborers and slaves.112 The Dutch Atlantic 
enterprise created indigenous trade networks that stretched from New Netherland to the 
Caribbean, Brazil, and the Wild Coast.113 These were unsanctioned trades that violated the 
Company’s explicit policy against the enslavement of indigenous peoples. The case of Jan 
Macxvelt, a Dutch commander stationed in Maranhão, highlights the illicit nature of Dutch 
involvement in the indigenous slave trade in the Caribbean and the potentially dangerous 
implications thereof. In March or April of 1643, Macxvelt was dispatched from Maranhão to St. 
Joan to catch fish and manatee. He traveled with “ten whites, ten Brasilianen from Ceará, and 
approximately thirty from Maranhão.” He failed to return to Maranhão, though. Dutch leaders 
later heard reports that Macxvelt had disobeyed their orders and instead sailed for St. Christoffel 
(St. Kitts) or Barbados where he hoped to trade the “free Brasilianen” as slaves. Gideon Morris, 
the Company’s liaison for Mission Indians in Ceará, ordered that Macxvelt immediately return to 
Maranhão with the Natives. Morris feared that news of the Natives’ capture would spark an 
indigenous resistance.114 Macxvelt’s whereabouts remained unknown for nearly a year until the 
Netherlander Gilles Tenant found him with the help of the English and French on the island of 
St. Christoffel (St. Kitts). Tenant was able to recover nine of the original Natives, but the other 
41 appeared to have been “wrongfully” sold on St. Eustatius – an island just ten miles to the south 
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of St. Christoffel.115 Tenant returned Macxvelt to Brazil where the Council of Justice imprisoned 
him as an example to others. Though, despite the Council’s best intentions to make an example 
of him, Macxvelt escaped from prison soon thereafter.116    
 Macxvelt received strict punishment not because he violated the Company’s policy against 
indigenous enslavement but because he attempted to enslave indigenous allies. This point is 
made clearer when looking at later actions by Dutch leaders in regards to indigenous enemies of 
the Company. In 1644, Peter Stuyvesant sent several Esopus prisoners-of-war to the Netherlands, 
Curaçao, and Bonaire. Those lucky enough to be sent to the Netherlands were set free, but those 
sent to the Caribbean joined other indigenous peoples from throughout the Americas in 
enslavement.117 In 1660, during the Esopus Wars (1659-1663), Stuyvesant sent an additional l5 
to 20 Esopus to Curaçao and Bonaire. The Esopus worked alongside African slaves in order to 
provide service to the Company.118 Stuyvesant justified his actions by suggesting that enslaving 
the Natives would expedite the war’s end and promised that he would send for their return once 
the Esopus signed a peace treaty.119  
 The Esopus sent to Curaçao and Bonaire would have been familiar with the European 
institution of slavery. As early as the 1620s, Kongolese and West African slaves had been 
enslaved in the Hudson Valley by the Company. After the 1637 Dutch conquest of Fort Elmina 
in West Africa, slaves in New Netherland and the Dutch Atlantic increasingly came from 
Ghana.120 African slaves frequently moved involuntarily throughout the Dutch Atlantic. Many 
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New Netherland slaves arrived via Curaçao and Brazil. In 1655, one slave voyage’s itinerary 
called for stops in the Bight of Guinea, the Caribbean, and New Netherland before returning to 
Amsterdam.121 In 1663, the Company chartered the Gideon to travel to Angola to purchase 
slaves before heading to Cayenne, Curaçao, and New Netherland. In Angola, the Dutch traders 
picked up 421 slaves. They arrived in Curaçao with 348 slaves, though deemed 36 to be 
“unsellable.” They then headed to New Netherland with 300 slaves aboard. In New Netherland, 
216 were put to work for the Company, another 72 were distributed to Peter Alrighs, and the 
remaining two were distributed via the drawing of lots.122 Slaves in New Netherland did not 
simply pass through Brazil or the Caribbean. Some spent significant time there before being sent 
to New Netherland. In 1644, New Netherlanders requested several slaves from Brazil to produce 
provisions that could be exported back to Brazil in support of the sugar trade.123 Each slave in 
this network created yet another connection, albeit unwillingly, in the Dutch Atlantic.  
 The Dutch West India Company also acted as a knowledge network and conduit for the 
flow of information, news, and ideas. Trade companies provided resources and avenues for 
soldiers, sailors, scientists, anthropologists, and ethnographers to gain access to and spread 
knowledge.124 Indigenous actors often facilitated these exchange by sharing medicinal and 
agricultural knowledge necessary for European invaders to survive in foreign environments. 
Through the work of contemporaries like Willem Piso and Georg Markgraf, the Dutch collected 
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and codified a wealth of scientific knowledge from indigenous peoples.125 And through the 
artistic renderings of Brasilianen and Tapuya peoples by Albert Eckhout and American 
landscapes by Frans Post and Johannes Vingboons the Dutch gained a glimpse at the world they 
had only read about before.126  
 People, goods, and ideas frequently flowed throughout the Dutch Atlantic and in the 
process connected diverse ecosystems and geographies. The Company planned to utilize this 
diversity to create a unified and self-supporting enterprise. Curaçao’s natural harbor provided a 
sally-port and naval base, Brazil’s tropical climate grew cash crops like sugar and tobacco, and 
New Netherland’s fertile soils could supply all three with provisions to feed colonists, 
administrators, cooperative indigenous allies, and slaves alike. Collectively, these colonies were 
supposed to form a self-sustaining colonial system from whence the Company could easily 
wrench profits and prosperity. Investors knew the Company would have to incur some of the 
initial costs, but believed once the system functioned they could sit back and reap a sizable return 
on their investment. The interdependent connections created within the Dutch Atlantic, however, 
also made it fragile and vulnerable.   
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2. A Climatological Pivot Phase in the Early Modern Atlantic 
Earth and its inhabitants experienced historical climatic shifts between 1300 and 1850 during the 
Little Ice Age. In Europe, temperatures dropped between a half and one-and-a-half degrees 
Celsius on average. Cooler temperatures stunted growing seasons and crops never ripened; 
stomachs went unfed and diseases spread more readily. In Africa, Asia, and the Americas, rains 
stopped falling and when they finally resumed, they often arrived with cataclysmic intensity only 
to disappear as quickly and disastrously as they had returned. In the Americas, megadroughts 
accompanied decreased yearly temperatures, afflicted indigenous peoples long before European 
arrival, and later altered the shape of European-indigenous relations. The prevalence of 
megadroughts interspersed with shorter, but still devastating droughts has led some scholars to 
classify this period as the Little Drought Age.127  
 European arrivals to the Americas happened to occur during a period of abnormally cold, 
dry years. Unusually cold years ice-locked Henry Hudson’s crew in James Bay leading to his 
death in 1611.128 The most extreme drought to strike Virginia in 800 years occurred 
simultaneously with the demise of the Lost Colony of Roanoke between 1587 and 1589. 
Similarly historical drought conditions led to high mortality rates and the near abandonment of 
the Jamestown Colony over the course of 1606 and 1612 as the colony persevered through what 
historical climatologists now know to be the driest seven-year period in 770 years.129 
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 Another turbulent era of extreme weather-related crises lasted from 1630 to 1645 and 
coincided with nearly a half dozen known conflicts in the Americas. These include, but are not 
limited to, the Pequot War (1637), the Mexico Revolt (1641-1642), and two Portuguese 
rebellions – first against the Spanish (1641) and then against the Dutch (1645).130 Three 
additional colonial conflicts erupted in Brazil, Curaçao, and the Hudson Valley when indigenous 
peoples resisted Dutch intrusions on their lands. Each of these conflicts has been tied to 
geopolitical, economic, inter-colonial or cross-cultural conflict. Recent advances in historical 
climatology reveal extreme weather events often correlated to these episodes of colonial 
violence.  
 A complex interplay of oceanic and atmospheric forces including El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) events, volcanic eruptions, and sunspot activity govern the Americas’ 
climate. Sudden changes in all three of these forces between 1620 and 1645 drove changes in the 
Earth’s climate, spurred extreme weather events, and created ripple effects that influenced 
European colonization throughout the Americas. The increased frequency and severity of 
extreme weather over a short period of time and a shift in the climate from one regime to another 
mark this period as a climatological pivot phase.131 Strong La Niña conditions, reduced sunspot 
activity, and increased volcanic eruptions led to unusually heavy rains in northeastern Brazil, 
intense drought conditions in the South Caribbean, and colder and snowier winters in the Hudson 
Valley.  
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 The impact of ENSO events on global and regional histories saw a surge of interest 
following the devastating El Niño events of 1982-83 and 1997-98. Deluges and landslides in 
California along with droughts in India, Africa, and Peru garnered wide-spread media attention. 
In the aftermath of these ENSO events, governments and non-profits created organizations and 
offices to study ENSO events’ causes and effects. Historians took notice as well and began 
publishing a wide-range of articles and manuscripts detailing ENSO events’ human history. 
Research ranged from the discovery of El Niño by Alexander von Humboldt during his venture 
through South America at the turn of the nineteenth-century, to its potential to wreak havoc on 
social and political relationships throughout the world.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 & 2.2: Left: ENSO Cold Episode (La Niña) Relationships: NOAA - 
http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/impacts/cold.gif. Right: ENSO Warm Episode (El 




 ENSO events manifest themselves in two phases. El Niño, the warm phase of ENSO 
events, typically precedes its sister La Niña – the cold phase of ENSO events. While El Niño 
events have garnered more historical attention, both have far-reaching global impacts (see Figure 
2.1 & 2.2) that have shaped human history. El Niño events are determined by changes in Pacific 
sea surface temperatures and trade wind patterns. During El Niño events, trade winds slacken 
causing warm western Pacific waters to move to the middle of the Pacific which leads to 
stormier and wetter conditions along the western coast of South America. Simultaneously, drier 
and warmer conditions prevail in the Caribbean during the summer while in the winter warmer 
air settles in over much of Canada and the northeast of the United States. In northeastern Brazil, 
temperatures rise as does the likelihood of droughts and forest fires. El Niño conditions, which 
were for the most part strong throughout the duration of the seventeenth century, were much less 
prevalent in the proxy record for the period between 1620 and 1645, though there is some 
indication that moderate El Niño events might have occurred in 1630 and 1635 followed by 
weaker events in 1638, 1639, 1641, and 1642.132 Outside of the Americas, El Niño can cause 
droughts in Ethiopia, Southern Africa, India, Asia, and Australasia.133  
  Sea surface temperatures in the Pacific also determine La Niña events. Trade winds 
blowing over the Pacific push the ocean’s surface water to the west and create storms over 
Indonesia. The hole created by wind-driven waters in the east allows cold, nutrient-rich water to 
well up in the eastern Pacific creating favorable fishing conditions along the coasts of Peru and 
Ecuador. Canada and the northeast of the United States tend to experience colder and 
wetter/snowier winters (December - February) during La Niña events while heavy rain plagues 
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northern Brazil. Elsewhere during the winter, La Niña causes cooler conditions in Western 
Africa; wet and cool conditions in Southern Africa, India, Southeast Asia and Australasia; and 
dry conditions in much of China. During the summer (June - August) La Niña’s impact in North 
America wanes. In the Caribbean, however, weaker winds and decreased atmospheric stability 
spur hurricane formation and cause drier conditions in southern Brazil. During the mid-
seventeenth century, several decades of frequent though mild La Niña conditions (1520s to 
1650s) gave way to a period with a low frequency but relatively high magnitude of La Niña 
events (1650s, 1660s, 1690s).134 In the interim years, La Niña events occurred on an almost 
yearly basis. Between 1620 and 1645, sixteen out of 25 years experienced moderate to extreme 
La Niña conditions (see figure 2.3). Prolonged La Niña conditions occurred between 1622 and 
1632 and again between 1637 and 1639.135 These chronologies bring a much needed clarity and 
specificity to the generally cited trend of increasingly intense El Niño episodes during the 
seventeenth century.  
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Figure 2.3: Decadal trends in reconstructed El Niño and La Niña event magnitude characteristics, A.D. 1525-2000. 
Note the red box around the 1630s and 1640s. This box indicates an extreme ENSO magnitude. Joëlle L. Gergis and 
Anthony M. Fowler, “A History of ENSO Events Since A.D. 1525: Implications for Future Climate Change,” 
Climatic Change 92, no. 3–4 (February 2009): 373.  
 
 La Niña events have impacted human history in myriad ways. Their ability to disrupt sea 
travel through increased hurricane activity is perhaps most notable amongst these impacts.136 
However, ENSO is not the only oceanic-atmospheric factor at work during hurricane season. The 
variability of hurricanes is the result of ENSO and the Atlantic Multi-Decadal Oscillation 
(AMO) working together. A warm phase of the AMO creates stronger, wetter West African 
monsoons and can cause a warmer ocean, decrease wind shear, and drive hurricane 
                                                            
136 During La Niña events, weaker vertical wind shear and trade winds combine with decreased atmospheric 
stability to favor increased Atlantic hurricane activity. The opposite occurs during El Niño events when strong 
vertical wind shear and trade winds together with greater atmospheric stability produce fewer hurricanes. 
 
 58 
formations.137 Solar radiation or radiative forcing has also been correlated to hurricane 
formations. During the Maunder Minimum (1645-1715 CE), a period of decreased sunspot 
activity, the Caribbean experienced a 75% reduction in decadal-scale tropical cyclone activity. 
Due to a limited quantity and quality of proxy sets for this time period, historical climatologists 
looked for evidence of shipwrecks to provide additional proof of hurricane activity. These 
climatologists correlated a documentary time series of Spanish shipwrecks in the Caribbean with 
a tree-growth suppression series from the Florida Keys and determined that shipwrecks provide a 
valid and reliable proxy for hurricane activity.138 The decades prior to the onset of the Maunder 
Minimum witnessed significant numbers of shipwrecks that seem to fluctuate with known La 
Niña episodes (see Figure 2.4). With the exception of 1628, the highest number of shipwrecks 
between the 1620s and 1640s correlate to years of strong or very strong La Niña years: 1622, 
1631, and 1641 (see figure 2.5).  
                                                            
137 Gerry Bell, “Impacts of El Niño and La Niña on the Hurricane Season,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, (April 28, 2016), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/enso/impacts-el-niño-and-la-niña-
hurricane-season. 
138 Valerie Trouet, Grant L. Harley, and Marta Domínguez-Delmás, “Shipwreck Rates Reveal Caribbean 
Tropical Cyclone Response to Past Radiative Forcing,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 
12 (March 22, 2016): 3169–74, doi:10.1073/pnas.1519566113. For more on the relationship between hurricanes and 
the Caribbean, see: Stuart B. Schwartz, Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from 




Figure 2.4: Percentage of storm-caused shipwrecks (1590-1770). Valerie Trouet, Grant L. Harley, and Marta 
Domínguez-Delmás, “Shipwreck Rates Reveal Caribbean Tropical Cyclone Response to Past Radiative Forcing,” 




Figure 2.5: La Niña intensity and Caribbean shipwrecks (1621-1645). Empty cells indicate an absence of La Niña 
activity. Take special note of 1622, 1631, and 1641 in which a significant number of shipwrecks correlate to high 




 ENSO’s ability to cause drought and extreme rain has also been linked to the spread of 
epidemic disease. Drought and extreme rain have the potential to create a nefarious environment 
for the breeding and spread of disease-carrying mosquitos such as A. aegypti and Anopheles 
which carry yellow fever and malaria, respectively. Rainy seasons create fecund periods for 
mosquitos to abound and repopulate. Conversely, droughts have the potential to suppress 
epidemic disease outbreaks by eliminating natural mosquito breeding grounds. However, dry 
periods also prompt individuals to store and collect water whenever and wherever they can, thus 
providing suitable man-made breeding sites for mosquitos. The most damaging periods for 
individuals in disease-prone regions occur when heavy rains follow drought years – the exact 
situation characteristic of La Niña events.139 Extreme weather could thus spur both harvest 
failures and famines that lead to malnourishment and weakened immune systems that made 
individuals more susceptible to disease. Placing an exact number on how many indigenous 
peoples succumbed to disease due to extreme weather would be mere speculation. Instead, here 
the argument is simply that extreme weather was yet another factor in what some have referred 
to as the “Great Dying.” The reach of extreme weather extended beyond the graves of millions of 
indigenous Americans and across the storming Atlantic. Extreme weather events in many ways 
encouraged the exploitation of Africans as they compounded the devastation and destruction 
wrought by disease epidemics on the indigenous populations of the Americas whom many 
Europeans relied upon as a labor source.140 The Dutch West India would take advantage of this 
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climate-induced crisis in west Africa to gain wealth through the forced enslavement of 
Africans.141  
 ENSO events are not the only oceanic-atmospheric dynamic at work in the Caribbean. In 
addition to the impact tropical Pacific sea surface temperatures (SST) can have on the Caribbean 
during ENSO events, the Caribbean is also susceptible to changes in the North Atlantic 
Oscillation (NOA), fluctuations in the South American Monsoon System (SAMS), and 
displacements of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ).142 Climate scientists are working 
to better understand these complex relationships, but great uncertainty still exists around both 
climatologists’ predictive capacity and historical climatologists’ ability to reconstruct the 
relationship between ENSO events and the Caribbean’s past climate. So while one would expect 
cooler and wetter conditions in the southern Caribbean during a La Niña event, this relationship 
does not always necessarily hold. In fact, sediment records from the Cariaco Basin off the coast 
of Venezuela suggest the exact opposite. This proxy data suggests decreased rain water run-off 
during much of the seventeenth century.143 This, it seems, is connected to a southern 
displacement of the ITCZ that resulted in drier conditions in the southern Caribbean and wetter 
                                                            
slaves that connected West Africa to Europe, the Indian Ocean basin, and Southeast Asia. Slaves often entered these 
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conditions in northeastern Brazil – conditions that are consistent with the written records of 
Dutch commanders in Brazil and on the island of Curaçao during the 1640s.144   
 Volcanic eruptions also had the powerful potential to influence extreme weather events in 
the Americas. From July 31 to October 9, 1640, the Komaga-take volcano, located on the 
Oshima Peninsula of southern Hokkaido, Japan, erupted. The explosion sent ash and debris as far 
as Honshu, produced a debris avalanche that reached the sea, and killed 700 people.145 Just a few 
months later, on January 4, 1641, Mount Parker on Mindanao Island in the Philippines 
erupted.146 In addition to sending ash and sediment high into the atmosphere, these eruptions 
combined to alter the global climate in ways that compounded the worst impacts of European 
colonialism on indigenous societies in the Americas.147 What made Mount Parker’s 1641 
eruption significant was not simply its magnitude, but its timing. The period surrounding Mount 
Parker’s eruption was a highly active volcanic period. Fourteen confirmed eruptions occurred 
around the globe between 1640 and 1641. If we broaden the temporal scale just slightly and 
narrow the geographic range, there was a record twelve volcanic eruptions around the Pacific 
near the equator between 1638 and 1644.148  
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 One way to assess the global impacts of these eruptions is to examine the concentration of 
sulfate found in Greenland ice core samples. Sulfate readings can assist in ascertaining the 
overall impact of volcanic eruptions on global climate change. Each volcano eruption has a 
different aerosol composition. Some are sulphur-rich while others are sulphur-poor. In general, 
large levels of sulphur-dioxide result in greater climatic impacts. Ice core samples reveal that the 
year 1640.5 ± 1 shows a sulfate fluctuation of 16.4 followed closely by a fluctuation of 17.6 in 
1640.95 ± 1. In other words, 1640 to 1641 saw an intense and measurable unipolar change in 
atmospheric disruption that would have caused a notable temperature decrease in the 
Americas.149  
 Sunspot activity might be the final piece of the puzzle in understanding the causes of the 
mid-seventeenth century pivot phase. According to nineteenth-century astronomer Edward 
Maunder's reconstructions of European sunspot observations, significantly fewer sunspots 
occurred between 1640 and 1720 compared to the surrounding years. In general, the sun 
undergoes an 11-year cycle of solar activity and longer-term solar minima and maxima. During a 
maxima, sunspots release a quick burst of solar radiation that collectively warms the Earth. In 
contrast, about once a century, a minima sets in and the sun's radiation decreases. Any significant 
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decrease in the frequency of sunspot activity can lead to a decrease in global temperatures – a 
situation that volcanic dust veils exacerbates. While the Maunder Minimum typical begins in 
1645, this formal start date was preceded by two periods of weak sunspot activity, 1625 to 1626 
and 1637 to 1645, the later correlating to a time of increased violence in the Americas.150  
 Scientist, however, continue to debate the impact of sunspot activity on Earth's climate. 
While warm and cold periods have correlated to solar maxima and minima, the relationship does 
not always hold true. For example, the Grindelwald Fluctuation (1560 to 1630), despite being an 
abnormally cold period, occurred alongside an increase in solar activity. In relation to today's 
anthropogenic climate change, solar activity's influence is minimal. Thus, it is important to see 
solar activity as but one of many causes of climate change.151 
 Collectively, frequent ENSO events, increased volcanic eruptions, and reduced sun spot 
activity drastically altered Earth’s climate in ways that had life-altering implications for all life 
on Earth. Between 1620 and 1645, humans, plants, animals, and even viruses responded, 
adapted, and changed as a result of complex and reciprocal relationships. Understanding how 
humans understood and responded to climatic changes and extreme weather events requires both 
a local and global perspective. Climate historians are well suited to zoom in on a few locations 
on the Earth’s map to get a better idea of how humans met the challenge of changing climates. In 
places like Brazil, Curaçao, and the Hudson Valley, this pivot phase correlated to a period of 
tense colonial conflicts. 
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Part II: Dutch Brazil, 1630-1654 
 
“Nature was as bountiful in the West as in the East, and the natives, unwilling to tolerate 
Portuguese domination any longer, were ready to shake off the royal yoke.” – Casper van 
Baerle, History of Brazil (1647)1 
 
 
View of Maranhão/São Luís. Johannes Vingboons, 1665. 
National Archives of the Netherlands, The Hague  
Foreign Map Collection 4.VELH: inv. nr. 619.71  
                                                            
1 Casper van Baerle, History of Brazil, 13. 
 
 66 
3. An Introduction to Dutch Brazil 
The history of Dutch involvement in the Americas dates back to the late fifteenth century, but its 
formal involvement began with the Company’s 1621 Charter. The Company had a difficult time 
finding investors and capital in its early years. Many potential investors perceived the 
Company’s establishment as a rouse by the States General to wage war against the Spanish 
Habsburgs and worried about investing in a military campaign disguised as a commercial 
enterprise. It took the Company until the summer of 1623 to reach its goal of seven million 
guilders. Financing finally came thanks to the support of non-traditional funders in the Dutch 
Republic’s inland regions rather than funders in coastal regions more attuned to overseas trade 
opportunities.2  
 Sufficient funds in pocket, the Heren XIX began devising plans for their American 
enterprise. Two plans were put forth. The first called for a full out assault on Spanish and 
Portuguese colonies. The second called for a targeted attack on the Spanish salt-producing 
colony of Punta de Araya on the Venezuelan coast. In the end, both plans were tabled – the first 
deemed too risky and the second unnecessary. The Company’s reformulated plan called for a 
three-pronged attack that could totally disrupt Iberia’s stranglehold in the region. First, they 
would weaken the Spanish mainland’s ability to continue its attacks on the Netherlands in the 
on-going Dutch Revolt. Spanish hostilities had recently been reignited following the end of the 
Twelve Years’ Truce (1609-1621). Second, the Company needed to create an opening for Dutch 
colonization in the profitable sugar trade. And third, they wanted to shift Spanish riches into 
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Dutch hands either by capturing elements of the Spanish treasure fleet or cutting off the Spanish 
trans-Atlantic slave trade.3  
  By October 1623, the Heren XIX settled upon what they described as a “Grand Design” to 
exert their influence in the Atlantic. First, Company troops would attack and capture the 
administrative capital Salvador de Bahia, perhaps the most profitable sugar region of Brazil. 
Next, a smaller expedition would launch from Bahia to capture the slave-trading port of Luanda 
in Angola in order to interrupt the Iberian slave trade. If successful, a fleet of reinforcements 
would work to capture portions of the Spanish treasure fleet in the Caribbean while another fleet 
attacked the Portuguese stronghold of São Jorge da Mina (Elmina) on the Gold Coast of Africa. 
With plan in hand an initial attack fleet set sail from the Dutch Republic during the winter of 
1623-1624.4  
 The fleet arrived off the coast of Salvador de Bahia on May 8, 1624. Portuguese colonists, 
despite having heard rumors and reports of a Dutch attack, had done little to prepare themselves. 
Company troops quickly made their way ashore and seized the city of Bahia as the city’s 
residents fled into the Recôncavo, the hinterlands and main agricultural region surrounding the 
city. On May 10, after two days of battle and at the cost of several Company troops, the 
Portuguese governor-general of Bahia, Diogo Mendonça de Furtado, surrendered.5  
 Company control of Bahia was short lived. Dispersed in the surrounding agricultural 
regions of Bahia, the city’s former Portuguese citizens rallied around the local Catholic bishop, 
Dom Marcos Teixeira, who had fled alongside them in the wake of the Dutch attack. Teixeira 
organized a force of royal soldiers, city residents, sugar planters, and Tupi-speaking Indians from 
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a Jesuit missionary to push back the Company’s advances. Portugal’s indigenous allies proved 
central in the eventual success in taking back Bahia. The mission Indians set up ambushes to 
attack Company forces that ventured outside Bahia’s city limits, and during one such ambush in 
June, they killed the Company’s ground force commander, Colonel van Dorth. Van Dorth’s 
death hampered additional expeditions into the interior and as a result the war settled into a 
stalemate with the Dutch in firm control of Bahia and Teixeira’s forces established in the 
hinterland.6  
 News of the attack and resulting standstill reached Europe by summer of 1624. It was clear 
that the balance of Bahia would not be tipped unless the Company or Iberian powers sent relief 
and reinforcements. The Portuguese and Spanish overcame deep political discord and organized 
a joint relief expedition that set sail for Bahia from the Cape Verde Islands by mid-February 
1625. The Company had more difficulty. Stormy weather and logistical issues delayed the 
Company’s expedition by approximately two months. As a result, the Spanish-Portuguese forces 
sailed into Bahia at the end of March, quickly overcame the Company’s forces in Bahia, and 
claimed the city on April 30. The Company had lost its claim in Brazil less than a year after 
arriving. The first phase of its “Grand Design” had failed.7  
 Subsequent attempts to carry out the plan’s second and third phases failed just as 
spectacularly. The Company’s reinforcements arrived in Bahia a month after its surrender and 
thus headed north to a bay near the border of the Paraíba and Rio Grande captaincies. The fleet 
took on fresh water and supplies. Those who had fallen ill during the Atlantic voyage tried to 
recover while Company leaders began to build a relationship with the local Potiguar. After a few 
weeks, the expedition split in half. One group launched a failed attack on Spanish Puerto Rico, 
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while the other – under the command of vice-admiral Piet Heyn – sailed for the Gold Coast 
where it also failed to secure Luanda and Elmina after two separate attacks.8 
 The Company learned valuable lessons during its failed attempt to realize the “Grand 
Design.” Most importantly, they learned of Spain’s and Portugal’s vulnerabilities in Africa and 
the Americas that could be exploited at little to no cost. In Africa, due to a disinterested Spanish 
crown, the Portuguese lacked the necessary support to stave off Dutch forces along the Gold 
Coast. By 1630, the Company had seized this opportunity and emerged as a key player in the 
West African gold trade. In addition to gold, the Dutch exported ivory, wax, grain, and dye 
wood. While the Company initially shied away from entering into the slave trade due to its own 
lack of need and experience, this would change around 1633 once the Company had secured 
several sugar producing captaincies in Brazil.9 The Company also maintained a maritime 
presence in the Caribbean and found profit through privateering and maritime predation. Armed 
galleons typically escorted the Spanish treasure fleet that carried gold and silver, but Spanish 
ships loaded with hides, tobacco, and dyes sailed relatively unarmed throughout the Caribbean. 
The Dutch naval hero Piet Heyn targeted these vessels with great success. In 1627, he captured 
more than 2,500 chests of sugar and the following year he famously captured a portion of the 
Spanish ‘silver fleet’ at Matanzas (Cuba). The profits from his attacks, estimated at 11.5 million 
guilders at the time, not only boosted Company morale but also provided a windfall of money 
that financed a new Company’s assault on Brazil.10   
 The second Company attack on Brazil targeted Pernambuco, a heavy sugar producing 
region to the north of Bahia. A fleet with 7,000 soldiers and sailors departed from the Dutch 
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Republic in late 1629 and arrived off the coast of Brazil in February 1630. Company troops 
made quick work of securing Olinda and Recife while the Portuguese governor retreated into the 
countryside. The Company was determined not to fall into the same trap that doomed the 1624-
1625 Bahia expedition and sent immediate reinforcements from the Dutch Republic. The Dutch 
also gained important local allies. Several hundred African slaves served the Company as scouts 
and soldiers and a local mulatto informant named Domingos Fernandes Calabar taught Company 
forces how to deploy guerrilla tactics against Portuguese encampments. In contrast, 
disagreements between the Spanish and Portuguese weakened their ability to respond with any 
significant show of force. Despite the Iberians’ lack of resolve, it took the Company five years of 
sporadic and targeted attacks to force the hand of Pernambuco’s governor who finally retreated 
to Bahia with his forces in the summer of 1635. During that time, the Dutch slowly expanded 
their power in the region. They took Fort Reis Magos – at the mouth of the Rio Grande – in 1633 
and renamed it Fort Keulen. Then, with the help of Tarairiu allies, they seized captaincies 
stretching from Cabo de Santo Agostinho in the south to Rio Grande in the north.11  
 The Company launched a propaganda campaign to convince the remaining Portuguese 
planters or moradores to end the conflict. Company leaders promised the moradores economic 
benefits and religious freedom. This appeared to be enough to convince the moradores to 
commit to a cease-fire and end hostilities. By the end of 1635, the Company, through a 
combination of military advances and propaganda campaigns, had won over most of the 
moradores, solidified alliances with numerous indigenous groups, and gained control of Brazil’s 
most important sugar districts.12 
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 The joint-crown of Spain and Portugal did not sit idle upon hearing news of the Company’s 
advances. By the end of 1635 they had organized and outfitted thirty warships to take back 
control of Brazil. Upon landing, the Iberian troops launched a guerrilla campaign against the 
Dutch using burnt earth tactics to inflict damage upon the Company’s recently won sugar mills. 
The effect was immediate and by 1636 the Company’s debt from lost revenue and military 
expenditures climbed to 18 million guilders.13 The Company needed a new strategy and a new 
plan if they were to keep and profit from their newly won Brazilian properties. 
 The Heren XIX concluded that a strong, central leader could solve Brazil’s pestering 
military and financial problems. Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679), a German 
nobleman, fit the bill. Johan Maurits, in addition to being the grandnephew of stadholder 
Frederik Hendrik, had established himself as a keen military commander during the Dutch 
Revolt. The Heren XIX believed his military experience could be deployed to usher an end to 
Iberian attacks and as governor he could provide order to the chaotic, shared governing structure 
in place in Brazil. They consequently appointed him governor and supreme military and naval 
commander of northeastern Brazil in August 1636. He arrived in Recife the following January.14  
 Johan Maurits’ military shrewdness began to shine almost immediately. A month after 
arriving, he organized and personally led an attack to drive out the Spanish forces remaining at 
Porto Calvo. The assault succeeded and the Iberian troops fled south over the Rio São Francisco 
in search of refuge in Bahia. The river became the southern border of Dutch Brazil, guarded by 
Company soldiers and indigenous allies. Johan Maurits attempted to push the border over the 
river a year later, but the attack failed miserably and at great cost in Company soldiers and 
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indigenous allies. Johan Maurits had better luck in the north. In 1637, a Company expedition 
secured a northern border after capturing Ceará, a Portuguese fort along the coast.15  
  Back on the Iberian Peninsula, political developments resulted in the disintegration of 
Iberia’s united crown and temporarily halted the Company’s expansion in Brazil. Beginning in 
1634, three Portuguese gentlemen (fidalgos) gave voice to Portuguese disdain for Iberia’s union 
of crowns and declared an oath to restore Portugal’s independence. They succeeded in 
overthrowing the Spanish administration in December 1640. The end of Iberia’s united crown 
led to negotiations between the Netherlands and Portugal aimed at creating an anti-Spanish 
alliance. In Brazil, an ominous sign foretold the developments in Spain. On November 13, 1640, 
a solar eclipse darkened the sky above Brazil. The Dutch chronicler Caspar van Baerle later 
recounted that while “the cause for this phenomenon is well known,” for many the eclipse 
“raised their hopes.” Denizens of the West India Company interpreted the blackout as a 
favorable metaphor for the “fall and extinction of Spain’s glory in these regions” and “extolled 
Count Johan Maurits, who had diminished the bright splendor and honor of Spain’s royal 
powers.”16  
 Dutch and Portuguese leaders in Brazil agreed to temporarily suspend hostilities when 
news of Portugal’s independence reached them in early 1641. The leaders recognized they now 
shared an enemy in Spain but neither was sure of what to expect of their own relationship going 
forward. Johan Maurits stalled and waited on instructions from the Dutch Republic.17 The Heren 
XIX worried that a negotiated treaty with Portugal would end with the loss of tough-won 
Brazilian territories. They instructed Johan Maurits to launch an aggressive expansion campaign 
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to prevent such losses while they continued negotiations back in Europe. This marked a drastic 
change in the character of Dutch Brazil. Once risky endeavors and pursuits to expand the 
Company’s presence were now seen as essential as the Dutch worked against time, hoping to 
acquire as much territory as possible before the Dutch concluded a treaty with Portugal.18  
 Johan Maurits’ campaign to seize territory throughout Brazil and Africa proved successful. 
His first goal was to gain a foothold in the African slave trade. While the Company had long 
wavered on the issue of the transatlantic slave trade, Johan Maurits believed a steady supply of 
African labor essential to Dutch Brazil’s success. He set his sights on the strategic Portuguese 
slave port in Luanda. The source of most of Portugal’s and Spain’s slave labor, Luanda exported 
Angolan and Congolese slaves believed to be more familiar with plantation agriculture than 
slaves from the Gold Coast. In May 1641, Johan Maurits sent an expedition force supported by 
250 to 300 Brasilianen under the command of Cornelis Jol to capture the city. Several months 
later, Jol captured São Tomé, a Portuguese sugar-producing island and key transit stop in the 
Atlantic slave trade. Back in Brazil, Johan Maurits pushed the southern and northern borders of 
Dutch Brazil slightly forward. In the south, an expedition captured the captaincy of Sergipe and 
extended the Dutch border beyond the Rio São Francisco and in the north, a separate expedition 
capture the city of São Luis de Maranhão, both in 1641.19  
 The 1641 expeditions and conquests marked the Company’s territorial zenith.20 The 
Portuguese and the Dutch Republic signed an agreement in late 1641, followed a year later by a 
formal truce between Johan Maurits and the Portuguese in Bahia. Cease fires in Angola and São 
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Tomé soon followed. Company officials were confident in their circumstances even though 
Portuguese grievances began pouring into the Dutch Republic that the Company’s advances 
violated the terms of the final agreement. By 1664, the Company had a firm hold in Brazil and 
West Africa as well as in North America and, to some extent, the Caribbean. Believing the 
treaties would hold, the Heren XIX recalled Johan Maurits and many of his troops, and waited for 
the profits to flow.21 Their enterprise, however, quickly began to crumble.  
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4. Rain & Drought in Maranhão 
Casper van Baerle captured Dutch hopes for Brazil in a single sentence in 1647. The promise of 
Brazil, opined Van Baerle, centered on its supposed natural abundance and the readiness of its 
allegedly oppressed indigenous peoples to provide aid to their self-described Dutch liberators.22 
The grand dreams of Brazil also held true for Maranhão – a small island and captaincy along 
Brazil’s northeastern coast. Company employees ventured to Maranhão as early as 1623 and by 
l640, the region’s healthy climate, fertile soils, salt and silver mines, and an abundance of 
indigenous peoples whose “aid and goodwill” could be applied in a variety of ways, captured the 
attention of Company leaders.23 Maranhão’s geographic position made it an ideal point to defend 
against Spanish attacks and launch assaults against Portuguese trading vessels. A year later the 
Company launched a successful campaign to seize the region from the Portuguese.   
 The Company’s plans for the region could not have veered farther off course. Less than 
three years after Company soldiers arrived, the region’s indigenous population and climate had 
turned against them. The indigenous Brasilianen, spurred on by Portuguese propaganda and 
support, took advantage of a weather-beaten Dutch force to launch a violent resistance in 1642 
that successfully forced the Company to abandon the region by April 1644.   
 Climate alone did not cause indigenous peoples to revolt against Dutch control in the 
1640s. Instead, climate compounded the Natives’ tenuous conditions initiated by an era of 
European colonialism. Mission villages or aldeias lay at the heart of the Brasilianen’s ills. 
Originally established by French Jesuits, Brasilianen continued to live in mission villages under 
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subsequent Portuguese and Dutch control. Once confined, mission Indians became a reliable 
source of labor for colonial officials. Europeans forced the Brasilianen to work on salt flats and 
in sugar mills and tend to agricultural fields that fed both Company soldiers and Natives 
themselves. When extreme rains destroyed crop fields, the Brasilianen, who had been cut-off 
from their traditional subsistence practices, became dependent on colonial officials for daily food 
rations that were drawn from the Company’s magazines. The Brasilianen became the first to 
suffer when weather-related crop failures and Company supply-line breakdowns caused food 
supplies to dwindle. The failure of Company officials to live up to their promises pushed the 
Brasilianen to join the Portuguese in a resistance against the Dutch.  
 Extreme weather did not differentiate between Europeans and Natives. Rains and droughts 
catalyzed a string of local-level decisions that enraged indigenous peoples and hindered the 
ability of Company leaders to address growing indigenous disdain for the Dutch. During the 
early 1640s, extreme weather events stretched Dutch commanders’ abilities to supply and 
maintain garrisons at the fringes of the Company’s expanding territory as well as at its core. As a 
result, Johan Maurits was forced to place his expansionist ambitions on hold. According to at 
least one contemporaneous Dutch writer, this hold pattern prevented the Company from 
capturing key agricultural regions that could have resolved the supply crisis.24 Johan Maurits’ 
orders precluded local leaders from advancing and tasked them with maintaining their positions 
with limited supplies. Local Company leaders in Maranhão responded to the growing subsistence 
crisis by ordering Brasilianen to work longer hours in order to increase food production. 
Maranhão’s leaders did so despite their inability to uphold promises to pay the Brasilianen for 
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their work. As a result of these and other grievances, the Brasilianen joined the Portuguese in a 
violent resistance.  
 The two-pronged assault of extreme weather and indigenous resistance in Maranhão was a 
turning point in the Company’s control of Brazil and its entire Atlantic enterprise. The 
Portuguese seized on the Company’s supply crisis, its loss of Maranhão, and the departure of 
Johan Maurits in order “to transform their smoldering resentment against the hated heretics into 
action.”25 The Portuguese fed the flames of indigenous resistance and ignited a war against the 
Dutch to retake Brazil. Their efforts were rewarded nine years later when the Dutch ceded 
control of Brazil back to the Portuguese. 
 Profits drove Dutch interest in Maranhão, but money was not their sole motivation. Caspar 
van Baerle’s 1647 publication The History of Brazil, based on sundry sources available to him in 
the Netherlands, described Maranhão in detail. According to Baerle, Maranhão was a pleasant 
and agreeable place. A southeasterly breeze made for a healthy climate and rid the land of mists 
and infectious miasmas. And while March, April, and May witnesses heavy rains the rest of the 
year remained calm. The hot climate only added to the fecundity of the land and yielded ample 
harvests of manioc, sugarcane, brazil wood, saffron, cotton, pepper, and tobacco.26   
 Baerle continued his history of Brazil with a description of the region’s indigenous peoples. 
Baerle found the tall, sturdy, and supposedly cannibalistic Brasilianen perfectly suited to carry 
the heavy loads produced by Maranhão’s fertile soils. In Baerle’s mind, the Brasilianen’s deep 
hatred for both the Portuguese and Tapuyas – Portugal’s indigenous allies – made them vital 
allies in the Company’s pursuits in Brazil. Willem Usselincx, an early champion for a West 
Indian equivalent to the VOC, made a similar argument in 1608. Usselincx envisioned Brazil as 
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one of several cash crop colonies. Riches and wealth, he argued, came not through mining silver 
and gold alone but instead in the aggregate trade of natural commodities such as sugar, indigo, 
dye woods, and cotton. Brazil stood foremost amongst potential sites that could make his vision 
a reality. To wrench these goods from Brazil’s fertile soils, Usselincx, a fervent believer in the 
superiority of free labor over enslaved, intended that local Natives could one day be employed as 
voluntary paid laborers to work the fields.  
 Dutch nomenclature divided Brazil’s supposedly willing indigenous peoples into two 
groups: Brasilianen and Tapuyas. The division perpetuated a false oversimplification of the 
diverse peoples of Brazil that the Portuguese had first established and the Dutch later adopted. In 
reality, the Brasilianen consisted of various Tupi-speaking peoples from coastal Brazil who had 
been gathered together by the Portuguese and placed in Jesuit-run missions during the sixteenth 
century. For this reason they were also referred to as indios aldeados or Indians of the aldeias 
(Jesuit mission villages). In contrast, the Tapuyas, a generic term for several tribes, resided 
further inland in the arid backcountry known as the Sertão. Regardless of the plurality of Brazil’s 
indigenous groups, the Dutch believed that this dichotomy would allow them to exploit 
indigenous disregard for Portuguese rulers. Instead, these tribes, as seen on multiple occasions 
during the Netherlands’ short-lived control over the Maranhão, continuously invoked their 
sovereignty to determine who to aid and when.27 
 The Dutch Republic’s plans and policies for Maranhão’s indigenous inhabitants failed to 
account for the region’s turbulent climate and earlier colonial history.28 Brazil’s seasonal 
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fluctuations between heavy rains during the first half of the year and drought in the second half 
had important and lasting repercussions on the Netherlands’ colonial ambitions. The most 
prevalent concern to soldiers and officers was a lack of food. Reports of inadequate food supply 
and exhausted magazines pepper the archival records of Brazil. A combination of operational 
failures, poor Company planning, and extreme weather caused the shortages. Drought left crops 
desiccated while heavy rains caused them to rot; both situations led to meager harvests, reduced 
rations, and hungry personnel. Heavy rains also negatively impacted the quantity of salt and 
sugar ready to be shipped – all to the detriment of already marginal profits. Exceptionally heavy 
rain battered hastily built or shoddily repaired fortifications – damages that required the attention 
of the too-few carpenters and under-manned garrisons. Extreme weather, however, also had 
impacts of which most observers were unaware. Drought correlated with the outbreak of 
smallpox epidemics including a 1642 epidemic that struck Maranhão. While the origin of this 
particular outbreak has more to do with the movement of individuals between villages and the 
spread of the disease amongst Indians in confined mission villages, extreme weather might have 
increased its intensity.29 Climate-induced famines led to higher rates of indigenous 
malnourishment that would have compromised indigenous immune systems and made them 
more vulnerable to disease.  
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 Extreme weather’s ability to impact societies cannot be divorced from a society’s social 
and cultural context. In the case of the Maranhão, turbulent interactions with the French and later 
the Portuguese profoundly shaped the region’s indigenous societies. In 1594, several ships 
including a French corsair ran aground off Brazil’s northeastern coast. The shipwrecked French 
made their way to dry land where they encountered a group of Tupinambá who had migrated 
from Pernambuco to Maranhão after the Portuguese arrived there in the 1590s. Upon their return 
to France, the Frenchmen’s earlier interactions spurred them to later champion a colony in 
Maranhão. In 1612, after receiving a royal charter to do so, several ships sailed to claim 
Maranhão for France. The French made haste to convert the local indigenous population to 
Catholicism and planned to expand their conquest in the region. The Tupinambá, according to 
French accounts, eagerly welcomed the French and jumped at the chance to parlay their new 
European connections into an attack on the Camarapin – their enemies who dwelled in “huts 
built on stilts in the marshy islands at the mouth of the [Maranhão] river.”30  
 The Portuguese soon joined the French in an imperial competition for Maranhão. The 
Portuguese had begun expanding into the northeast from their base of operations in Pernambuco 
several years before France laid claim to Maranhão. By 1612, the Portuguese had firmly 
established control in Paraíba and Rio Grande do Norte – lands occupied by the Potiguar – and 
were marching west towards Ceará. France’s arrival in Maranhão propelled the Portuguese to 
double their efforts.  
 The Tobajara residing in Ceará’s Ibiapaba hills stood between the Portuguese marching 
from the east and the French and the Tupinambá residing in Maranhão. In 1603, the Portuguese 
sent Pero Coelho de Sousa and a force of 65 Portuguese and 200 indigenous allies into Ceará. 
                                                            




His troops had to overcome hunger and resilient Ibiapaba tribes, but the Portuguese ultimately 
succeeded in forcing thirty villages to submit to their rule. The Portuguese’s colonization 
attempts quickly fizzled out, however, when a drought struck Ceará in 1616. The dry spell killed 
several Portuguese farmers and pushed the survivors to abandon the colony. A Jesuit mission 
soon followed Coelho de Sousa’s failed colonization effort. Two missionaries tasked with 
converting the Tobajara tribes of the Ibiapaba hills traveled to Ceará in January 1607. Using gifts 
of tools and clothing, Francisco Pinto and Luís Figueria succeeded in converting several 
Tobajara, but failed to convert Gê-speaking tribes including the Cariri and Tacariju. The Tacariju 
doubted the missionaries’ motives and attacked the two men on January 11, 1608. They killed 
Pinto while Figueria hid in the woods. After the killing, Figueria buried his friend and returned to 
Rio Grande.31  
 In the end, the Portuguese succeeded in taking Ceará not with guns or gospel, but with the 
open hand of Martím Soares Moreno. Martím Soares was a young Portuguese officer with a deep 
interest in the customs, culture, and language of Brazil’s indigenous peoples. His friendship with 
the indigenous peoples of Ceará allowed the Portuguese to expand to the Camocim River, 250 
miles from Maranhão and within striking distance of France’s newly founded colony. Early in 
October of 1608, King Philip ordered the attack.32  
 Portuguese efforts to expel the French in Maranhão relied heavily upon indigenous 
support. The Portuguese allied with the Potiguar, negotiated with indigenous chiefs in Rio 
Grande, rallied the support of some 370 mission Indians, and brokered an alliance with the 
Tobajara and the Tremembé (a Tapuya tribe that dwelled off the coast of Maranhão near the 
Paraíba River). Portugal’s indigenous allies provided soldiers, food, weapons, and intelligence. 
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Meanwhile, the French could only muster the assistance of the Tupinambá. Though even this 
relationship appeared fragile. One Tupinambá shaman prophesied against the French that “I will 
make the roots in their garden die, so that they will die of hunger.”33 
 In August 1614, the Portuguese set sail to attack the newly built French fort of St. Louis on 
the island of Maranhão. Though outnumbered against a force consisting of 400 French soldiers 
and 2000 Natives, the Portuguese launched a surprise attack on the fort on November 19 that left 
90 French and 400 Indians dead. More importantly, the Portuguese attack convinced France’s 
Tupinambá allies to switch their alliance. A year later after a year-long truce expired, the 
Portuguese attacked again and the French surrendered.34 
 The Portuguese moved to consolidate their control in Maranhão to the detriment of the 
Tupinambá. While Portuguese Jesuits, under the leadership of Luís Figuera, assumed control of 
the twenty-seven former French Franciscan missions on the island of Maranhão, Portuguese 
commanders pushed into the countryside. The Portuguese encountered several indigenous tribes 
during their efforts but poor Portuguese leadership led to weak relations. The fragile relations 
shattered in 1617 after a Jesuit-trained Indian courier claimed that one of the letters he carried 
detailed Portuguese plans to enslave the Tupinambá. In order to prevent their own enslavement, 
the Tupinambá attacked the Portuguese at Tapuitapera (near São Luís) and launched a three-year 
offensive against Portuguese encroachment. In 1619, after multiple attacks and counterattacks, a 
new Portuguese governor, Jerónimo Fragoso de Albuquerque, along with a ruthless Portuguese 
woodsman, Bento Maciel Parente, had had enough. Individually, they systematically hunted 
down the mainland Tupinambá. Several Tupinambá survivors migrated and joined other tribes, 
while others surrendered and were put to work on Portuguese settlements. The Portuguese spared 
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the Tupinambá on Maranhão who had maintained an allegiance to the Portuguese throughout the 
war. The Portuguese could not, however, protect their indigenous allies from the ravishing 
damages wrought by colonial diseases. In 1621, smallpox entered the missions of São Luís and 
quickly spread through the 27 villages.35  
 The Tupinambá who survived the devastation of smallpox lived only to be forced into 
slave-like working conditions by Portuguese planters. The Portuguese planters argued that 
African slaves were too expensive and instead relied upon Native labor. The Portuguese acquired 
Indian slaves through slaving expeditions along the Amazon River and from the missions. As a 
result of enslavement, by 1636 the villages of Maranhão and Tapuitapera had been reduced from 
almost two thousand bowmen to less than five hundred and only ten of the original 27 aldeia 
remained.36  
 The tense relationships between Maranhão’s indigenous population and the Portuguese 
explains the Natives’ initial willingness to embrace Dutch Company forces. The Company put 
their plan to take Maranhão into effect in October of 1641. Their principle objective was the city 
of São Luís located on the island of Maranhão. Admiral Jan Cornelis Lichthart and Colonel 
Johan van Kühn (Coin), both experienced military commanders, led the assault. Armed with 
eight months of provisions, the leaders planned to first stop in Ceará in order to gather supplies, 
find a Portuguese pilot capable of navigating the little-known territory, and enlist “Brasilianen or 
others” to serve in the attack. Their orders also stipulated that they were to enlist the help of 
Gideon Morris to “make contractual alliances with the Indians living between Ceará and 
Maranhão,” presumably in Comestij.37  
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 Lichthart’s and Kühn’s orders gave specific instructions on how to interact with 
Maranhão’s indigenous population. Once the Company had seized their objective, the 
Brasilianen from Ceará would be allowed to return to their homes while the local “Indian 
Nations” would be granted full freedom. While the Council in Recife advised this measure in 
order to secure their assistance in later conflicts and to ensure that the city would “enjoy the 
merits and benefits” of the land, their wording implies a more calculated and profit-oriented 
motive. Once given their freedom, the Council hoped that these indigenous peoples would serve 
as laborers so as to prevent the colony from becoming an “uncultivated and unprofitable 
possession” owing to the region’s “lack of slaves.” The orders reiterated this point stating that 
Natives would be granted full freedom “in order to better cultivate the land.” While the 
Company’s local garrison would benefit from indigenous cultivation of manioc, Company 
employees were prohibited from holding either Indians or Africans as slaves, except those 
bought directly from the Company. A single adult African male, a single African women, or three 
African children would be sold at 40 gulden. Indians would be sold at half the African rate.38   
 The Dutch attack fleet faced a torrent of troubles before ever arriving in Maranhão. A storm 
battered the convoy while it was still en route to Ceará. Strong waves snapped lines and caused 
many ships to abandon their anchors. Making matters worse, either due to the strong winds, 
navigational error, or a combination of both, the fleet overshot Ceará by nearly 30 miles. They 
realized their mistake when Gideon Morris sailed to the distressed fleet to tell them. Morris also 
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came bearing additional bad news. He could only spare some 70 Brasilianen from Ceará, a 
number considerably less than requested, due in part to an outbreak of smallpox and the need for 
indigenous labor in Ceará’s nearby saltpans. He did, however, manage to gain the support of a 
few Tapuya and Brasilianen in Comestij, who brought the total indigenous fighting force to 80.39 
 The Company fleet finally arrived at Maranhão on November 25, 1641 and quickly took 
control of the island. Two Dutch ships, the Tijger and the Wildeboer, sustained damages en route 
to the landing site, but suffered only a single wounded man each. These would be the only 
casualties in the assault. The Portuguese did not put up any opposition. Instead, when the fleet 
landed, two Portuguese representatives approached Lord Colonel Kühn and requested the Dutch 
enter into negotiations with the Portuguese governor of São Luís, Bento Maciel Parente. Kühn 
agreed.40  
 News of Maranhão’s capture reached Recife early in January along with a copy of the final 
agreement reached between Company commanders and Parente.41 In the accord, Parente 
protested the Company’s right to attack and possess Maranhão. He had received news of a peace 
agreement between Portugal and the Netherlands stating that neither country could attack the 
other. As a result, the accord acted more as a temporary cease-fire than a full surrender. It put the 
Dutch in charge of the fort, stripped the Portuguese of their weapons and ammo, and afforded the 
Portuguese the right to stay in the fort until a proper settlement could be concluded by Johan 
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 86 
Maurits and the High Council.42 The Company also allowed Portuguese planters to maintain 
possession of their property. A move that various Company officials later sharply criticized.43 
 Kühn and Lichthart reported to the High Council that Maranhão’s indigenous peoples had 
quickly submitted to Company control. The commanders calculated that about 300 Brasilianen, 
living in three separate mission villages, resided on the island and that these Natives had shown 
honesty and full contentment towards the Dutch. Approximately 25 additional Native households 
resided in two additional aldeias in Tipuitapere. These Natives lived a humble existence in what 
they described as a “simple place” – producing only enough farina, tobacco, and wool to meet 
their own needs. Each of these groups, along with the Native inhabitants of Tapicuru, appeared 
before the Dutch commander and requested to be “taken under their protection.”44 The Dutch 
commanders agreed and issued orders regarding the future treatment of these indigenous 
peoples. “No Brasilianen or anyone from an Indian tribe could be bound into slavery” and 
additionally “they would enjoy the same right to freedom as any Dutch.”45 In doing so, Kühn and 
Lichthart imitated a similar policy used by Johan Maurits to solicit the support and service of 
Natives living in Ceará.46  
 The Company employed their Brasilianen allies in a wide range of agricultural and 
militaristic occupations. Foremost, the Company employed Native warriors as mercenaries to 
support the Company’s territorial ambitions and many received wages for their military service. 
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During times of peace, the Company’s indigenous allies cut wood, wrangled cattle, and drove 
carts as hired-out laborers in the employ of Portuguese settlers (moradores). They also played an 
important role in hunting down escaped runaway slaves and cultivating manioc. For the most 
part, the Brasilianen spent their time cultivating crops and engaging in military skirmishes.47 
 Company leaders quickly went to work to determine whether their conquest would be 
profitable. Kühn took inventory of the fort and began exploring the surrounding area. He found 
55 canons, a good quantity of powder, and a bit of wine that was quickly consumed. A total of 45 
enemy ships of various sizes were found, seized, and put into the employment of the Company. 
Only six working mills and three unfinished mills of lesser value were found on or near the 
island. Together, Kühn estimated the mills could produce approximately 600 chests of sugar per 
year. To expedite profits the commanders entered into a contract for a total of 300 chests of sugar 
with the “Lords of the Ingenios” in Tapicuru. They sent an additional three ships to Barbados and 
St. Christopher Island to search for any profitable goods that might be found there. As for the salt 
pans that had been touted to exist in Maranhão, unidentified sources alluded that the pans were 
not yet prepared, but could be put into service with a little money and effort so that the Company 
could expect at least some profit.48  
 The commanders concluded that about 600 men should be left behind in order to secure the 
Company’s newly-acquired outpost.49 Company leaders, however, would have a hard time 
justifying the expense of maintaining so many men. A sizable quantity of rations had been 
offloaded from the initial attack’s support ships in order to support the remaining troops prior to 
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their return to Recife. Spanish wine, brandy, oil, vinegar, meat, speck, stockfish, rye flour, farina, 
peas, beans, boards, and a bit of bread should have sufficed until additional rations could be 
sent.50 Unfortunately, upon inspection, Commissioner J. Sichvriet found that the wet rations had 
reached precariously low levels and much of the dry rations had spoiled.51 Just over a month 
after arriving, the Company’s magazines had already begun to deteriorate. Supplies, tools, 
rations, and medicine necessary for the fortification, maintenance, and defense of the fort were 
urgently needed if the Company wanted to maintain its grip on Maranhão.52  
 Maranhão was not alone in its desperate need for provisions. Reports from throughout 
Dutch-controlled regions of Brazil flooded into Recife during 1642. Local commanders 
bemoaned the scarcity of provisions, a sober state, and a great hunger. As early as May, outposts 
in Rio Grande, Paraíba, Sergipe, Rio San Francisco, Porto Calvo, and as far away as St. Thomé 
repeatedly petitioned the Council in Recife requesting flour, bacon, and meat. The Council 
agreed to arrange provisions for those place which “could not obtain their necessities from the 
land” so far as the “state of our magazines can bear.” The Company, however, often bore much 
less than what the outposts required. Two months later, as the dry season set in, additional 
requests began arriving from Sergipe del Rey and Rio Grande with letters continuing to arrive 
until the end of the year from Recife, Itamaríca, and Maranhão.53  
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 Despite the Council’s desire to resupply desperate outposts, their magazines continuously 
ran on thin margins. The “chronic lack of supplies and provisions” led one admiral to later 
described Recife as a “starvation corner.”54 Johan Maurits and the High Council took the supply 
crisis seriously. Johan Maurits “frequently voiced complaints about the inadequate supply of 
food,” which “place the country at risk of starvation and ruin if provisions were not made in 
time.”55  
 The High Council worked proactively to resolve the situation. Early in January 1642, the 
Council requested that the Heren XIX send additional “soldiers, sailors, treijnpersoonen, 
provisions, medications, material, and other necessary equipment” as soon as possible. The 
quantity of each, they demanded, should be at levels sufficient to meet the needs demanded by 
the newly-acquired outposts of Sergipe, São Thomé, and Maranhão.56 
 The Company’s needs quickly depleted their magazine. By June 1642, the Company had 
consumed the magazine’s meat supply and most other provisions had reached precariously low 
levels.57 Despite frequent requests to patria, the situation still had not improved by August.58 
Making matters worse, August witnessed a rise in the cost of an alquere (bushel) of farinha (flour 
made from manioc) from six schellings to nine. Some suppliers asked 14 to 16 schellings. The 
Council refused to pay this exorbitant price.59 By September, the Company’s magazines were “at 
their end” and the Company only had enough rations for eight more days. Money was worthless, 
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the Council lamented, since there was no food to buy. Officials worried that if the situation 
continued, soldiers would begin plundering homes and wreaking havoc throughout the 
countryside.60  
 The Company had faced shortages in Brazil before. During the early attacks of 1630 and 
1631, both the Portuguese and Dutch suffered from malnutrition. According to historian C.R. 
Boxer, the Dutch, “at one period being reduced to eating cats and rats, while the Portuguese 
soldiers received as their daily ration a single spike of maize each.” Boxer attributes the 
difficulties to the Netherlands’ inexperience in “tropical warfare,” while the Portuguese 
authorities in Lisbon were contending with multiple troubles beyond Brazil including a three 
year drought-induced famine in Portugal.61 Shortages persisted with requests for assistance 
continuing to arrive in the Netherlands in 1632 and 1634.62 The difference in 1641 and 1642 was 
that the shortages came at a punctuation point for Dutch expansion in the region. A time when 
the company wanted to expand its hold throughout the Atlantic world. Without necessary 
supplies, the expansion would come to a screeching halt. 
 The Company’s outposts grew to depend on Recife’s magazine, but the Company’s ability 
to meet those demands grew increasingly difficult. Following news of the Company’s victory in 
Maranhão, the Council, “having suppressed our wills,” begrudgingly agreed to send eight 
months of provisions for 250 people.63 Sending much needed supplies to far off places, though, 
came with immediate push-back from Recife’s European settlers. One colonist, Pieter van Der 
                                                            
60 “Council Deliberation to Obtain Farinha for the Garrisons,” September 16, 1642, NA, OWIC, 1.05.01.01, inv. 
nr. 69. 
61 Boxer, Dutch in Brazil, 41, 54. 
62 “Request for Subsidies to Brazil,” March 31, 1632, NA, States General, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 5753; “Letter 
Declaring Low Rations and Immediate Need of Assistance,” August 30, 1634, NA, States General, 1.01.02, inv. nr. 
5753. 
63 “Lettre from Governor-General Johan Maurits and Council to Heren XIX,” January 16, 1642, NA, OWIC, 
1.05.01.01, inv. nr. 57.144. 
 
 91 
Haghen, complained explicitly about the Council’s administration of rations. He simply stated 
that the handling of the magazines was “very bad” and characterized its manager as a “bloetien,” 
roughly translated as a nitwit. Adriaen van Bullestraten, a member of the High Council, did little 
to help the situation. He ordered the purchase of farinha, which he declared to be of “no value,” 
and then sold it at 16 schellings. And at least in Van Der Haghen’s estimation, the flour 
Bullestrate did send to the outposts was “not fit for baking.”64 
 The Council devised a variety of solutions throughout the year to remedy the colony’s 
persistent supply problems. The immediate and rational solution was to plead to the Heren XIX 
for immediate assistance since the Heren XIX had previously agreed to ration the colony. A 
resolution dated June 20, 1640 stated that every ship heading to Brazil would be loaded with 18 
lasten of rye flour and two lasten of wheat flour. The resolution also stipulated that every 
Company ship would be provided nine months of provisions. This, however, was far too much 
for the Company to supply. Six months later, in December, they decreased the provisioning to 12 
lasten of rye flour and a single lasten of wheat. Brazil’s High Council worried how they would 
be able to support the Company’s expanding presence. The Company now controlled territories 
in Brazil and Africa that stretched from Maranhão to Sergipe del Rey and across the Atlantic to 
St. Paulo in Angola. Any new ships, the High Council replied, must be fully supplied, “because 
we suffer shortages here and it is not possible for us to provide the support needed for such 
distant places.” To emphasize their desperation, they added that ships that “cannot support 
themselves will fall into the enemy’s hands.”65   
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 Desperate need for provisions became a common refrain in the High Council’s reports. 
According to Balthasar van de Voorde, “Everything here is beginning to dissipate, flour…is now 
sold at high prices, there is little Brazilian farinha and what exists is extremely expensive, if the 
ships from the Fatherland linger any longer, we shall fall into great disrepair.”66 The Council 
reiterated the importance of sending provisions, medication, and ammunition not only to support 
“our Garrisons in Brazil,” but also the Company’s newest conquests in Africa including Luanda 
and São Thomé.67 In June, after reviewing an inventory of rations which showed “everything 
lacking,” the Council ordered provisions for 6000 men for 12 months.68 
 The High Council’s requests, while not necessarily falling on deaf ears, could not be 
fulfilled. The Company’s increasing financial disarray prevented them from provisioning Recife. 
Unfortunately, Brazil had come to depend upon the Dutch Republic almost exclusively. This was 
an unintended consequence of a battle pitted between free-traders and monopolists during the 
1630s. C.R. Boxer explains that “fortunes were made by merchants who imported European 
provisions and manufactured goods which they sold or exchanged for sugar; but these fortunes 
were made by private traders for the most part.”69 This upset Company officials and employees 
who saw the unfair accumulation of wealth by those who had not fought to conquer Brazil. In 
1634, the Company sided with the monopolists and issued an edict that reserved the Company’s 
exclusive right on the export of provisions, munitions, and dyewood. They reversed this decision 
in 1638 in an effort to overcome their own financial shortcomings. Now the Company 
maintained a privilege only on slaves, dye woods, and munitions. Everything else could be 
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openly traded, although the Company did institute a license system that required all merchants to 
be shareholders in the Company. The debate, however, would continue to rage until August 1648 
when the Company opened trade completely. As a result of this changing policy and the 
Company’s inadequate financial resources, shipments that arrived in Brazil usually fell far short 
of requested amounts and arrived instead “in bits and pieces.”70  
 Unable to secure a reliable stream of supplies from the Dutch Republic, the High Council 
implemented additional measures to acquire provisions. They first tried to purchase provisions 
locally. In June, due to a shortage of meat in the magazines, the High Council granted 
commissary Sweerts permission to purchase three to four thousand pounds of stockfish to 
provision outgoing ships.71 The same month, the Council moved to replace rations of potspijse 
with farinha.72 The next month the Council notified the ships in Porto Calvo to purchase 800 
bushels of farinha and send it to Recife “for the support of the soldiers and citizens where there is 
a great shortage.”73 A similar appeal was made the following month, this time for 600 bushels of 
farinha from Iguaracú.74 In September, the Council gave Luis Gomes 1000 guilders to purchase 
farinha in St. Laurens and transport it back to Recife. For his services, his family was granted a 
reprieve from the dues (reverantie) of farinha.75 
 Simply ordering the purchase of farinha, however, did not ensure a ready supply. Many of 
the Council’s orders went unfilled. Manioc, from which farinha is produced, is typically planted 
in northeastern Brazil early in the rainy season (December through January) and can be harvested 
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nine to twelve months later (September through October).76 In times of need, farmers could 
harvest smaller portions as early as six months (June through July) and in times of plenty up to 
eighteen months later.77 The Council expected the supply of farinha to surge by September 1642 
at the start of the harvest season when they hoped to once again purchase farinha at nine 
schelling per bushel.78 Unfortunately, no such bounty came. News arrived from Serinhais 
(Sirinhaém) in Pernambuco in September that “the district had been able to make enough farinha 
to support their own garrisons, but not enough to send to [Recife].”79 Similar news arrived from 
Bahia in December.80 Concerned that “currently no place” was producing enough farinha “to 
ration the garrisons,” the Council continued to look elsewhere for a food supply and sent out 
orders that any farinha that “exceeds the needed rations for soldiers in outposts should be sent [to 
Recife].”81 
 The supply shortages of 1642 moved the Council to make a concerted effort to encourage 
local cultivation to abate the current crisis and create a long-term solution. In December 1641, 
“with the time to plant for the coming year at hand,” the Council ordered placards posted so that 
an “abundance of farinha be planted” to “prevent an extreme of famine” if the scarcity of 
provisions from patria or the “infertility of the land continued another year.”82 They renewed the 
placards in January.83 Placards included specific requirements detailing exactly how much 
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farinha should be planted. In February 1642, this amounted to “five hundred covas de Mandioca” 
for every African slave a planter possessed and an additional thousand for all other inhabitants. 
The renewed placards were “emanated, charged and ordered to all the possessions which fall 
under our obedience” and the High Council ordered that “all courts of magistrates…publicize 
and post” the accords so that no individual could claim “ignorance.”84 Due to the “large scarcity 
of farinha which one currently sees in these conquests,” failure to meet these requirements would 
result in apprehension, litigation, fines, and punishment. While the Council believed that “harsh 
punishment” was the only means to exact their orders, many planters still preferred to 
concentrate their efforts on the more lucrative sugar fields.85 
 The Council continued to worry about the prolongation of a food shortage. In March 1642, 
a lengthy Council discussion resulted in the renewal and elaboration of the placards. The Council 
attributed a continual increase in the price of farinha to the disobeyance of the placards, the 
“former bad crops,” and the “small output from the Netherlands.” In order to mitigate future 
price increases, the Council forbid hoarding of farinha and declared that individuals should only 
maintain enough farinha to “support their family and laborers.” In addition, the Council extended 
the reach of the placards and included orders to “promote an increase in the multiplication of 
cattle.” No one would be allowed “to carry out the slaughter of any cows, calfs, or oxen” unless 
the animal became “unfit due to old age or injury.”86 
 The placards, though benign in nature, were not hollow threats. Schouts, an administrative 
position combining the roles of sheriff and prosecutor, visited districts throughout Dutch Brazil 
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to ensure planters obeyed the placards. Though the regularity of their visits is unclear, schouts 
typically visited as a result of unfulfilled quotas. This was the case in August 1642 when the 
High Council request the schout of Igaracú visit the Parish of St. Amaro following complaints 
that the residents “could no longer provide farinha to the Company in support of the garrisons.” 
In addition to checking that the residents had planted farinha according to orders, the High 
Council requested the schout ensure that residents had taken all means to ensure that those in 
Recife “may obtain a good quantity of farinha.”87 Another schout reported the same day that he 
had “visited all the farinha plantings throughout the entire district of Maúrits and found that all 
conformed to the latest emanated order, yet no one could have a complete crop before the 
upcoming month of January and that the manioc was extraordinarily damaged.”88 Some areas 
requested a reduction or delay in farinha quotes to avoid potential fines associated with schout 
visits. In June 1642, a message arrived from Serinhais (Sirinhaém) in Pernambuco requesting “a 
liberation from farinha in support of the garrisons there for a time of four to five months” so that 
their crops might reach maturity since harvesting too early would result in “significant damage” 
to the crop.89 
 Increasing the size of arable land remained yet another option for remedying the persistent 
food shortages. In Recife, the focus of agricultural expansion fell upon Alagoas, an area lying 
between Pernambuco to the north and Sergipe to the south. Alagoas had become a prosperous 
sugar producing region by 1642, but Johan Maurits and the High Council became convinced that 
it could also produce subsistence crops in support of the colony in general. In fact, they believed 
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that “populating the Alagoas…to be the only remedy to set these lands outside of famine.”90 
They double-downed on this proposition after hearing that the Portuguese before them had never 
been able to support themselves except through outside support from Portugal. As such, Johan 
Maurits prepared to travel to Alagoas in order to survey and evaluate its agricultural potential.91 
Yet, despite repeated petitions to seize the region, the financially conservative members of the 
Heren XIX refused to support the conquest and the “projects came to nothing.”92 
 Similar expansionist appeals arrived in Recife from Maranhão. As early as April 1642, 
Gideon Morris championed the necessity of extending the Company’s control beyond Maranhão 
farther west towards Gran Para and the Amazon River. Morris, describing the situation, fertility, 
and profitability of Maranhão, explained that the region was “not as great as I had supposed in 
my writings.” The cause of the discrepancy, however, was not a personal oversight but rather the 
result of the Company failure to “fully execute the conquest as I had proposed.” Morris argued 
that a complete conquest required the seizure of Gran Para and the Amazon River because “these 
belong under one government” and “that one cannot exist without the other.” It would also have 
required the Company to seize all property and possessions from the Portuguese. Morris deemed 
Gran Para and the Amazon River “of more importance than Maranhão itself” for several reasons. 
First, the region contained more fertile soil better suited for the cultivation of sugar and tobacco. 
Second, the land was “richer in people because there is an uncountable number of Indians who 
can be used to cultivate the land.” Third, there was an abundance of trade to be had in slaves, 
manatees (zeecoyen), dyes, and cotton. And finally, a great possibility existed to discover gold 
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and silver mines.93 The Council, faced with a growing supply shortage and unable to provision 
already existing outposts, presumably tabled Morris’s request.  
 The Council did everything in their power to ensure a prosperous expansion in Brazil, but 
several extenuating factors placed the cause of the crisis out of their control. Operational and 
climatological factors were at work. The Company had planned to provision Company forces 
during its initial assault in Brazil, but they had never intended to provision them on a long-term, 
continuous basis. They hoped that the promised bounty of New Netherland would eventually 
produce enough to provide subsistence to both itself and possessions in the Caribbean and Brazil. 
These hopes never materialized due to New Netherland’s own subsistence crisis and growing 
indigenous unrest. 
 Dutch Brazil, like New Netherland and the Dutch Republic, also failed to provide the 
colony with sufficient agricultural goods. C.R. Boxer attributes the cause of this failure to 
inconsistent immigration policies and the uncooperativeness of the skilled agricultural laborers 
who did come. Johan Maurits advocated on multiple occasions for the immigration of Dutch and 
German farmers to Dutch Brazil declaring it “the sole means of securing this conquest for us.”94 
The Heren XIX agreed in October 1641 writing, “the welfare of the Company depended on 
peopling the land.”95 Motivating Dutch farmers to risk a trans-Atlantic journey, however, proved 
difficult if not impossible. The Dutch Republic, unlike other European nations that suffered 
during the attendant Little Ice Age, was in the midst of a Golden Age. And those who did not 
gain directly from the wealth of the age could rely upon a safety net offered by the church and 
emerging welfare-state. The farmers who did arrive in Dutch Brazil failed to live up to Johan 
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Maurits’ expectations. They only temporarily took up plows in rural areas. Farming proved 
difficult and far from lucrative. Many instead exchanged their spade for a chance at trade in 
Recife which lured them in with promises of quick returns and long-lasting riches.96 
 The Company’s failure to promote a bountiful agricultural community meant they had to 
purchase subsistence goods from Portuguese inhabitants throughout Brazil. With the scarcity and 
high price of grain, the Company’s financial situation became even more strained. The 
Company’s indebtedness reverberated throughout their enterprise and left those in charge of 
Brazil with a chronic lack of cash. The High Council required an infusion of gold and silver if 
they wanted to keep the conquests out of enemy hands. Monthly reports reveal that despite low 
cash balances, the Council was able to purchase goods and pay wages, though never completely 
and often sporadically.97 As a result, debts rose, stock piles ran low, officers complained about 
lost wages, indigenous allies went unpaid, and unrest festered throughout.98 
 In addition to purchasing subsistence goods from the Portuguese, the Company 
increasingly relied upon their Brasilianen allies to sow, plow, and harvest subsistence goods. 
These provisions fed hungry soldiers, sailors, officers, slaves, and indigenous peoples 
themselves. Gideon Morris emerged as a leading proponent of employing Brasilianen. He wrote 
to the Council in August 1641 complaining about an attempt by Andries Edolffes to lure 
Brasilianen “using sweet words and great promises” away from Ceará in order to transport them 
to Rio Grande. Morris hoped to retain as many Brasilianen as possible in Ceará so that he could 
employ them in the making of salt and on plantations so that “we should not suffer a shortage 
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due to lack of provisions.”99 By the summer of 1643, the Brasilianen in Maranhão had been put 
to work producing provisions for the entire garrison there including themselves.100 
 Extreme weather events, in the form of disastrous and torrential rainfall in 1641 and 1642, 
proved the most detrimental factor in the direct provisioning of Dutch Brazil. All attempts to 
provision the colony from within, whether by encouraging Dutch farmers, purchasing provisions 
from Portuguese planters, or receiving assistance from indigenous allies, failed when extreme 
weather hit the colony between 1641 and 1642.  
 Northeastern Brazil typically experiences heavy rain between December and May with the 
heaviest rains coming in April and May. The dry season quickly follows ending with the driest 
months of the year in September and October. In 1641, the rainy season began as usual but by 
April had pushed rivers over their banks and flooded fields. Van Baerle described the impact in 
spectacular detail. “The movement of surging and receding waves pulled away what had been 
planted. The dams were either submerged or broken, leaving the cultivated fields flooded and no 
longer visible. As a result, ships sailed across them, and the landowners served as sailors. The 
death and destruction of people and animals were a great loss.”101 May came and went without a 
stop in the rain. In June, Albert Smient wrote from Salinas and bemoaned the terrible conditions 
there. He contributed his distress to the “rainy season which persisted so extraordinarily long."102 
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He repeated his lament two months later stating that the first days of dry weather finally began 
on August 8, two months later than usual.103 
 Johan Maurits and the Council of Brazil, reflecting upon the previous year, relayed the 
concerns of Smient and others like him to the Heren XIX in February 1642. Poor weather, they 
wrote, caused the previous “unseasonable year” and had prevented the Council from rationing 
garrisons despite their continued dissemination of placards requiring the planting of farinha. 
“The first planting of farinha was destroyed,” they wrote, “by the great cold and long lasting 
dampness.” A second painting failed to mature due to “the persistent drought.”104 Rain continued 
to plague fields and farmers. The continuous deluge prompted David Wiltschut, Commander in 
Rio St. Francisco, to assert that “here in six years such high water never has been.”105 The 
overflowing river, he lamented, had pulled out the fields and rotted the remaining roots. Farinha, 
needless-to-say, would not be coming from Rio St. Francisco.  
 Hunger reached beyond just Company personnel and struck the aldeias and slave quarters 
throughout New Holland as well. Indigenous peoples, forced into aldeias and given little option 
but to work, were able to provide some subsistence goods to the Company during good harvests, 
but when extreme weather hit, they too became dependent on the generosity (or neglect) of the 
Company. Even when the Brasilianen plowed and harvested the fields themselves the rations 
they produced typically went directly into the Company’s magazines to be distributed amongst 
the entire population.  
 Indigenous reliance upon the Company for provisions began as early as 1641. Due to 
flooding in the aldeia of Mauritia, all the Brasilianen’s plantings rotted. The Council stepped in 
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to assist and agreed to send 12 bushels of farinha and 25 pounds of stockfish to the aldeia on a 
weekly basis for a period of three months.106 Later in December the Council ordered the schout 
from Igracú to produce 200 bushels of farinha for the benefit of the Brasilianen who had been 
working in the salt mines near the River Upanemina.107 The Company brought 200 Tapuya who 
appeared near Rio St. Francisco to an aldeia to prevent them from consuming the cattle herds 
roaming in the region as well as strengthen the aldeia population that had fallen due to hunger 
and smallpox.108  
 Consolidating the free Brasilianen population in aldeias became a common remedy 
proposed by the Council to counter the declining mission Indian population. Once placed in the 
enclosed mission, Company officials could force the Brasilianen to work for the Company. 
While this presumably increased the death toll amongst the indigenous population by exposing 
additional Indians to smallpox and other diseases, it also began to chew into the Company’s 
diminished magazines. By June 1642, the Council began to send groups of Tapuya located in 
Recife to other aldeias in order to decrease the expenses associated with housing them, including 
the burden placed on the Company magazine, from which the Tapuya had been provisioned on a 
weekly basis.109  
 Continuously wrangling up and consolidating indigenous peoples in mission villages cut 
them off from their traditional subsistence and resilience strategies. Boxer writes that Brasilianen 
who lived in aldeias only planted “a few allotments of manioc and beans around their villages 
but were very negligent about cultivating them, chiefly relying on the products of the chase and 
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forest fruits for their sustenance.”110 Efforts by the Company in February 1642 to shift the 
Brasilianen’s focus away from hunting and scavenging towards agriculture backfired when 
extreme weather events significantly decreased agricultural output and caused many mission 
Indians to die from a deadly combination of smallpox and malnourishment.111 
 In contrast to mission Indians, the Tapuya near Maranhão and Ceará who lived outside of 
the missions maintained their traditional subsistence practices that combined agriculture, 
hunting, and gathering. They subsisted on “fruits and edibles that they find in the wild, the 
animals they have hunted, fish, and wild honey.” Older women and women without children 
supplemented these provisions by making bread from scavenged roots which they call attouh, 
“while the younger women who cohabit with men bring ground nuts for all and prepare the 
food.” Men hunted, fished, and collected honey.112 
 Native priests played an important role in Tapuya agricultural rituals. Native priests 
consecrated fields before sowing or planting could begin. They blew tobacco smoke across them, 
which “filled the minds of the incredulous with dreams of fertility.” When harvest season 
approached, the king issued an edict for all the people and priests to join together. At this 
ceremony, priests decorated themselves in “brilliant colors and wear ornaments of specially 
chosen feathers, while the people put on wreaths of green leaves.” After consuming a vomit-
inducing mixture of crushed, roasted tree nuts and water, the priests threw feathers into the sky. 
The abundance or scarcity of the harvest was then determined by how many feathers fell to the 
ground.113 
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 The Tapuya showed great respect to their priests in determining the outcome of 
expeditions, hunts, battles, and food gathering. The priests trekked into the woods and consulted 
with, “the devil or some similar creature,” before proclaiming the fate of any plan. The priests 
also engaged in a dialogue with birds using song to determine the future. Such beliefs, concluded 
Van Baerle, meant that the Tapuya, “would rather obey their soothsayers than their rulers.”114 
 The Tapuya appealed to these priests in 1641 when heavy rains flooded their fields and 
caused great damage to their harvests. Six priests turned to the Tapuya’s most sacred object – 
stones enclosed in a gourd which hung in the King’s tent – to understand and interpret the crisis. 
Despite the damaging rains, all six priests predicted fertile views of the future. The first declared 
that while the Dutch had been at war with the inhabitants of Bahia, they now sought 
reconciliation. The second, “showed a flower from the millet plant and predicted an abundant 
harvest.” The rest proclaimed an abundance of milk, flower, and honey, as well as bountiful 
hunts.115 
 The priests who relied upon the sacred stones might have predicted a bright future, but 
other Tapuya told stories suggesting that something in their spiritual world had gone awry. The 
Tapuya worshipped the Great Bear constellation as their “superior divinity,” singing and dancing 
when it emerged. A story told that the Tapuya once, “had a better and easier life, when food was 
always at hand without labor.” At some point, however, Fox arrived which caused them to turn 
away from Great Bear and hate him. As a result, Great Bear “denied their nation that favors of 
the great divinity” and “now their way of life is different and they must work to subsist because 
of the offense done the Great Bear and his subsequent anger.”116  
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 Fox might have been an allegory referring to European colonists who had arrived in the 
sixteenth century, converted indigenous peoples to Christianity, and caused them turn away from 
Great Bear. In addition to disrupting the spiritual practices of the Tapuya, European colonization 
along the coast most likely disturbed an important resilience strategy: migration. The Tapuya 
moved in connection to the rainy season. January rains which collected in mountain hollows, 
explained Baerle, “lead the Tapuyas to begin their summer wanderings and find a place to make 
camp.”117 When this water dissipated, it appears that interior tribes like the Tapuya, migrated to 
the coasts where they could subsist off sea life. In 1644, due to a “lack of water” and ongoing 
warfare with neighboring groups, at least 120 Tapuya migrated to the Dutch-controlled regions 
of northeastern Brazil.118 
 Despite the shaman’s optimistic readings, 1642 proved deadly for the indigenous peoples 
of northeastern Brazil. Extreme weather arrived alongside deadly diseases and together led to a 
“great death” amongst “negros and Brasilianen.” Van Bullestrate blamed the deaths on the “great 
rains which fell during the rainy season along with the cold and drought which followed.” 
Together, cold and drought caused the fields and manioc crops to “mostly perish.”119 A similar 
fate befell the “negros and Brasilianen” in Pernambuco who suffered great losses due to heavy 
rains, followed by a drought, and an outbreak of smallpox.120 In Maranhão, where Commander 
J.J. Bas reported “great and continuous rain began very early this year,” the Brasilianen suffered 
terrible losses. “The streets and paths are found full of dead bodies caused by the great hunger.” 
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Shortly, Bas continued, the Brasilianen would not be able to return to their aldeias because they 
will all “perish from hunger.”121 The Company supported the mission Indians at least for a while 
with a small outlay of farinha, but reduced food rations, a lack of medication, and close quarters 
exacerbated an outbreak of smallpox that had been spreading throughout northeastern Brazil for 
several months.  
 The smallpox virus arrived aboard a ship traveling from Guinea to Recife on February 6, 
1642. The boat carried 361 slaves, but 60 died en route.122 It did not take long for the virus to 
spread. By February 28, reports arrived that slaves and Brasilianen in Pernambuco, Paraiba, and 
Itamaraca had been infected. Mission Indians were especially hard hit with some reports 
indicating that some aldeias suffered a total, 100% loss of life.123 The Amsterveen reported 
similar conditions in Comestij, located 70 miles west of Ceará. The ship had hoped to load a 
shipment of Brazilianwood, but could not find any males to help because “all the Indians there 
were dead or lay under the smallpox illness.” Consequently they had to divert their course to 
Upanema to load salt.124  
 When the virus arrived in Maranhão it decimated the indigenous population. By April 
1642, Gideon Morris reported that nearly 1,000 people in Maranhão, “both slave and free,” had 
succumbed to smallpox and “still daily pitifully die.”125 J.J. Bas, accounting for the death of 
nearly two-thirds of the Brasilianen since the Company’s arrival, attributed the outbreak to the 
“Brasilianen which were brought with us from Ceará and Comestij for the completion of this 
successful expedition.” “This plague,” he continued, had killed so many slaves that, “the reed 
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fields and farinha plantings can not be worked.”126 By July, if the censuses completed by Dutch 
commanders were accurate, the Brasilianen population had been drastically reduced to 600 men 
and women from 1,823 (1,088 males; 257 females; 478 children) in April. Jan Maxwell declared 
that the land stood in a terrible state and continued to deteriorate. The loss of slaves meant that 
the already planted manioc would rot in the ground and might prevent the “free Indians from 
obtaining any farinha the following year.”127  
 The Brasilianen, fearful of smallpox, kept away from the aldeias for as long as they 
possibly could. This created a problem for Dutch officials, though, who relied on a large, 
healthy, and skilled population of mission Indians. The “great and continuous sickness of pox,” 
the hesitancy of young Brasilianen men to return to pox-ridden areas, and the death of some of 
the strongest young men in recent skirmishes which left remaining but, “a few young [men], 
several old men, and many sad widows and orphans,” worried Dutch leaders.128 They resolved to 
move as many Brasilianen back into the aldeias as possible. 
 A decrease in the supply and efficiency of laborers due to smallpox and other diseases 
resulted in yet additional abuses to the indigenous population. Constant rain had an immediate 
impact on the ability of the Company to wrest profits from Brazil. C.R. Boxer put it bluntly. 
Before 1641, “a succession of bad harvests, floods, and droughts, and other natural calamities, 
apart from guerrilla activities,” hurt the sugar trade.129 Mill owners in Paraíba pointed directly to 
extreme rain and smallpox outbreaks (along with damages done by the soldiers of Castile who 
burned their fields two years prior) in a list of difficulties that had caused them to suffer 
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“significant damage” since 1639 and prevented them from paying creditors in full. “The high 
waters and high rivers of Paraíba” led to such considerable damage to the sugar reeds that “only 
half as much sugar was made as [they] had hoped.” Smallpox killed at least one-thousand slaves 
and prevented those infected from working for three months.130 
 Other planters complained that the cause of the “desolate state and limited fruits” was due 
in part to the “passing long and hard winter, which due to all too much water placed the reed 
fields under water and severe cold which kept the reeds from producing crops that could be 
milled.” These planters described yet another natural disaster, this time in the form of a worm 
carried by the high waters, that wreaked havoc on the sugar fields in 1641. The pest, presumably 
a species of sugar cane borer (biesges), consumed the reeds from the inside and afflicted so many 
fields that “no good reed field is found.”131 The collective impact of extreme rain, smallpox, and 
the worm epidemic devastated Brazil’s 1641 sugar production. Losses varied widely. Van 
Bullestrate claimed that the heavy rain, extreme cold, and worm epidemic cut the harvest in 
half.132 The lack of sugar reeds, according to another source, caused many mills to halt 
production completely in October and November 1641.133 The following year offered little relief. 
In March 1642, Johan Maurits reported that due to the “heavy rain and subsequent drought, little 
sugar” would be available to send back to patria.134 The same heavy rains fell on Maranhão. 
“The great and continuous rains, which this year have started very early, has prevented any sugar 
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from being dried in the Ingenios.”135 Company sugar exports from Brazil fell drastically as a 
result. In 1641, the Company and private exports of sugar totaled 447,560 arroba (approximately 
14.75 kilograms). In 1642, the total dropped to 298,914 arroba. The losses continued to mount 
year after year, never again recovering to their 1641 high.136 
 Salt mines, in contrast to sugar plantations which ran mostly on the backs of slaves, relied 
more heavily on indigenous workers. Rain made the tough work of preparing salt for export, a 
process that required dry conditions, even harder for the declining indigenous population. Gideon 
Morris raved about the potential profits to be made in the salt mines in northeastern Brazil in 
several letters to the Council, but the Company quickly learned that these promises appeared to 
have been exaggerated. This, however, was not necessarily the fault of Morris. The extreme rain 
that struck Brazil’s sugar cane also afflicted the salt mines.  
 Already in June 1641, five months before the Company captured Maranhão, Elbert Smient 
in Salinas reported that due to the “rainy season, which now so extraordinary long has held,” it 
was not possible to dry salt, but he hoped that the circumstances would change with the 
approaching dry season.137 His hopes would only briefly be realized as the dry season was short 
lived. The following January, Jacob Abrahamsen wrote to the Council that “because all day here 
it severely lightenings and thunders, I do my best to dry all the salt.”138 Again in 1642, the rains 
continued longer than usual. In July, Smient sent yet another letter to the Council suggesting that 
the rain had caused the salt to go bad.139  
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 The financial loss on the Company, which had invested time, men, and supplies into the 
repair, construction, and maintenance of Brazil’s salt pans, must have been disappointing. The 
smallpox epidemic that had killed at least one thousand Brasilianen in northeastern Brazil also 
contributed to the salt pans underwhelming performance. “This sickness is also the cause 
that…no salt could be obtained in Upanema, because the Brasilianen who dry the salt…and 
bring it onboard the ships” had died due to the “terrible sickness.”140  
 A general lack of African slaves throughout Dutch Brazil due to the smallpox epidemic 
challenged the resolve of several Dutch commanders in Brazil to grant indigenous peoples’ 
freedom and keep the Company’s promise with those who had already been granted freedom. 
Company officials in Maranhão responded to the Company’s orders to grant freedom to the 
Brasilianen by stating that the Brasilianen were the only available labor source in Maranhão and 
that “by the liberation of these all the inhabitants on any day would be ruined.” The already freed 
Brasilianen refused even to be loaned out for a day’s work saying that, “they did not want to be 
forced to work.” There only concern was the “filling of their stomachs.” The lack of slaves and 
the refusal of the Brasilianen to work, wrote Johan Maurits, meant that the “farinha plantings 
will remain way behind, and cause our garrisons to lack flour.”141 
 Indigenous peoples’ refusal to work infuriated Company officials who grew increasingly 
dependent upon them due to the African slaves’ increased death rate. “Without the help of 
Brazilianen or negros,” Johan Maurits warned, “nothing could be expected from there.” A lack 
of slaves might also have influenced Gideon Morris to suggest that the Company make an 
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exception in Maranhão to their policy regarding the enslavement of indigenous peoples.142 
Though Van Baerle interprets this move as a means to buy back enslaved indigenous allies so 
that they might be set free, another interpretation suggests a more sinister intention.143 Guised as 
both “profitable for the Company and Christian,” Morris twisted the inter-tribal warfare that 
often ended in the death by cannibalism of those captured. Morris believed that the Company 
should save these people from the gruesome fate of cannibalism by enslaving them instead.144 
 Desperation amongst some Dutch leaders at decreased productivity and falling profits 
might have led them to push indigenous peoples into forced servitude – a move that further 
soured Dutch-indigenous relations. Dutch leaders were not entirely unaware of the deteriorating 
relationship between the Company and its indigenous allies. As Mark Meuwese explains, “the 
Brasilianen were…shocked by the many Indians who lost their lives during,” an expedition to 
Africa in 1641, and whom upon their return complained, “that the Dutch treated Brasilianen as 
expendable.”145 To remedy the alliance, Johan Maurits organized a meeting of aldeia chiefs in 
March 1642 and gifted cloth, shirts, and linen to the approximately 42 leaders in attendance. This 
did enough to pacify the aldeias closest to Recife, but failed to appease the disgruntled 
indigenous leaders in the outposts further off.146 
 The promise of Maranhão, the most distant of the Company’s outposts, had greatly 
diminished during the Company’s first year there.147 In April 1642, the dissipating situation 
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provoked Johan Maurits to inform the Heren XIX that, “due to the lack of laborers a large part of 
Maranhão is left uncultivated,” and without the assistance of the Brasilianen, “the new conquest 
will remain non-beneficial and fruitless for the Company.” He remained skeptical though that the 
“vindictive and cruel” indigenous nations who would “kill and destroy all the Portuguese” if 
allowed to, would not flee from the Company’s control.148 Despite these apprehensions, the 
Council decided to take the gamble and sent provisions to Maranhão and was even willing to pay 
600 guilders for the use of a private vessel due to a shortage of small, Company-owned vessels in 
Recife.149 Various tools, several officers, and an unknown number of reinforcements to bolster 
the area’s defensive forces set sail for the outposts in May 1642. The decision to reinforce 
Maranhão came just in time for the Dutch stationed there.150   
 The first signs of notable resistance by indigenous groups against the Company in 
Maranhão began to emerge during the summer of 1642. Resistance initially came in the form of a 
string of complaints and remonstrances by Natives writing to Company leaders in Recife. Their 
complaints focused primarily on forced labor conditions and mishandling by Dutch leaders that 
prevented them from working in their fields to the detriment of their families. Dutch leaders also 
received news that the Tapuya living in Rio Grande, under the leadership of Jan de Wij, had 
committed robbery against the Dutch and launched several raids against the Company.151  
 Company leaders took several measures in responses to indigenous complains. First, they 
attempted to bring the Tapuya back under control. In June they hired Jacob Rabe to supervise the 
Tapuya. Rabe, a German, had spent several years amongst the Tapuya, learned their language, 
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and earned their trust. Given his experience and trust, the Company ordered he act as an 
intermediary. He would live amongst the Tapuya and look after them in order to ensure a 
decrease in the raids led by Jan de Wij. The Company ordered the commanders at Casteel Ceúlen 
and Rio Grande to offer Rabe “a helping hand” if he needed it. The Company also offered a 
carrot with its stick. They decided to increase the wages of the Tapuya living in Rio Grande from 
four to five varas of lynwaat or linen. This, they believed, was more in line with the going rate 
for a month’s work throughout the rest of Dutch-controlled Brazil and would adequately 
compensate the Tapuya for their work. Finally, they attempted to stop Company commanders 
from mishandling and abusing indigenous laborers. The Council not only ordered commanders 
to allow the Tapuya sufficient time in their fields but also expressly prohibited commanders from 
forcing any Brasilianen – man, woman, married, single, son, or daughter – to work in service to 
the Company against their will.152  
 In August, yet more Native complaints arrived in the form of a remonstrance, this time 
from Itamaríca. Johannes Listri, supervisor over the Brasilianen there, submitted the petition. 
Amongst his principal concerns was the need to remedy the “disorders amongst the Brazilianen 
which daily creep in.” He proposed two solutions to the problems. First, trusted Dutch leaders 
should be placed in command of each aldeia to watch over potentially rebellious natives. 
Second, any Brasilianen who lived outside of the aldeias, and thus susceptible to enslavement, 
should be moved into the missions. Listri argued that once in the missions, the Company could 
ensure the freedom of these indigenous peoples and bring them to a “more civil life.”  Younger 
Natives who could be drawn in by the Portuguese drew special attention from Listri.153 While 
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Listri masked his intentions with an air of benevolence, his thinly-veiled purposes were intended 
to prevent additional mishaps and stop a rebellion from forming.  
 Despite these efforts taken during the summer of 1642, the indigenous peoples of Brazil 
had reached a tipping point. They began to turn against their Dutch allies after being abused, 
mishandled, underpaid and even unpaid, dislocated from their families and traditional 
subsistence strategies, malnourished, and devastated by diseases. The first resistance began in 
Maranhão, but it soon spread to Ceará, then cascaded into a joint effort with the Portuguese in 
what is now known as the Planters’ Revolt. 
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5. Indigenous Responses to Climate & Colonialism 
In Maranhão, indigenous petitions and complaints against the Dutch West India Company boiled 
over into a violent assault by the Brasilianen. Historians have traditionally divided the 
subsequent indigenous resistance movement into two separate attacks. The first came during the 
winter of 1642 and the second in the spring of 1644. Both attacks originated with the arrival of 
Portuguese instigators and reinforcements who stirred up the local indigenous population. This 
explanation, however, fails to account for the Brasilianen’s motivations in agreeing to join forces 
with their former overseers. When seen from a climatological and indigenous perspective, the 
resistance movements of 1642 and 1644 might better be understood as a single, prolonged event. 
Extreme weather created a general subsistence crisis that not only exacerbated the impacts of 
labor abuses and smallpox, but also encouraged the Tapuya and Brasilianen – traditional 
enemies – to join forces with the Portuguese against Dutch control.  
 Sixteen Dutch soldiers became the first casualties of indigenous resistance in Maranhão on 
October 4, 1642. Jacob Stam, Jan Reijnieres, and Jurriaan Albertsz. – all former soldiers who had 
served in Maranhão – attested to these deaths when they returned to Amsterdam in 1644. The 
sixteen men had been sent to the mill of Anthonij Menies in early July for unspecified reasons 
and according to the soldier’s testimony, all were killed by Natives the night before the full 
assault on São Luís began.154 The next day, October 5, an allied force of Brasilianen, Tapuya, 
and Portuguese advanced towards the Company fort. They struck the small Dutch outpost of Fort 
Monte Calvário near Tapicuru and “betrayed, killed, and murdered” the soldiers stationed near 
the mills there. The deadly attacks by formerly-friendly Natives took the Company by surprise. 
                                                            




“This seems to us unbelievable, because of the oath of loyalty they took to us and the publication 
of the peace agreement.”  
 Any doubts Company commanders might have had to the validity of the assault faded the 
next day when three Brasilianen from the aldeias confirmed the attacks. The Brasilianen 
informed Dutch commanders that a Portuguese person had arrived in the aldeia in Maripirao and 
attempted “to stir up the Indians there and incite them to commit further treachery.” Many 
Natives, they said, had been convinced by the Portuguese and joined their efforts.  Company 
commanders, after hearing the news, ordered Commander Doorschot to the aldeia of Maripirao 
with orders to arrest the Portuguese solicitors. When Doorschot arrived, however, he found the 
aldeia almost completely abandoned. He and his force encountered but a single mulatto, a Jesuit 
servant, who fled upon seeing the Dutch. Company forces caught him after a quick pursuit and 
interrogated him the next morning. The captured mulatto revealed that the entire treasonous plot 
had been planned by Anthony Monis (Antonio Muniz Barreiros) and several Jesuit leaders. The 
Company then executed the mulatto and placed his head on a stake as a sign to others.155  
 Company leaders quickly went to work to assess damages and halt the enemy’s advances. 
While they worked to uncover the reason for the assault, they also dispatched Heer Bas, Captain 
Sandelanen, Commander Macxvelt, and fourteen soldiers down river to assess the situation at 
Fort Mont Calvário in Tapicuru. The expedition’s two ships, however, ran aground short of the 
fort. While Company troops waited for the tide to lift them a Lieutenant Bartholomeus van 
Alphen made contact and informed them that the Portuguese and Native force aimed to march on 
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the city of São Luís. The relief party now feared that São Luís would be conquered and decided 
to turn around to inform and defend the city.156  
 The news of an imminent attack on São Luís prompted Company leaders to solidify their 
positions. Captain Negentoon ordered all the inhabitants of the city into the fort and gave express 
orders for them to gather any farinha they could obtain along the way. By evening, his orders had 
been completed. All inhabitants had arrived carrying a “good quantity of farinha.” Outside the 
fort’s walls, six Dutch soldiers and an equal number of still-loyal Brasilianen, all under the 
command of Sergeant Adriaene Crijnen, patrolled the surrounding fields.157 
 Company patrols spotted the Native and Portuguese forces near the “Old Coral” advancing 
towards the fort on the morning of October 8. In the fort, commander leaders prepared for a 
drawn-out fight. Captain Negentoon ordered that additional farinha from throughout the city be 
obtained to feed the barricaded citizenry. In the meantime, Lieutenant Cocq and forty soldiers 
attempted to spy on the enemy’s position and tried to capture one Portuguese or Native for 
information, but ultimately failed. The Portuguese along with “an uncountable multitude of 
Brasilianen” lay in ambush near the Coral. Cocq ordered a retreat after a brief skirmish that left 
two Company soldiers dead and several wounded.158   
 The Company tried yet another unsuccessful attack on October 10. The Fiscaal, supervised 
by Commander Macxvelt and under the protection of Captain Sandelanen, departed for Tapicuru 
with orders to apprehend Antony Monis and “inflict some damages” upon the enemy. Within a 
few hours, several wounded troops hobbled back to São Luís and reported that Captain 
Sandelanen and his troops had been defeated and most lay dead in the field. On the morning of 






Sunday, October 12, the enemy attempted a direct attack upon the Company, perhaps hoping to 
find the troops worshipping at church. The Company forces, however, were armed and pushed 
back the attack without injury to themselves.159  
 Company commanders soon realized the fruitlessness of additional attacks and turned to 
diplomacy to bring an end to the assault. They sent a youth to hang their protests in a public 
place where a Portuguese soldier might find it. A few days later, however, the youth returned 
with a counter-protest and a letter from Antony Monis proclaiming that the Portuguese would not 
cease their attacks.  
 Just eleven days after the opening salvo, the Company forces in Maranhão were running 
low on supplies. The salt, farinha, fish, wine, and slaughtered livestock that had been secured by 
various means throughout the early days of the attack had been exhausted. And the enemy had 
cut off all passages out of the city – a tactic that both prevented the Company from obtaining any 
additional provisions and prevented reinforcements from arriving.160 “Considering we lack 
everything,” wrote the Company’s commanders, “the general officers and soldiers show extreme 
courage and affection to defend this place to the last man in service to the Company.” They 
continued, however, by demanding more men, ammunition, and food if the Company hoped to 
keep the fort from these “tyrannical traitors and wild murderers.” The soldiers and wounded were 
quickly exhausting the little lead, flour, and medicine they had. They reported a dire situation. 
Brackish water was all that remained to drink and their forces had been reduced to 400, though 
they estimated 2,000 were needed to hold the fort.161  
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 The besieged force received a brief glimmer of hope in early December when James 
Henderson and approximately 150 soldiers arrived in Maranhão’s bay. The fleet had departed 
Pernambuco on November 20, about three weeks before news of the attack on Maranhão actually 
reached the High Council. Henderson’s force, however, appeared inadequate to take on the 
Native-Portuguese alliance which now numbered close to 200 Portuguese and 700 to 800 
Brasilianen and African slaves.162 Making matters worse, the new forces arrived under-
provisioned and the enemy’s blockades continued to prevent anyone from foraging the 
surrounding countryside.163 
 News of Maranhão’s attack and requests for reinforcements and provisions did not reach 
Recife until December 11.164 Fulfilling the provisioning requests, however, required sacrifices on 
the part of the High Council. The previous months had been meager times. In October, Johan 
Maurits and the High Council had written to the Heren XIX that the entire colony was in a “sober 
state due to a lack of provisions.” “In short,” they pleaded, “not one single pound of flour can be 
found in the magazines to speak of, nor can a vat more be found to purchase from private 
planters.” They placed the cause of the “extreme dilapidation” on the “untimely season and death 
of the negroes.”165 The situation had failed to improve a month later when an inventory of 
Recife, including men, weapons, and parts, found the Company in need of more food.166  
 The Council had to act if they hoped to maintain control of Maranhão. They feared their 
inability to act would result in the loss of not only Maranhão but perhaps all of Brazil. By their 
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own admission and what appeared to be ominous foresight, they worried that a failure to quell 
the revolt would incite nearby captaincies to revolt as well.167 On December 12, a day after 
hearing news of the attacks, the Secret Council ordered 300 soldiers to Maranhão. The ships 
carrying them would stop en route in Ceará to pick up additional Brasilianen to assist in the 
counter-attack. The Secret Council also ordered enough provisions for 600 people including hard 
bread, meat, dried cod, and flour for four months.168 The deputy of provisions traveled to 
Maranhão to oversee the distribution of the scarce supplies.169  
 The High Council quickly tried to cobble together the necessary goods and people. They 
purchased flour from a ship that had recently arrived from the Dutch Republic and conscripted 
several men to help man the fort.170 The Council also signed a contract with Skipper Gasper 
Gauwemeel for the use of his flute (fluijt or fluyt – a dedicated cargo ship) to ship the men and 
supplies.171 Everything finally came together on December 27 and the Company assigned 
Lieutenant-Colonel James Henderson and Captain David Wiltschut to oversee the relief effort.172  
 The Council instructed Henderson to secure additional indigenous support on his way to 
Maranhão. First, Henderson was to stop in Ceará to pick up Gideon Morris and 200 Brasilianen 
auxiliaries. In order to hasten an end to the attacks, the Council granted Henderson and Morris 
the power to offer the Brasilianen a general pardon for all past transgressions and a promise of 
freedom to the Brasilianen and their offspring. The Council also hoped Henderson and Morris 
could uncover the cause of the Brasilianen’s discontent so that “in the future it can be remedied.” 
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The Council recognized, though, that the cause appeared to be the Company’s “unseemly” or 
“improper” employment of the Natives. As for the Portuguese, Henderson was to assess the 
situation in Monte Calvário, use all the power of his force to eradicate the Portuguese, and return 
Maranhão to its previous state of obedience.173  
 The arrival of Henderson and his troops, estimated at 400 Company soldiers and 150 
Brasilianen from Ceará, on January 15 temporarily turned the tide of war in the Company’s 
favor. Henderson’s troops immediately organized a counter-attack that dislodged the surrounding 
Native-Portuguese forces near São Luís. Though, the Native-Portuguese force then fortified 
themselves at a nearby plantation. The Company force pursued but was repelled and suffered 
several dead and 60 to 70 wounded. A week later, the Company sent a patrol of 12 Company 
soldiers and 10 Ceará Brasilianen to investigate the enemy’s strength. The force found the 
plantation abandoned. Captain Jacob Enous led a follow-up expedition of 100 to 150 Brasilianen 
that discovered the enemy position on the banks of the river high on a hill. Enous, however, 
retreated after realizing the enemy’s numerical superiority and geographic advantage. The 
mission was not a complete failure. Enous managed to capture a Brasilianen who informed him 
that the Portuguese were expecting reinforcements.174 Additional Brasilianen and Tapuya from 
Gran Pará were heading to Maranhão and were expected to join the forces already entrenched at 
Fort Monte Calvário in Tapicuru.175 When the Portuguese reinforcements did arrive, Company 
commanders estimated the total Native-Portuguese force rose to 700 Portuguese and 3,000 
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Brasilianen.176 In contrast, the Company had 536 soldiers and 235 Brasilianen.177 The smaller 
Company force might have been able to maintain the island of São Luís, but it was clear if the 
Company wanted to quell the Native-Portuguese revolt, dislodge them from Fort Monte 
Calvário, and restore Dutch order, they would need to rally additional men and supplies.  
 Speculations abounded regarding the cause of the Brasilianen’s alleged betrayal as the 
conflict wore on. The Company’s main focus, however, never wavered from returning their 
former Native allies back “to our devotion.” James Henderson placed the cause of “all the evil” 
squarely on the shoulders of the “devilishly lustful” Portuguese who forced the Brasilianen to 
work for them. Henderson went on to suggest that without being properly “enlightened” by the 
Dutch, the Brasilianen would sink into a state of slavery.178 Other Dutch commanders, hopeful of 
restoring the Brasilianen alliance, exclaimed the Company’s innocence and placed the blame 
solely on a few bad apples.179 But as much as the Company needed the Brasilianen’s allegiance, 
they had little to offer them in return.  
 The revolt settled into a stalemate as the rainy season set in at the end of January 1643. 
Company commanders worried that the heavy rains would jeopardize their already precarious 
hold in Maranhão. Heavy rains pounded holes into the red, earthen walls of Fort São Luís. The 
repairs required the daily labor of an already spent force who had “little to eat.”180 Heavy rains 
and thunderstorms continued into April making it difficult to acquire food or to “get any work 
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done.” The situation deteriorated more each day as the fort fell into disrepair, the Company’s 
magazines ran dry, and the nerves of soldiers and inhabitants in Maranhão wore thin.181 
 Dutch leaders in Maranhão could no longer rely upon their former Brasilianen allies for 
resources and looked for alternative means to acquire much needed food provisions. The 
Company “daily exert[ed] great diligence to harvest manioc from the land in order to make 
farinha," but heavy rains and thunderstorms made finding harvestable manioc difficult.182 In 
addition to damaging the crops and rotting its roots, on at least one occasion thunderstorms foiled 
Company efforts to gather the little edible manioc they found nearby. Several patrols had been 
ordered to look for food and on one occasion the soldiers stumbled across a field of manioc 
about a mile from the fort. During their attempt to load the roots, however, a thunderstorm broke 
the lines of the smaller flatboat that they used to haul the roots from the shallow beach back to 
their ship. The boat drifted out of reach, the manioc it carried fell overboard, and once the ship 
was recovered it was deemed irreparable.183  
 Maranhão leaders who could not adequately meet the garrison’s needs by foraging nearby 
fields instead petitioned, pleaded, and begged Johan Maurits and the High Council for 
assistance.184 Pieter Bas and James Henderson feared Maranhão’s “great scarcity in 
everything.”185 Maranhão, they cried, “can not tolerate any delay.”186 If the fort was not properly 
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maintained, “the enemy, God forbid, will notice our poor state” and launch an assault.187 Their 
messages were clear. If the Council failed to send provisions, Maranhão would be completely 
lost. Yet, their request for assistance went unanswered. And so, Maranhão’s leaders tried one 
final tactic. They sent James Henderson back to Recife to report on Maranhão’s terrible 
condition and request immediate assistance.188 
 The High Council could do little to help the beleaguered troops in Maranhão. The situation 
in Recife had not improved since December and the Company’s main magazines continued to be 
depleted. In January, the Council thanked the Heren XIX in Amsterdam for their assistance in 
mustering additional supplies and men but lamented that the Heren XIX’s projections were below 
the levels the Council of Brazil had requested. Brazil’s High Council additionally bemoaned the 
lack of money to support trade and commerce in Brazil. They knew a lack of money would lead 
to a complete halt in trade and the loss of the colony, but it also seemed that money could do 
little to alleviate the colony’s supply problems.189  
 While heavy rains afflicted the besieged Company soldiers in Maranhão, excessively dry 
conditions prevailed further south and in the Sertão. Early in April 1643, Johan Maurits reported 
that “our greatest difficulty lies in the scarcity of provisions.” He believed locally grown“flour 
would reduce the burden, but by means of the excessive drought this year and as a result of the 
infertility none can be purchased.”190 He expected little help from the Heren XIX, though.191 As a 
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result of failed harvests and a lack of money, the Company “fell into greater scarcity of 
provisions from day to day,” and complaints from throughout Brazil poured into Recife 
demanding help.192 
 The Council had moved to send some provisions and medication to Maranhão in April, but 
never acted on their resolution. James Henderson’s arrival in Recife in May provided the 
necessary pressure to convince the Council of Brazil to spare additional provisions.193 Henderson 
pleaded with the Council to send help if they wished to maintain control over the region.194 After 
much deliberation, including whether to send provisions to other places that had reported 
shortages including Guyana, Itamaríca, and Paraíba, the Council agreed to assist Henderson and 
Maranhão.195 Doing so came at a great cost to the Company. In June, one Adriaen Lems 
described the settlement’s magazine as completely destitute and the land fruitless.196  
 The course of the conflict in Maranhão took an unexpected turn in May 1643. Provisions 
sent by the Company allowed Maranhão’s defenders to secure the island of São Luís and hold off 
potential Native-Portuguese attacks. The Company, however, could not afford to mount a full 
assault to eradicate the surrounding Native-Portuguese forces. The Company’s luck improved in 
late May when a joint expedition of 80 Ceará Brasilianen and 100 Company forces found that 
the Native-Portuguese forces had abandoned Fort Monte Calvário. Company forces quickly 
reoccupied Fort Monte Calvário, although the Native-Portuguese force did destroy the 
surrounding sugar mills upon their retreat, rendering them useless to the Dutch.197  
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 The Native-Portuguese force had not been defeated. Instead, they had taken up new 
defenses along the Tapitapera River.198 From this new position they attacked a group of 
Company forces returning to São Luís. Aware that they were outnumbered and overpowered, the 
Company troops raised a white flag and entered into negotiations. The enemy force raised 
several points of complaint during the negotiations. Principally, the Brasilianen argued the Dutch 
had abused them, treated them as slaves, and had unlawfully taken Maranhão. The Company 
troops had no diplomatic powers, however, and the negotiations had to continue via an exchange 
of diplomatic letters between Company leaders in São Luís and the enemy commander. A 
majority of the Company’s leaders agreed that the Brasilianen’s accusations did not merit a 
response. Morris and several others disagreed. Unanswered allegations, Morris asserted, could be 
construed as a sign of guilt. Morris even hinted that there might be a bit of truth in the enemy’s 
allegations and suggested the Council request the Brasilianen to hand over the names, places, 
and times of the abuses so that the Company could punish those responsible and bring an end to 
the unrest. In the end, the Council ignored Morris’s suggestions and the enemy’s demands.199  
 Upon hearing news of the restoration of Fort Monte Calvário to Dutch control, the 
Brasilianen from Ceará, who had served in Maranhão since January 8, immediately requested to 
return home to their wives and children. They also demanded that they be paid for their service. 
Morris, who had overseen the Ceará Brasilianen during the hostilities, tried to acquire the 
necessary wages for payment of service but found nothing in Maranhão’s magazine to pay them 
except desiccated cassava. Morris understood the necessity of paying the Ceará auxiliaries. He 
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requested the High Council send full payment so that he could ensure the Brasilianen’s 
continued devotion. He also hoped that by paying the Brasilianen he could win back the 
previously loyal Brasilianen who now fought alongside the Portuguese. In order to win back 
those he referred to as “strangers,” he argued that the Company must demonstrate that they dealt 
honestly with people and paid those who served them. Until proper payment arrived, however, he 
was forced to feed the Brasilianen with promises and “good words.”  
 The inability of the Company to pay or feed the Brasilianen caused a great deal of agitation 
amongst the Natives. The Ceará Brasilianen had been of great service to the Company both 
during the conflict and after. While waiting for permission to return to Ceará they had toiled in 
the manioc fields and succeed in producing 710 alqueren of farina above their own rations that 
went directly into the Company’s magazines to feed its troops.200 Yet, the Natives – to their great 
anguish – still went unpaid and underfed.  
 Company leaders might have been relieved upon hearing news of Fort Monte Calvário’s 
recapture, but Gideon Morris believed the future of Maranhão was bleak. Morris reported that 
the Dutch did not have the people, provisions, or artillery to withstand additional assaults or 
revolts that might come from the Native-Portuguese forces still entrenched near the Tapitapera 
River. Already stretched Company forces had to be spread even thinner in order to maintain 
control over São Luís and now re-occupy Fort Monte Calvário. Additionally, the ongoing war 
prevented the sowing of farinha – a situation that would come at great expense if provisioning 
ships had to be sent on a continuous basis. Morris also worried that soon “sweet words” would 
have to replace bullets due to the shortage of firepower. If strength were not soon restored, either 
                                                            




through a longer campaign to seize Gran Pará to the west or through a peace agreement with the 
Portuguese, the Company stood to lose everything.201  
 Morris had a variety of reasons to fear an influx in Native resistance. The Brasilianen from 
Ceará who had been sent to the Maranhão in January to help the Company secure their position 
did so under the pretext of receiving due payment for their service, daily food rations, and the 
right to return home when hostilities ended. As July approached these promises remained un-
kept. The Brasilianen had not received their pay and the Company’s supply stock was so low 
that Maranhão’s leaders forced the Brasilianen to produce farina for themselves and the Dutch 
garrisons. The leaders also had not yet received permission from the High Council to allow the 
Brasilianen to return to their wives and children. Unpaid wages and involuntary indigenous 
labor, the same problems that led several Brasilianen to join forces with the Portuguese in 1642, 
now reappeared less than a year later. 
 Morris received more damning news regarding several Brasilianen who had been 
unlawfully sold into slavery. Commander Johannes Macxvelt had been sent to the Island of St. 
Joan with ten men and forty Brasilianen from Ceará and Maranhão in order to haul in some fish 
to help remedy Maranhão’s supply issues. Now it appeared he intended to sell these “free 
Brasilianen” as slaves either on St. Christoffel (St. Kitts) or Barbados. How Morris heard this 
news is unclear, but he rightfully fretted that if the Natives’ relatives heard the news it could 
cause further revolt. Morris implored Johan Maurits and his Council to send Macxvelt a letter 
demanding he return with the Natives.202 When Macxvelt was finally located and returned to 





Recife to face trial for his unlawful seizure and sale of the Brasilianen, it would be too late. 
Morris’s fears of additional indigenous resistance had already come true.203  
 Continued extreme weather, a shortage of cash, and the tardiness of incoming supplies 
from the Dutch Republic put the Company’s magazines in dire straits and the individuals who 
relied on those rations on edge. Company leaders continued to express their worries in several 
letters to the Heren XIX. The Company’s magazines were destitute.204 Harvest failures caused the 
cost of flour to skyrocket to exorbitant and excessive prices. And the Company, already short of 
cash, had no option but to pay these high prices leaving them with even less cash on hand. A lack 
of money also did great harm to the Company’s trade position as they were unable to purchase 
goods and services.205 Unruly soldiers, underfed and unpaid, led to even further difficulties.206 
The Company ordered the butchering of livestock to keep them fed, but this was an 
unsustainable option.207 Company leaders in Recife tried to spread the available rations around 
based on a calculation of strategic necessity and fort vulnerability. Maranhão, while not ranking 
at the top of this list, received a share.208  
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 The Council of Brazil’s best efforts did little but keep Maranhão on its last legs. When 
Pieter Jansen Bas, commander of Maranhão, arrived in Recife in September 1644 to petition for 
additional assistance, he reported the magazine to be in a “sober state” and the inhabitants of the 
region “destitute.”209  And by the end of December 1643, despite a renewal of Maranhão’s 
magazines, worries once again arose around the scarcity of provision. Eight weeks of flour, three 
weeks of meat, and one week of potspijs remained for the 456 people stationed on the island. J. 
Wiltschut declared the scarcity “sad.” Along with provisions, Wiltschut requested the Council in 
Recife send some carpenters. “The rainy months are at hand,” he fretted, and the already 
damaged fortification “will only get worse in the rainy months.”210  
 Company efforts to cultivate farinha in and around Maranhão continued to fail for multiple 
reasons. “There exists few fields with good farinha,” Michiel van Ochuijsen wrote to the Council 
in December 1643, “the reason being that they have been left unattended for too long and are 
soaked.” He continued that “the other reason is that we do not dare to send people out or they 
while be captured or killed by the enemy.” In Van Ochuijsen’s assessment, Maranhão “must be 
supported in everything by [the Council] since nothing at all is being planted and the plantations 
are empty and overgrown with weeds.”211  If the Council truly wished to rid Maranhão of revolt, 
restore order, and resume profits from the region, they would need to send additional men and 
supplies.  
 Before the Council could act, however, the tensions that had ignited in Maranhão began to 
spread into the neighboring region of Ceará. The first attack reportedly occurred on New Year’s 
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Eve when a group of Tapuya near Ceará shot and killed three Company soldiers.212 The full 
extent of the situation in Ceará would not become clear until March 1644. That month the 
Hasewint and Drack returned to Recife after a supply run to Maranhão.213 They reported that 
Maranhão remained in a sorry state. The Brasilianen and Portuguese continued to block 
passageways to and from fields and as a result, the garrison’s provisions continued to run dry. 
Since Maranhão’s garrisons were unable to “gain profit from the land” Company employees 
would have to be “fed out of hand” for the foreseeable future. The Council of Brazil took the 
report seriously and ordered the immediate provisioning of the Hasewint with 40 barrels of 
sundry food items which set sail for the Maranhão on March 22 along with a letter of assurance 
that the Melckmeyt would be sent as soon as possible with six months provisions for 450 
people.214  
 The two yachts also carried news of the indigenous strife in Ceará. The Hasewint and 
Drack had intended to bring refreshments and water to Ceará on their return journey from 
Maranhão but when they landed they found the garrison “to be completely different than what 
they expected.” The Hasewint’s skipper, one office, and two soldiers, went ashore approximately 
three miles north of Ceará but were met by a group of Brasilianen who attacked and murdered 
them. The skipper of the Drack, unaware of this earlier event, landed further down shore along 
with three officers and eight soldiers, intending to reach Ceará by foot. They too met a group of 
Brasilianen who overwhelmed them and beat most of them to death, except for three soldiers 
who escaped by swimming back to the ship. During the attack, an additional group of 
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Brasilianen boarded the Drack under the false pretense of exchanging some refreshments and 
parrots with the crew. In actuality they attempted to seize the yacht. Two Brasilianen and four 
sailors died before the Dutch were able to drive them off the boat. The three surviving soldiers 
later recounted the details, speculated that several barks along with the fort in Ceará must have 
been seized by the Brasilianen, and believed the Dutch inhabitants, including Gideon Morris, 
had been killed. The soldiers concluded that the Council could “not rely on the Brasilianen much, 
because in general they have no other goal or ambition but to remain in freedom and not in 
service, because they want to lead a lazy and idle life, additionally to be left in the consumption 
of brandy without punishment.”215  
 Johan Maurits and the High Council did not understand from where the Brasilianen’s 
enmity arose. Their immediate hunch led them to conclude that the Brasilianen in Ceará revolted 
as a result of a “misuse” of Brasilianen women, unpaid wages, and forced labor – all of which 
went against their orders.216 In a later report they suggested that the success of the Brasilianen in 
Maranhão must have encouraged the Ceará Brasilianen to resist as well. In order to bring an end 
to hostilities they ordered David Wiltschut to make full payment in the form of lijnwaet (linen) to 
the Brasilianen of Ceará and allow any Brasilianen who requested to return to their friends “to 
do so without question, in order to see if by these means they can be brought into peace and unity 
[with our nation].”217 But it would be too little too late. Ceará and its inhabitants would remain 
independent of Dutch rule until 1649 when Mathias Beck landed there and founded a new fort 
called Schonenburgh, although they did resume diplomatic relations in 1645.218   
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 News of the spreading revolt prompted the Council yet again to further action. In early 
March 1644, despite the “scarcity of provisions in which we ourselves have found ourselves for 
some time, [and which] is the reason that we are unable…to assist the Maranhão as they should 
be,” they once again ordered additional rations sent to Maranhão. The rations, though, would not 
make it in time.219  
 In April 1644, after 18 months of attacks by a Native-Portuguese alliance, relentless rains 
that destroyed forts and fields alike, and countless requests for assistance, the Company’s 
position in Maranhão had reached a breaking point. The garrison’s magazines had run dry and 
São Luís’s Company commander, David Wiltschut, had no other option but to abandon the fort. 
The 450 Company servants remaining in Maranhão sailed to the island of Curaçao where 
Wiltschut had previously served. They arrived “without any food supply” over the course of 
several days at the beginning of April and reported that it was due to this lack of food “that they 
had to leave their places.” Peter Stuyvesant, the island’s director, worried that as a result of the 
fleeing soldiers’ dire condition he would have to “provide for them out of our stores, diminishing 
our food supply, as it will diminish daily more and more.”220 
 The abandonment of Maranhão in April 1644, instigated by an indigenous revolt that began 
in November 1642 after Portuguese incitement, marked a turning point of Dutch expansion in 
Brazil and beyond. It was here that the contraction of the Netherlands' territorial control in the 
Atlantic world began. Johan Maurits' ambitious plans came to an end and while plans had been 
laid to push on to Gran Pará they would never come to fruition. The revolt spread and ignited the 
Portuguese Planters’ Revolt – a massive effort by Native and Portuguese allies to eradicate the 
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Company from Brazil entirely. The Dutch slowly lost hold of their Brazilian conquests over the 
next several years. In 1654, after a decade of attacks by Native and Portuguese forces and 
episodic extreme weather events, the Company left Brazil for good, but the loss of Maranhão in 




The Company tried on multiple occasions to restore indigenous relations in Brazil in the years 
between Maranhão’s fall and the Company’s final abandonment. Financial woes, supply 
concerns, and a reduction in troops following the 1642 treaty obligations with Portugal meant 
that the Dutch needed indigenous allies more than ever. To do so, the Dutch sent several 
indigenous intermediaries to Ceará to sure up relations. They did the same to solidify their 
relationship with aldeia leaders in Pernambuco, Itamaracá, Parnaíba, and Rio Grande.221 In order 
to firmly establish these alliances and demonstrate their willingness to recognize indigenous 
peoples as equal partners, the Heren XIX formally granted specific rights and freedoms to the 
Brasilianen in November 1644 in a document that emphasized indigenous sovereignty in order 
to alleviate Native concerns.222 
 The Company’s effort to restore diplomatic relations and solidify indigenous alliances 
came at a propitious time. In June 1645, disparate efforts to dislodge the Company throughout 
Brazil came together in Pernambuco when Portuguese planters (moradores) launched a full 
revolt against Dutch colonial occupation of Brazil. During the course of the Planters’ Revolt, the 
Dutch called upon their Tapuya and Brasilianen allies on multiple occasion. The Company’s 
indigenous allies proved fierce and faithful allies in the war. Though they suffered great losses, 
they remained loyal despite a vocal contingent of individuals who supported the Portuguese 
rebels over the Dutch.223    
 The willingness of the Brasilianen and other groups to remain loyal is striking given the 
earlier resistance movements staged in Maranhão and Ceará. The most logical explanation for 
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this turn of affairs suggests the willingness of the Company to recognize indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-government – something the Portuguese were unwilling to do. Additionally, the 
Portuguese wounded future relations with several of Brazil’s indigenous groups in August 1645. 
Portuguese officials, after attacking and capturing the Company-controlled fort of Serinhaem in 
Pernambuco, agreed to pardon the Company’s soldiers, but chose to hang 33 Brasilianen.224 The 
Brasilianen refused to forgive the Portuguese this grievance, but they also laid blame on the 
Company. The Company’s unwillingness to protect the rights and lives of their allies severely 
damaged their relationship. In March 1648, António Paraupaba, the Company’s indigenous 
magistrate (regidores) in Rio Grande, offered to intercede and restore relations in Ceará on 
behalf of the Company.225 He requested the Company supply him with diplomatic gifts in order 
to enter into negotiations. The Company believed he wanted to keep the goods for himself, 
though, and refused to provide the trade goods the Paraupaba requested.226 Though in future 
diplomatic efforts, trade goods, mainly in the form of linen that the Brasilianen used for clothing, 
were essential in maintaining indigenous alliances healthy throughout the war.227  
 Extreme weather events both at home and abroad continued to mark the Company’s 
waning years in Brazil. In the Netherlands, after receiving news of the Portuguese revolt at the 
end of August 1645, severe frost left ports icebound during the winter of 1645-1646 and delayed 
ships from departing. Some ships were left stuck in the English Channel and others could not 
depart until May 1646.228 The delay jeopardized the Company’s position in Recife. Soldiers’ 
rations were reduced to two ounces daily, food supplies reached famine levels, and malnutrition 
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and beriberi became an everyday reality. The arrival of two Dutch ships in June carrying 
provisions brought relief and optimistic news that additional ships were on the way. The ships 
came just in time. The Company was down to its last four barrels of flour.229   
 The last of the provisioning ships dispatched during the winter of 1645-1646 finally 
reached Recife in November. While the ships temporarily provided relief for the besieged 
Netherlanders, extreme weather in Brazil threatened the Company’s defenses again as early as 
January 1647. James Henderson, stationed in Penedo located along the banks of the Rio de São 
Francisco in the Captaincy of Alagoas, requested additional troops to support his efforts. The 
enemy, he reported, was very strong in contrast to the Dutch who were “weak and faint due to 
the work and the unusualness of the water.”230   
 Another period of extreme weather struck northern Brazil between 1650 and 1652. Severe 
weather on the Atlantic in 1650 delayed the arrival of several Dutch warships. The ships had 
been provisioned upon their departure with supplies for sixteen months but arrived carrying less 
than a year’s provisions after an abnormally long five-month ocean crossing. A two-year drought 
imperiled both sides of the fight as dry weather decimated the region’s cash and subsistence 
crops. For the Spanish, the drought hampered their attacks as they became increasingly reliant on 
the importation of provisions from abroad to supply their growing military presence. For the 
Dutch, by August and September 1652, the drought-induced supply crises led the High Council 
to write that if Recife were attacked they would be forced to surrender. The arrival of six supply 
ships from the Netherlands and the return of rain and manioc crops, however, only delayed the 
Company’s eventual defeat by a few months.231  
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 The Portuguese Planters’ Revolt, ignited by indigenous resistance movements in Maranhão 
and Ceará nearly a decade earlier, finally forced the Company to surrender Brazil to Portugal in 
January 1654. During negotiations with Portugal, Company leaders petitioned on behalf of their 
indigenous allies and included a provision that the Portuguese pardon the Brasilianen. As news 
of the Dutch defeat spread throughout Brazil, however, the Company’s Brasilianen allies fled to 
Ceará where the Portuguese presence was weak. The Brasilianen feared the Portuguese planters 
would not be as forgiving as Portuguese commanders ordered them to be. The Company’s 
indigenous allies felt abandoned by their Dutch allies. The Brasilianen “did nothing but swear 
and curse the Dutch whom they had served and assisted so faithfully for many years.”232 The 
Brasilianen petitioned the Dutch for compensation for their work over the next decade but after 
failing several times to receive any financial recourse, eventually resigned themselves to life 
under Portuguese rule.233 
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Part III: Curaçao, 1634-1662 
 
“Likewise, they on their part, each for themselves, promise, on pain of corporeal 
punishment, that they shall not hunt, catch, kill nor in any way injure the Company’s 
livestock, such as horses, cattle, goats, sheep and pigs; not plunder the Indians gardens.” 




Map of Curaçao. Claes Jansz. Visscher, c. 1640. 
Van der Hagen Atlas, Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague 
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7. Indigenous Adaptation and Resilience 
Curaçao, a tiny, semi-arid island in the southern Caribbean, lay at the center of the Dutch 
Republic’s imperial ambitions for much of the seventeenth century. At the dawn of the century, 
the Dutch prized the island for its abundant salt flats. By century’s end, however, the Dutch had 
altered the island’s primary purpose as it became clear that it made for a better trade entrepôt 
than salt supply. The story of Curaçao’s transformation is as much a story of global trade currents 
as it is of weather and indigenous peoples. The island’s semi-arid climate created salt Dutch 
merchants need for the Dutch Republic’s herring industry and also catalyzed a resistance 
movement against the Dutch West India Company by the island’s indigenous Caquetios.  
 The Company’s “Grand Design” included plans to establish a Company foothold in the 
Caribbean in addition to its growing presence in Brazil and West Africa. The seizure of Recife 
and Pernambuco in 1630 provided a convenient and strategic site from which to claim 
uninhabited islands and launch assaults on European-controlled islands in the southern 
Caribbean. Within the next decade the Dutch had expanded their global empire to include the 
islands of St. Martin (1631); St. Eustatius (1635); Saba (1640); and Curaçao, Aruba, and Bonaire 
(1634). The Dutch had little trouble in obtaining these islands as the Spanish empire had decreed 
them to be islas inútiles or useless islands and thus maintained little to no military presence on 
them. In contrast, the Company competed with French, English, Spanish, and Swedish forces for 
control of Anguilla, St. Croix, Tobago, and the Virgin Islands, but never retained control of these 
islands for a significant period of time.2  
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 Dutch interest in the Caribbean spiked due to a peculiar predicament involving a rather 
malodorous fish and the Dutch Republic’s 80-year revolt against Spanish rule (1568-1648).3 
Beginning in the fifteenth century, fishermen trawled the North Sea hauling in herring destined 
for sale and consumption throughout the Low Countries, a tradition that continues today and is 
marked each spring when the first herring (nieuwe haring) is auctioned off and its proceeds 
donated to charitable causes. The success of this commodity, however, was dependent on 
another: salt. A rarity in the fluvial Dutch countryside, Dutch merchants found salt in plenty 
along the coasts of the Iberian Peninsula. The Low Countries, at the time a part of the Spanish 
Habsburgs' empire, traded frequently with the Spanish and Portuguese who gladly welcomed the 
chance to trade their salt for the lumber and grain Dutch merchants brought from the Baltics.4 
William the Orange’s revolt against the Spanish Habsburgs, however, threatened this lucrative 
and mutually-beneficial arrangement.5 The Dutch Revolt did not immediately end Dutch-Spanish 
trade ties, though. Initially, Spain’s Philip II allowed the continuation of trade between the Low 
Countries, Spain, and Portugal due to the Iberian Peninsula’s dependency on Dutch goods. By 
1585, with the inchoate Dutch Republic slowly escaping his grasp, Philip II decided to risk an 
end to the trade and issued an embargo forbidding Dutch merchants and salt carriers from 
entering Spanish waters.  
 The Dutch Republic’s scramble for salt began almost immediately. Private fish merchants 
desperately needed a reliable salt supply to stave off financial ruin, not to mention the potential 
stench of rotting herring piling up in Dutch warehouses. For a brief period, Dutch trawlers relied 
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upon salt from the Spanish-controlled Cape Verde Islands, but the islands carried too much risk 
as a long-term prospect. Merchants continued to sail further south along the African coast finding 
little salt to cure the problem of rotting fish back home. The herring industry breathed a sigh of 
relief, though, after private voyages to the Caribbean returned carrying loads and reports of salt. 
By 1598, the salt flats of Punta de Araya off the coast of Venezuela teemed with Dutch salt 
carriers. It would remain this way until after Philip II lifted his embargo and the Dutch signed the 
Twelve Years’ Truce (1609-1621).6 
 In addition to salt Dutch merchants also returned carrying brazilwood (Caesalpinia 
echinata). Portuguese explorers in South America had identified this tree as a relative of a known 
Asian species that was used as a red dye known as lignum brasilium or simply brazilin meaning 
“red like an ember.” The name Brazil originated with Fernão de Noronha, a Portuguese 
merchant, who referred to Brazil as Terra do Brasil or “land of brazilwood.”7 While the dye-
producing tree inhabited mainland Brazil, Dutch sailors found it growing throughout the 
southern Caribbean and especially on Bonaire.8 When neither salt nor wood could be found, 
sanctioned and illicit trade with Spanish and French ships offered a third alternative for profits.   
 Not everyone who traveled to the Caribbean focused on trade. Several individuals 
attempted to create plantation settlements after the Dutch West India Company was officially 
chartered in 1621. In December of 1635, Jan Slouck, a mariner from Flushing, received 
permission from the Zeeland Chamber to establish a colony in the southern Caribbean. After a 
failed attempt at occupying St. Croix, he managed to colonize St. Eustatius. For his efforts, the 
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Company granted Slouch and his colonists a ten-year exemption from duties except on “salt, 
wood, and ‘other products delivered by nature itself.’”9 As a result, the island’s colonists wrought 
profits through the cultivation of tobacco and later sugar. Both crops required extensive labor 
supplies. The colonists captured and traded Natives from nearby islands in order to fill these 
positions. The inhabitants also claimed the island of Saba in 1640, constructed a fort there, and 
harvested cotton, coffee, indigo, and tobacco.10   
 A lack of fresh water, hostile indigenous groups, and barren landscapes initially precluded 
the Company itself from making any formidable claims in the Caribbean. In 1633, however, the 
English re-captured St. Martin (the Company’s primary salt supplier) and the Company felt a 
new urgency to establish a Caribbean stronghold. The ABC islands emerged as the Company’s 
top choice. Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao were located approximately 50 miles north of mainland 
Venezuela, the latter two were known to have salt pans and stands of brazilwood, and Curaçao 
had a natural, defensible, and deep harbor. On April 16, 1634, the Company approved an 
expedition to seize the islands from Spanish hands and establish a trading post that could be used 
by merchants moving throughout the Atlantic.11 The Company gained full control of the islands 
by the end of August 1634 due to the limited Spanish presence on the islands and with the help 
of several Indian guides.12 The Spanish made several attempts to recover the ABC islands over 
the next decade, but all failed. 
 The Company’s expansion in the Caribbean ground to a halt by the early 1640s just as it 
had in Brazil. The Company’s first retreat came when they attempted to establish a salt mine on 
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the Spanish mainland (Venezuela). In August 1640, the Company made plans to access salt pans 
along the Unare River.13 The Unare was well-suited for sustaining workers. It provided fresh 
water, ample food, and wood supplies could be found nearby. The Dutch made quick work in 
constructing a fort and establishing native allies in the area, but the Spanish did not tolerate the 
Company’s presence. After a direct assault on the Company’s fort failed, the Spanish commander 
decided to destroy the salt pan itself. He ordered a small canal dug that could dilute the pan with 
the river’s fresh water.14   
 The Dutch still required additional salt and so the Company, undeterred by Spanish 
malfeasance, turned its attention back to St. Martin. In 1644, eleven years after they had first lost 
the island to the Spanish, the Dutch sent another expedition under the command of Peter 
Stuyvesant, the director of Curaçao at the time. By this point, however, Stuyvesant’s forces on 
Curaçao were near a breaking point due to a prolonged drought, famine conditions, and 
indigenous threat.   
 Curaçao is situated 34 miles off Venezuela’s northern coast and sandwiched between 
Aruba, 70 miles to its west, and Bonaire, 50 miles to its east. With an area of only 171 square 
miles, it is just twice the size of Washington, D.C. The northern coastline is a veritable fortress of 
cliffs and rocky outcroppings, while the southern coast is resplendent with multiple bays and 
harbors well suited to oceanic respites and secure ship moorings. The low and hilly terrain 
stretches 38 miles long and seven miles at its widest. On average, only 24 inches of precipitation 
falls on the island annually.15 Less than an inch per month falls during the dry season (March-
June) while the island’s wettest months (October-December) receive around four inches each. Its 
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small size, defensible geography, salt flats, and secure harbors made it an ideal place for the 
Company to establish a stronghold in a fiercely contested Caribbean. However, the Company 
first had to appease the island’s indigenous Caquetio.  
 The indigenous peoples of Curaçao exemplify the importance of adaptation in climate 
history and offer an example of human resilience. Over time, the collective memory of Curaçao’s 
indigenous population allowed them to improve their societal resistance to extreme weather and 
to thrive on the island. When Europeans arrived in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the 
Caquetios had become well adapted to the island’s arid environment. They utilized their 
knowledge to delay the worst effects of European colonialism.   
 Arawak peoples, the island’s first inhabitants according to most archaeologists, arrived on 
Curaçao from the northern coast of present-day Venezuela sometime around 5000-4000 B.P. 
During this period the southern Caribbean cooled and dried after what had been a rather long, 
warm, and moist period that began around 10,000 B.P at the onset of the Holocene.16 This 
change towards cooler and drier conditions was caused by a shift in the mean latitude of the 
Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), itself susceptible to the influences of El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) events and climatic variability in the Pacific Ocean.17 Ascertaining the 
influence of this climatic shift on the movement of Natives throughout the Caribbean and their 
arrival on Curaçao is difficult, but it is a question worth posing.18 Historical climatologists have 
laid the groundwork for understanding how climatic shifts in various locations have led to 
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conflict, abandonment, and dislocation of peoples in the past.19 The increasingly dry Caribbean 
climate that began around 5000 B.P. possibly led to resource scarcity on the mainland, induced 
societal conflict, and led to a migration of indigenous peoples to southern Caribbean islands. 
 Between 5000 B.P. and 3000 B.P. the climate continued to cool and precipitation increased. 
This respite provided the necessary context for a Curaçaoan population to establish themselves 
on the island before a long-term drying pattern resumed around 3000 B.P.20 The presence of 
stone and shell tools demonstrates that Curaçao’s early inhabitants subsisted on a combination of 
hunting and gathering during this initial period of settlement. The return of drier conditions, 
however, pressured Curaçao’s earliest human inhabitants to adapt. When water supplies began to 
dry up, paleolithic peoples became more reliant on gathering, small game hunting, and fishing.21 
Despite living on a relatively small island, Curaçao’s earliest inhabitants demonstrated a 
remarkable capacity to adapt and thrive in a mercurial environment.22 What followed this early 
settlement period were centuries of continued adaptation to Curaçao’s variable climate.  
 The broad contours of a unique agricultural, political, social, and cultural identity, 
prevalent on the Curaçao when Europeans first arrived, roughly overlapped with the warmer and 
drier climate that began around 3000 B.P.23  A lack of archaeological evidence puts into question 
the extent to which the island was inhabited for the period between 3000 to 1500 B.P., but the 
excavation of lithic agricultural implements dating to 1400 B.P. strongly suggests that by this 
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time the island was populated by Paleo-Indians deploying agriculture techniques necessary to 
fortify themselves against increasingly common Caribbean droughts.24 This period perhaps more 
than any other helps in understanding the adaptive capacity of Curaçao’s earliest inhabitants and 
provides hints to how the Caquetios who inhabited the island when Dutch merchants arrived at 
the beginning of the seventeenth century might have survived periodic droughts.25 During this 
time period Paleo-Indians developed significant technological and agricultural innovations that 
increased their adaptive capacity.  
 In response to an increasingly dry climate, indigenous groups throughout the Caribbean 
developed and practiced a drought-resilient system of mixed subsistence agriculture known as 
conuco agriculture. The conuco agricultural system relied on shifting cultivation strategies that 
made it well suited to the southern Caribbean’s variable climate, especially its seasonal dry spells 
and prolonged periods of droughts. The system’s unique combination of propagation methods, 
timing of planting and harvest, and the selection of specific crop varieties improved its 
practitioners’ chances of survival. 
 Fresh water proved the most essential and difficult-to-find resource for the survival of 
Curaçao’s inhabitants. Two prehistoric types of fresh-water sources existed on the island: fresh 
water springs and water run-off catchments. Due to the predominance of basalt soils on Curaçao, 
which do not retain water on a long-term basis, water catchments were most likely isolated to 
limestone areas that typically provide an impervious bottom. Based on these requirements, 48 
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suitable locations for prehistoric water run-off catchments existed including the underground 
lake of Shingot Cave.26 Water run-off systems though are prone to evaporation during dry 
periods and are not reliable water sources under such conditions. When the climate began to dry 
in 3000 B.P, indigenous peoples would have had to adapt their agricultural practices to account 
for decreased water supplies or alternatively construct some type of irrigation canals stemming 
from the island’s three fresh water springs (themselves dependent on rainfall).27 The lack of 
archaeological evidence supporting the construction of any such waterworks suggests that the 
Caquetios developed techniques of conuco agriculture, instead.28  
 The conuco system began with the selection of a suitable plot of land. In choosing sites 
indigenous peoples preferred areas within close proximity to settlements. Proximity allowed for 
convenient access for the day-to-day tasks of weeding as well as the seasonal tasks of planting 
and harvesting. Not any piece of land, however, would do. Soil needed to be light, easy to work, 
and porous enough to stave-off waterlogging and root rot when heavy rains occasionally fell.29  
 Once indigenous peoples identified suitable soils they then prepared the soil for cultivation. 
This process ideally occurred during the dry season so as to ensure the land was ready for 
plantings when rains came between October and February.30 The land was first cleared using a 
form of “slash-and-burn” that came with the added benefit of introducing valuable nutrients into 
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the top layer of soil. Then they molded the soil into mounds meant to improve the soil’s 
drainage. A properly maintained conuco site, once completed, could retain essential soil nutrients 
for upwards of 15 to 20 years, providing its users thousands of calories annually.31  
 Manioc, also known as yuca or cassava, emerged as the most valuable cultivated crop on 
Curaçao.32 Manioc is naturally drought resistant and grew well in the island’s slightly alkaline to 
slightly acidic soils.33 A single planting of manioc could be harvested several times, each time 
providing its consumer a meal rich in calories and starch. Any manioc not immediately 
consumed was baked into an unleavened flat bread. This bread could be stored for long periods 
and used during drought-induced famines.34  
 Scholars have suggested two additional domesticated crops cultivated on Curaçao that 
supplemented manioc. The first was maize. Maize, in general, requires slightly denser soils that 
can retain more water compared to the lighter, easily drained soils needed for manioc cultivation. 
Though archaeologists have uncovered various tools to suggest the cultivation of maize, it is 
difficult to ascertain to what extent maize played a role in indigenous peoples’ subsistence 
strategy. Maize’s high water requirements together with the relatively low levels of precipitation 
on Curaçao and lack of any form of pre-historic irrigation system suggests that maize was 
perhaps only sporadically planted by the Caquetios.35   
 Sweet potatoes were also used to supplement manioc. The Caquetios’ close relatives in 
northwest Venezuela and other Arawak groups cultivated sweet potatoes and there is a high 
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likelihood that sweet potatoes were cultivated on Curaçao as well.36 Sweet potatoes require 
slightly more moisture than manioc but considerably less moisture than maize. Sweet potatoes 
offer its cultivators several benefits. Unlike manioc that requires at least eight months before it 
can be harvested, sweet potatoes can be harvested in as little as four months after planting. 
Additionally, when planted as part of a multi-crop system, they can be utilized as ground cover, 
potentially reducing evaporation rates.  
 Gender-based divisions of labor were deeply embedded in the conuco system. Men 
selected and cleared new sites, set fire to clear the area, hoed and mounded the fields, and 
planted cuttings for new growth. Women took over day-to-day maintenance after the field was 
prepared. They weeded and harvested when necessary, though no single harvesting season 
dominated the Caquetios’ calendar.37 Instead, harvesting took place sporadically based on 
necessity and fruit ripeness, providing essential foodstuffs throughout the year. The high 
frequency of small harvests even came to drive the Caquetios’ understanding of time – they 
determined time based on the ripening of plants rather than astronomical observations.38 Conuco 
agriculture thus provided the peoples of Curaçao a variety of possible food stuffs to stave off 
moderate drought periods and insulate themselves during potentially longer drought episodes.  
 The Caquetios also foraged a variety of Curaçao’s wild plants. Two stand out. Cocuy 
(Agave cocui) provided important amino acids to low protein diets and was used in the making of 
rope, baskets, nets, and hammocks. Maguey (Fucraeas macrophylla) was fermented by circum-
Caribbean Arawak groups into an intoxicating beverage and easily grew in Curaçao’s arid, rocky 
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environment.39 Curaçao’s neighboring indigenous groups such as the Goajira utilized additional 
wild plants such as elephant ear or yautia (Xanthosoma sp.), prickly pear (Opuntia sp.), organ 
cactus (Carnegiea gigantean), and divi-divi (Caesalpinia coriaria).40 Archaeologists suspect 
Curaçao’s inhabitants might have foraged these wild plants as well but have found no evidence 
to support their theory. Wild and domesticated crops provided Curaçao’s inhabitants an 
additional source of vitamins, minerals, and carbohydrates. Cassava, though, remained the 
central staple.  
  Caquetios turned to the island’s naturally abundant supply of wildlife during drought 
periods to supplement any decline in harvestable plants. While no evidence has been found to 
support the Caquetios’ domestication of animals, it is clear from archaeological dig sites that they 
hunted and foraged quite successfully. The island’s wildlife provided essential sources of protein 
and fats. Atlantic pearl oysters (Pinctada radiata), queen conch (Strombus gigas), and sundry 
shellfish species comprised the main protein staples while rodents, iguanas, birds, and deer 
appear to have been secondary in the Caquetios diet.41 Collectively, they proved an important 
source of calories in times of agricultural crises. 
 The arrival of Spanish ships in Curaçao’s harbors beginning in 1499 immediately changed 
the Caquetios’ way-of-life. Spanish officials found little value in the island’s natural resources 
beyond its stands of brazilwood. By 1513, after denuding the landscape of dye-woods and failing 
to find precious metals, they declared Curaçao and its neighbors Aruba and Bonaire islas inútiles 
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or useless islands. In doing so, Spanish officials opened Curaçao’s doors to indieros or Indian 
hunters. 
 The earliest population estimates for Curaçao indicate that at the dawn of the sixteenth 
century approximately 2,000 Caquetios were spread out across the island. They resided in the 
four principal villages of Santa Cruz, Ascension, Santa Anna Bay, and Santa Barbara. It did not 
take long for indieros to exploit the island’s human population. In 1515, under Spanish 
supervision, nearly 2,000 indigenous peoples on Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao were captured, 
enslaved, and exported to Hispaniola.42  
 Slave raids on Curaçao continued for a decade until 1526 when the Spanish factor of 
Hispaniola, Juan de Ampués, ordered their discontinuation. The human toll of Spain’s slave raids 
might have meant the end of Curaçao’s indigenous population. However, by 1528, the island’s 
indigenous population had rebounded to 400. Of these, 200 had been repatriated to the island in 
1525 by Ampués for unknown reasons. The others seem to have arrived from the Spanish Main 
after fleeing Tierra Firma, the northwestern coast of modern-day Venezuela, hoping to escape 
slavery and forced labor. Collectively, the 400 Natives found themselves nominally under 
Spanish supervision and isolated in the villages of Ascension and Santa Anna Bay.43  
 Spanish exploitation of Curaçao exacted more than a human toll. Spanish manipulation, 
exploitation, and newly introduced plant and animal species had disturbed Curaçao’s ecology. By 
1530, a slew of European cattle, horses, pigs, and goats roamed the island. Ampués additionally 
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had a variety of fruit trees, particularly orange, pomegranate, and lemons, planted.44 Together, the 
new flora and fauna altered the island’s ecology and the Caquetios’ way-of-life.45 
 The Caquetios adapted well to the newly introduced European plants and animals, 
incorporating many of them into their subsistence strategies. The success of introduced species, 
however, varied. By 1630, according to a Dutch account, the fecund livestock had expanded to 
2,000 cattle; 9,000 sheep and lamb; 750 horses; 1,000 goats; and an indefinite number of pigs. 
The Caquetios became valued by the Dutch for their skills in wrangling and hunting these 
European livestock.46 Ampués’ fruit trees also established themselves on the island but with less 
success compared to livestock. When Company sailors arrived to the island in 1634, they found 
orange trees scattered sporadically across the island and were particularly struck by how well 
orange trees grew in Indian-tended gardens. When severe drought set in around 1641, the 
oranges taunted hungry Dutch soldiers to the extent that Company officials had to issue an 
official decree forbidding soldiers from plundering the Native’s fruit groves under penalty of 
death.47  
 European-introduced food stuffs became essential parts of the Caquetios’ diet, but the 
Spanish presence on the island also translated into the end of more traditional Caquetio 
foodstuffs. This is most notably seen in the Caquetios’ changed oyster preferences. Prior to 
Spanish arrival, the Caquetios relied heavily upon the oyster species Pinctada radiata. This 
specific species, however, faded around 1500 after Spanish colonists arrived and was replaced by 
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an increased reliance on chitons (large marine mollusks), different oyster species (Ostrea 
muricatus, Ostrea equestris, and Isognomon alatus), and mussels (Brachidontes exustus).  
 The change in diet represented a shift in the Caquetios’ settlement locations. The earlier 
species were drawn mostly from the southern coast while the newly prevalent species were 
naturally more abundant along the island’s northern coast.48 This is indicative of a settlement 
shift away from the more hospitable southern coastal regions and towards rockier northern 
regions. Why the Caquetios abandoned the southern coast is unclear, but it seems possible that 
they were attempting to avoid contact with the Spanish who favored and populated the southern 
coast. Archeologists have also noted a decrease in mammal and reptile remains around Caquetios 
dig sites that coincided with their shifting shellfish preferences. While archeologist Jay Haviser, 
Jr. suggests this decline might be attributed to the difficulty in transporting reptiles from their 
primary habitats along the south coast bays back to inland villages, his reasoning does not 
account for the latent potential for conflict between the Caquetios and Spanish. Nor does it 
account for changes in the island’s ecology due to the flourishing livestock population.49 The 
heavy presence of European livestock must have exerted a tremendous pressure on the island’s 
fragile ecosystem and threatened many of the secondary species upon which the Caquetios 
relied. 
  Curaçao’s importance to the Spanish began to fade following the death of Juan de Ampués 
in 1533. The island came under the supervision of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo which 
prohibited settlement on the island without prior permission.50 As time passed so did the island 
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pass from the minds of Spanish officials. The Caquetios were left to their own accord, 
presumably free to continue their lives on the now neglected, though nominally Spanish island.51 
 Adapting to changing and shifting climatic and ecological conditions was deeply 
embedded in Caquetio culture and tradition. In this way, incorporating newly introduced plant 
and animal species into a subsistence lifestyle appears remarkably sensible. Doing so allowed the 
Caquetios to reestablish themselves on Curaçao after a devastating period of Spanish 
enslavement and rule. In the interim years between Spanish near-abandonment and the 1634 
arrival of Dutch Company forces, the Caquetio population rebounded slightly from 400 in 1528 
to nearly 450.52 This small force proved both a helpful ally and a formidable obstacle during the 
Company’s inchoate years on the island.  
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8. Negotiating Drought & Empire 
Initially, the Dutch West India Company had a relatively easy time securing Curaçao. The 
island’s naturally deep harbors, advantageous location along the shipping route between Brazil 
and New Netherland, and, of course, its salt flats drew the Company’s attention and ultimately 
propelled the Company to mount a military assault to acquire the island.53 It did not take long for 
some 240 Company forces to wrest control of Curaçao from Spanish hands. The Company 
forces, led by Johannes van Walbeeck, met only limited resistance during their assault that lasted 
from July 28 to August 21, 1634. A small contingent of five or six Spanish troops led by Lope 
López de Morla occupied the island at the time, though they were supported by approximately 
100 able-bodied Natives, presumably Caquetios. The Caquetios’ loyalty to the Spanish was 
tenuous. Before the Dutch had even seized the island, the Company had already succeeded in 
bringing one indigenous man, later known as Balthazar de Montero, into their fold. The 
Company won Balthazar’s allegiance after an early morning reconnaissance mission stumbled 
upon his scouting party. After Company soldiers shot Balthazar, his party, presuming him dead, 
left him to die. The Company nursed Balthazar back to health and in return he provided the 
Company important geographical information about the island. He even led the Company to the 
final, secluded encampment of Curaçao’s remaining indigenous defenders. The Company took 
the encampment by surprise and the Caquetios surrendered. De Morla surrendered the island a 
few days later, thus beginning a period of Dutch control which continues still today.54 Despite a 
relatively easily won victory, drought, scarcity, and mounting threats from the Caquetios defined 
the Company’s inchoate years on Curaçao.  
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 The Company’s 1634 attack occurred during a particularly dry spell that was followed a 
few years later by a three-year drought lasting from 1641 to 1644.55 Dutch farmers quickly found 
the dry weather insurmountable and failed to yield crops from the island’s soil. Company leaders 
responded to failed agricultural efforts by requesting provisions from New Netherland and the 
Republic. When these requests went unfulfilled, they turned to the Caquetios for help. The 
Caquetios understood their importance to the Company’s tenuous position on Curaçao and 
leveraged it to their benefit. They deployed prototypical “weapons of the weak” in order to force 
Dutch concessions and gain new rights and freedoms.56 Caquetios used foot-dragging, desertion, 
false compliance, and the play-off system. The Caquetios’ threats struck fear in Dutch leaders. 
The Company’s presence on the island was unsustainable without the help of the Caquetios who 
wrangled the island’s livestock and helped cultivate the dry soil. In order to maintain these 
relationship, the Company had little recourse but to negotiate with the Caquetios after they began 
resisting.  
 Johannes van Walbeeck’s first order as Curaçao’s newest European leader called for all 
indigenous inhabitants to report for an official counting. All told, 402 indigenous peoples 
including 105 able-bodied men reported. Van Walbeeck, however, remained skeptical of their 
allegiances and ordered all but 20 families, totaling 75 individuals, to leave for Coro in 
Venezuela along with the captured Spanish forces. The remaining indigenous peoples found 
                                                            
55 Proxy-based reconstructions of the southern Caribbean are largely derived from analyses of core samples 
taken from the anoxic Cariaco Basin located off the north-central coast of Venezuela. Analysis of titanium and iron 
concentrations suggest a period of drier conditions during the Little Ice Age. Particular to this study, low titanium 
concentrations indicative of below-average rainfall occurred between 1639 and 1649, see: Haug et al., “Southward 
Migration of the Intertropical Convergence Zone Through the Holocene,” 1306. 
56 I derive my conception of the Caquetios’ resistance against the Company from James C. Scott’s notion of the 
“weapons of the weak.” According to Scott, these are the “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups” and 
included “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, 
sabotage, and so on.” He argues these forms of resistance were used by the peasantry against those who sought to 
“extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them.” See: Scott, Weapons of the Weak, xvi. 
 
 158 
themselves splintered, relocated, and forced into servitude. Van Walbeeck chose to retain 23 
Natives at his camp as servants and let the remaining 50 return to the Indian village at Ascensión, 
presumably to live as they wished in a drastically altered cultural and ecological environment. 
Coerced into forced labor, the Caquetios leveraged their local ecological knowledge to meet the 
dual threat of climate and Dutch colonialism.57  
 Two official Company documents codified how Company leaders on Curaçao, in general, 
were to treat indigenous peoples. The original Company charter, written by the Lords of the 
States General in 1621, granted the joint-stock company sundry rights and exemptions including 
the authority to “make contracts, commitments and alliances with the princes and Natives of the 
countries” within the Company’s defined, monopolistic territory.58 The official Company policy 
regarding Curaçao’s indigenous peoples went a step further. It deeded the Company’s vested 
authority over to the island’s directors and granted them “supreme authority and 
command…over…Natives of [Curaçao],” and charged them to “vigorously enforce and observe 
the ordinances…that no one shall cause any violence or fraud on the Natives of [Curaçao].”59 
Official policy, open to broad interpretation and difficult to enforce, rarely correlated to reality. 
In actuality, far from any Company oversight, Dutch leaders could exact whatever policies they 
wished.  
 The harsh ecological conditions of the island’s semi-arid environment proved an enigma to 
Company newcomers. Dutch merchants had plied the Caribbean’s waters for nearly two decades, 
but settlement colonies were a new and foreign venture replete with their own set of obstacles 
and difficulties. Chief amongst these was learning how to draw “everything from the soil of the 
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country through agriculture,” a task expressly charged to Curaçao’s directors.60 The efforts 
expended in pursuit of this charge, however, appear meek. In 1635, Laurens Pietersz, a farmer 
and the first private colonist, arrived aboard the Salm accompanied by two farmhands. Pietersz 
was joined in his toils by Jan Claeszoon van Campen, sent to Curaçao for his knowledge of salt 
making and agriculture. Neither had much success in reaping nourishment from the soil. After 
briefly experimenting with rye and wheat seeds sent over from the Dutch Republic, all of which 
failed to sprout, Pietersz and his farmhands enlisted in the Company. Clearly reaping ones daily 
bread from the island’s soils proved a more daunting task than the Heren XIX had earlier 
envisioned.61  
 Unable to yield fruit from the dry soils of Curaçao, the Company sought sustenance 
elsewhere. They first tried to request additional provisions from the Heren XIX. The Board, 
however, was only able to supply Curaçao on a limited and sporadic basis. Next they tried to 
secure succor from other Company colonies in the Americas. Brazil was the first option while 
New Netherland, partially established as a provisioning colony for the Caribbean, had yet to find 
firm footing and was experiencing its own extreme weather events that made it impossible to 
spare food provisions.62  
 The repercussions of scarce provisions resulted in several potentially devastating 
situations. The most pressing concern for the Company’s leaders on the island seems to have 
come when soldiers, now more-or-less construction workers and salt miners, refused to work – 
first in June of 1635 and then again in February of 1636.63 Company leaders also feared that the 
Spanish might learn of the dire straits under which the Dutch clung to Curaçao and launch an 
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immediate assault to re-take the island. Over the Company’s first decade of occupation on the 
island, the Caquetios proved important though often reluctant allies in thwarting and assuaging 
all of these latent threats.  
 The Company and Caquetios forged a pragmatic, yet mercurial relationship. This 
relationship wavered depending on the fluctuating value each perceived in the other. If the 
Company abused the relationship, the Caquetios could always turn to the Spanish. Beginning 
with enlisting the help of Balzathar to seize control of the island from Spain, Dutch officials 
increasingly came to see the value and importance of the Caquetios for their knowledge of the 
island, malleable relationship with the Spanish, and skills in corralling the island’s now abundant 
population of horses and livestock. The Caquetios could and did, however, use their position to 
force Dutch leaders into providing them greater freedoms and exemptions by threatening violent 
and non-violent resistance.    
 Early on, Johannes Van Walbeeck and his Council realized the value in Caquetios’ 
geographical knowledge of the island. Dutch interrogations and conversations (the record 
remains unclear about what information was given freely and what was coerced) garnered a bevy 
of information regarding the island’s landscape. Balzathar’s knowledge of hideouts, as has 
already been shown, led to the immediate capture of Spain’s indigenous allies. As a result, Van 
Walbeeck conferred Balthazar with the title “Captain of the Indians” and placed him in charge of 
the island’s remaining indigenous population. Three days after receiving his commission as 
“Captain of the Indians,” Balzathar escorted Van Walbeeck on a tour of Curaçao. Blazathar’s aid 
in mapping the island proved essential to the Company’s territorial claims.  
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 Description, as historian Patricia Seed argues, laid at the center of Dutch ceremonies of 
possession.64 This was no different in the case of Curaçao and Balzathar made this task 
significantly easier. Together, Van Walbeeck and Balzathar set out from Santa Anna Bay to 
conduct an inventory of Curaçao. They first stopped at Santa Barbara Bay which Van Walbeeck 
found more suitable than Santa Anna Bay for blocking Spanish offensives. The tour continued 
over several days, stopping at various smaller bays, the island’s salt flats, and four Indian villages 
of which only two remained inhabited. Van Walbeeck later compiled this information with 
information he gathered during a coastal survey and included it in a hand-sketched map that he 
sent back to Amsterdam.65 The Heren XIX then used the details included in Van Walbeeck’s map 
and supplementary reports in their final decision to retain control of Curaçao.  
 Balzathar’s knowledge traveled across the Atlantic and into the maps of one of the 
Netherland’s most well-known cartographers, Claes Jansz Visscher. Visscher probably used Van 
Walbeeck’s map and supplementary reports to create a descriptive map of Curaçao.66 One of the 
earliest known maps of Curaçao, this map provided information about the Company’s knowledge 
of Curaçao and details what natural resources they deemed important. First, there is a detailed 
accounting of the location of the livestock remaining on the island, principally steer, cows, 
sheep, and wild horses. Second, each lake is identified as a potential source of salt or fresh water. 
Third, indigenous villages are indicated. Finally, while importance is ascribed to livestock and 
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water, no mention is made of potential gardens, farms, or plantation sites. The reasons for Van 
Walbeeck’s and later Blaeu’s inclusion or omission of these details is impossible to ascertain. 
However, one might discern from the map a few ideas pertaining to Dutch plans for provisioning 
the island’s inhabitants. As long as the Company sent a steady supply of provisions, the “many 
and overflowing” livestock together with the few sources of “clean” water would suffice to 
sustain the island’s Company population.67 Unfortunately for Company employees located on the 
island, the Company failed to send the promised provisions. A lack of support during the 
Company’s crucial early years on the island left Van Walbeeck in a precarious position. He soon 
found himself faced with mounting resistance from both the Caquetios and Company employees.  
 Company employees were the first to push back. In June of 1635, Company soldiers who 
were employed to defend the island found themselves instead building barracks, pushing 
wheelbarrows of salt, and hauling pails of water without adequate food provisions. To make 
matters worse, several weeks earlier Van Walbeeck and his advisors reduced soldiers’ daily bread 
ration due to declining supplies and denied their requests for increased wages. For unknown 
reasons, the Heren XIX had failed to send a resupply ship to Curaçao since it was first taken over 
a year earlier. Malnourished, overworked, and underpaid, the soldiers lay down their guns and 
shovels and refused to work.   
 The first instance of Dutch leader’s acquiescence to the Caquetios emerged during this 
stressful strike. In the throes of the soldiers’ disobedience, Van Walbeeck issued a decree 
providing the Caquetios protection and fair treatment from the Company’s soldiers. The timing 
of these two events appears more than coincidental. Based on a similar situation that occurred in 
1643 (discussed later), it might be concluded that Dutch soldiers had taken to robbing the 
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Caquetios’ gardens to supplement their meager rations. Van Walbeeck, attuned to the necessity of 
maintaining the Caquetios as military allies and cattle herders, chose to ensure a continued 
alliance by protecting the remaining indigenous population. Whatever his purpose, the strike was 
short lived. A few days after Van Walbeeck had issued his edict, two supply ships arrived 
carrying food provisions. Another provisioning ship arrived a month later.68 
 Efforts by the Company to retain the Caquetios’ assistance in wrangling cattle illuminates 
the reason for Van Walbeeck’s willingness to negotiate with the Caquetios. In late November 
1635, Company leaders on Curaçao decided unanimously to allow Balzathar, the so-called 
“Captain of the Indians,” to leave the Company’s service. Allowing Balzathar’s departure seems 
strange since he had acted as a willing and able informant. They explained their reasoning for 
“liberating” Balzathar by saying that they needed his help in convincing his people to herd the 
island’s wild livestock.69 Still a month later the need for Caquetios cattle herders appears to have 
grown, most likely due to daily declining food provisions. The Dutch attempted to incentivize 
the Caquetios by offering all Indians who served as livestock herders “a goodly lot of clothes, 
shirts, and shoes.”70 The Company, while perhaps believing they received the better end of this 
deal, unknowingly tipped their hat. The Caquetios were quickly learning how much the 
Company relied upon their assistance. They would soon leverage this dependency for their own 
gains. 
 The Caquetios became empowered to resist the Company’s control once they comprehend 
their importance to the Company’s success and livelihood. They resisted though violent and non-
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violent acts. The nature of these acts took many forms as the Caquetios adapted to the changing 
geo-political power struggle for the island. Typically, their efforts materialized in either brazen 
efforts to aid the Spanish in retaking the island or secretive attempts to abscond from the island 
in acts of desertion. Dutch dependency on the Caquetios is visible in the Company’s responses to 
these acts of resistance: acquiescence and forgiveness. 
 The attempted escape of several Caquetios further illustrates Dutch dependency and 
forgiveness of the Caquetios. On the rainy evening of January 14, 1635, three Indians absconded 
to the island’s interior with their wives and children, in all totaling sixteen people.71 Shortly after, 
Company leaders ordered a cavalry party to pursue, capture, and return them to the main Dutch 
encampment. Near-daily downpours thwarted the efforts of additional search parties after the 
first attempt proved unsuccessful in locating the runaway Natives. A week passed. Still 
unsuccessful, the Dutch changed tactics and sent some Caquetio women after the party with 
promises of pardon. Surely, the Dutch leaders thought, pardon and the incursion of lost wages 
would be enough to incentivize the fugitives to return. They were wrong. 
 A general feeling of optimism amongst Dutch leaders quickly waned during the nearly 
month-long ordeal with the “fugitive” Natives. On January 20, 1635, just a few days after the 
Natives fled, a Dutch official recorded optimistically that through recent storms “the greening of 
the land might continue.”72 But not a week later the mood had drastically changed. A solid week 
of dry weather following the Caquetios’ escape halted the greening of the island and speculation 
of an intense drought began. The Council reported that the dry season came earlier and had lasted 
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one to two months longer than the year before.73 Company leaders became increasingly eager to 
find the Caquetios and return them to service.   
 The dry weather allowed search efforts to resume in full. On January 30, David Wiltschut, 
Commander of the Dutch forces on Curaçao, rode out into the interior to retrieve the Natives 
stating that he desired to return the Natives so as to “continue the consumption of the fruit and 
beasts” found on the island. Wiltschut along with several horsemen quickly succeeded in locating 
one Indian who, after being interrogated, informed the Dutch of the other runaways’ location. 
The captured and interrogated Native then led a small group of Dutch horsemen directly to a cliff 
where they found the remaining Natives.74 The next day, the Dutch patrol seized the fleeing 
Natives and returned them to the newly established fort of Wiltschutsburg to receive their 
punishment.   
 Johannes Van Walbeeck weighed his options as he faced the difficult question of what to do 
with a group of attempted runaway Natives. The traditional punishment for a runaway soldier 
was death, but Van Walbeeck understood the Netherlander’s dependency on the Caquetios and 
wanted to ensure continued good relations with the Caquetios. As a result, he and his Council 
pardoned all of the Natives. The Council provided several reasons to justify their decision. First, 
the Natives appeared to be of a peaceful nature. Second, the runaways ensured the Dutch that 
they had no intention of leaving the island. Finally, and the “most important reason of all,” was 
that the Dutch troops were so occupied working on the construction of fortifications that they 
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had no time to learn how to round up livestock.75 Dutch leaders were firmly beholden to the 
Caquetios livestock wranglers to survive the impending dry season. 
 The Company clearly relied upon the Caquetios as cattle herders and they might have also 
relied upon them as agriculturalists. After Jan Claeszoon van Campen, Laurens Pietersz, and 
Pietersz’s farm hands traded in their shovels for weapons sometime during the summer of 1635, 
no mention is made of attempts to grow subsistence crops, although Van Walbeeck did express 
interest in growing cash crops like tobacco on several occasions.76 Nevertheless, several gardens 
appear to have been tended near Dutch fortifications. These gardens were most likely tended by 
the Caquetios. Garden work would probably be below Company commanders and soldiers had 
already been overworked to the point of striking. The only farmers on the island had quickly 
abandoned agricultural pursuits and enlisted as soldiers, while no European women lived on 
Curaçao until around 1638.77 This left only the remaining Caquetios. Indeed, two Caquetio later 
testified that they aided the Company by helping them grow vegetables.78 Johannes van 
Walbeeck also frequently mentioned the Caquetios’ agricultural skills.79 One of these Company 
gardens, named after Commander Wiltschut, became the object of considerable attention 
following yet another soldiers’ strike.  
 By February 1636, the supplies provided by the three provisioning ships that ended the 
previous soldiers’ strike in June of 1635 had begun to run low. In response to decreased 
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provisions, Company soldiers abandoned their work yet again in mid-February. Within three 
days, Company leaders had reached an accord with the “mutinous” soldiers and put an indefinite 
end to construction projects and the strike. However, the crucial problem of subsistence 
provisions remained unsolved. Several increasingly desperate soldiers took actions into their own 
hands. During the night of March 1, several soldiers commandeered a few horses, trampled about 
the island, and robbed fruit from an unidentified garden.80 A few nights later a similar incident 
occurred. According to a report by the quartermaster, several soldiers pillaged Wiltschut’s garden 
and stole everything they could carry.81 These actions were both attempts to satiate hunger and 
provoke Dutch leaders into providing better provisions. 
 In response to the robberies Director Van Walbeeck acted to protect the remaining garden 
sites. Between March 7 and 10, Van Walbeeck sent several Company troops to protect a large 
garden near Santa Barbara Bay that contained orange, lemon, and pomegranate trees. Next, Van 
Walbeeck issued an edict that no soldier be allowed outside the Quarter without prior consent 
and instituted a punishment of death for any soldier caught stealing from any garden.82 This 
policy seems to have squashed future robbery attempts from Company gardens until 1641 when 
Peter Stuyvesant would be forced to issue a similar edict under severe drought conditions. The 
lengths to which Van Walbeeck went to protect the Company’s gardens from theft indicates their 
greater importance to the Company’s success on Curaçao.  
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 Caquetio threats of fleeing the island or refusing to work for the Company were perhaps 
less daunting than the potential that the Caquetios might choose to collude with the Spanish 
against the Dutch. The Caquetios’ allegiances to any single European power were not universally 
shared amongst members on the island. Various factions alternatively favored the Spanish, the 
Dutch, and/or switched allegiances for reasons advantageous to their own well-being. During the 
Company’s early settlement of Curaçao, most Caquetios favored the passive Spanish and sought 
out opportunities to aid them, though their attempts never fully materialized. By the 1640s, with 
the Dutch precariously weakened by the onset of extreme dry weather, the Caquetios returned to 
the play-off system. In acts of violent and non-violent resistance, they threatened Dutch leaders 
that if their demands for greater freedom were not met they would once again aid the Spanish.  
 Attempts by indigenous peoples to work with the Spanish to oust the Company began with 
Caquetios aid to De Morla in August of 1634. They continued their efforts, though, even after the 
Company had secured the island. Many times the Spanish provoked Caquetios’ resistance while 
at other times the Caquetios initiated actions themselves. One of the earliest “conspiratorial” acts 
involved a cadre of Caquetios who Van Walbeeck had earlier sent to Coro. These “sensible and 
keen-witted Indians,” now under the command of the Spanish commander Nuñez Melian, plotted 
to sail to Curaçao and poison the island’s few drinking wells. Stormy weather, however, foiled 
their plan and the boat never returned. Months later Melian sent a second expedition, this time 
led by Domingo Antonio, to capture a Dutchman. Antonio’s expedition, unlike the first, reached 
the island but failed to capture anyone. Antonio did, however, convince a group of Caquetios to 
return with him who provided detailed information to Melian about the Company’s situation. In 
June 1635, one of the biggest blows to befall Van Walbeeck came when one of his indigenous 
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confidants, Juan Martin, colluded with the Spanish.83 For the Dutch these would be the first in a 
long and stuttered series of Caquetio attempts to return passive Spanish agents to Curaçao. 
 Native alliances remained pragmatic if not capricious. In November 1635, a group of 
Netherlanders patrolling the island came across an abandoned canoe at Westpunt (Westpoint). 
They immediately set fire to the rather large vessel to prevent the vessel’s owners from escaping. 
A pursuit in search of the owners recovered a very old Native by the name of Juan Mestizo who 
claimed that he along with his brother and one other Native had been sent to Curaçao to carry of 
Indian vaqueros (cattle herders). While the Dutch never tracked down the two other Caquetios, 
they did manage to convince Mestizo to enter into their service as an informant. He did so 
without much hesitation and provided detailed information pertaining to Curaçao’s Spanish 
occupation.84   
 The period between 1634 and 1636 laid the groundwork for the events that took place 
between 1641 and 1644 when severe drought conditions descended on the island. While the 
Caquetios proved helpful informants, livestock herders, and potentially agriculturalists, they 
could just as easily turn on the Dutch through acts of resistance. Dutch leaders on the island 
including Johannes Van Walbeeck, David Wiltschut, and later Peter Stuyvesant understood the 
Company’s deep dependency on indigenous allies. They issued edicts and instituted policies to 
ensure indigenous cooperation and service. In doing so, however, they showed their weaknesses 
and empowered the Caquetios.  
 Few extent documents exist for the period between the tenure of Johannes Van Walbeeck 
(1634-1638) and that of Peter Stuyvesant (1642-1644). However, the dynamic between Company 
employees and the indigenous peoples of Curaçao appear to have undergone significant changes 
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during this period. A 1643 report calculated that the collective indigenous population on Aruba, 
Bonaire, and Curaçao had doubled.85 The inclusion of Aruba and Bonaire in this total, though, is 
indicative of a larger change. The Dutch had by now extended their relationship with indigenous 
peoples to include those living on Curaçao’s neighboring islands who were “relatives” of the 
Caquetios remaining on Curaçao.86 The exact relationship of the indigenous population on Aruba 
to those on Curaçao is complicated by the early sixteenth-century Spanish slave raids of the 
islands and the gradual re-population of Aruba. Scholars have suggested that by the 1640s the 
indigenous population on Aruba consisted of refugees from the mainland, escapees from various 
Antilles islands, and returned descendants of the Caquetios shipped to Hispaniola in 1515. 
Nevertheless, going forward the indigenous populations on all three islands worked together in 
acts of resistance. Secondly, the Company had begun incorporating African slave labor into their 
work force on the island. The Netherlanders’ transition to a new labor source proved problematic 
to the Caquetios who watched their importance to Dutch success slowly give way to a new, less 
independent source of labor.  
 Drought-induced famine conditions overtook the island as early as 1641. In October, 
Curaçao’s director Jan Clasen van Campen wrote to New Netherland “earnestly requesting” 
provision. Van Campen argued that the island was “very much in need of them and can no longer 
send their ships out to sea for lack of provisions.” The New Netherland Council agreed to find 
the “most profitable way” to send provision to Curaçao, but nothing ever came of their 
decision.87 Similar drought conditions continued into 1642. In response, Stuyvesant worked to 
quell riotous soldiers troubled by a looming famine and acted to stop any additional 
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“insubordination and mutiny among the soldiers.”88 Because of the lack of supplies from both 
the Netherlands and New Netherland, Stuyvesant worked to reduce the Company’s personnel on 
Curaçao to the bare minimum necessary for defense and operations. The contracted time of an 
untold number of soldiers had expired in 1642 and many now sought to escape the hardships of 
another imminent famine by returning to the Netherlands. Finding it “advisable for the maximum 
service to the Company, peace, [and] unity,” Stuyvesant and his Council granted the “veteran 
soldiers deliverance” by allowing them to depart Curaçao onboard several ships traveling from 
Brazil to the Netherlands.89 Along with the soldiers, Stuyvesant sent word of the immediate need 
for provisions alluding to a recent attack by the Spanish on Bonaire and its consequential losses 
to Company profits. The underlying message: send additional support or risk losing even more 
profits.90 
 The year 1643 proved a turning point for all parties with a vested interest in Curaçao. 
Spanish attacks ramped up, Dutch subsistence supplies reached untenably low levels, Director 
Stuyvesant called upon Caquetios and enslaved Africans for assistance, and the Caquetios staged 
one of their last resistance movements before being almost completely replaced by enslaved 
Africans. All of this occurred amidst one of the worst droughts of the era.  
 Stuyvesant knew that he could not rely solely on support from the fatherland and issued 
several orders to counteract the brunt of another famine. On March 13, believing New 
Netherland to be better supplied than Curaçao, he dispatched one of four Company yachts to 
New Netherland for food.91 Then in April, he sent a smaller sloop to the islands of Aves and 
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Rocas, located east of Bonaire, “to catch some turtles, if possible, for the Negroes.”92 He altered 
his plan a month later when conditions on the island further deteriorated. He ordered sixteen 
additional soldiers to join the hunt for turtles that he believed could provide “for the maintenance 
of the Negroes…as well as for the rationing out of [their] own food supply.”93 Weighing his 
decision, Stuyvesant concluded that while fewer soldiers on the island made it more vulnerable 
to attack, it was more important to make Curaçao’s “meager food supply last longer.”94  
 Constant fear of a renewed Spanish assault on Curaçao exacerbated drought-induced 
anxieties amongst the Dutch. As early as 1642, the Spanish had made inroads on Curaçao’s 
neighboring islands of Bonaire and Aruba.95 Sometime before 1643, the Spanish had pillaged 
Bonaire, destroyed the Netherlands’ salt operation supplies, completely destroyed all Dutch 
fortifications, and rendered the island, according to Stuyvesant, “useless and of no service.”96  
 By March 1643, Spanish attacks had become so frequent and severe that Stuyvesant alerted 
the Heren XIX of the threat. In their missive to the Heren XIX, Company leaders lamented the 
loss of Bonaire’s productive capacity and additionally laid bare the island’s increasingly 
disastrous drought-induced famine conditions. They pleaded for immediate food provisions 
either from the Dutch Republic or from New Netherland and stressed that the island’s utter lack 
of food had led to “insubordination and mutiny among the soldiers.”97 
 The Dutch Republic’s failure to respond to Curaçao’s pleas for help forced Stuyvesant into 
a difficult position. With ever decreasing food supplies, Stuyvesant decided to follow Van 
Walbeeck’s example and turned to the Caquetios and burgeoning population of enslaved Africans 
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for help. He deployed two measures to ensure the Caquetios’ cordiality and assistance. The first 
measure restrained Company personnel from plundering Native gardens. Stuyvesant received 
numerous complaints from the Caquetios during the early months of 1643 that Company 
soldiers, hungry due to low food rations, had “robbed their abandoned gardens of fruit…and 
destroyed the fruit trees.”98 Coming in the middle of a prolonged famine it is likely that the 
soldiers did not simply destroy the fruit trees but rather stole the remaining fruit for personal 
consumption. Regardless, Stuyvesant issued an order carrying the death penalty for any 
Company employee found plundering Native gardens.99 Additionally, Stuyvesant declared that 
any Company employee desirous of remaining on Curaçao after their terms of service expired 
could do so by establishing themselves on any land, “provided that they do not select any 
gardens presently cultivated by the Indians or the Company’s employed blacks.”100 Stuyvesant 
understood that support from the local Caquetios was essential. Their ability to supply hungry 
Dutch soldiers required that he maintain cordial relations to ensure he could turn to them during 
times of intense need.  
 Despite Stuyvesant’s efforts, the Company’s food supply had dwindled to no “more than 4 
to 5 weeks” of provisions by June 1643.101 Making matters worse, the Dutch received reports of 
Spanish intentions to attack Curaçao as early as May, just as Stuyvesant was deciding how best 
to distribute his troops. The drought-induced subsistence crisis lay foremost in Stuyvesant’s mind 
as he weighed his options on how best to bring relief to hungry, riotous soldiers. Initially, he 
hoped to send additional troops to the nearby islands of Rocas and Aves to scour for additional 
food, but rethought his decision after learning that “24 ships have been assembled at the island of 
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St. Martin,” which he feared were “planning one or another attack from there.”102 The threat of a 
potential famine-induced riot prevailed and Stuyvesant agreed to send a sloop of soldiers to 
search out new food sources.  
 In the meantime, however, a Company patrol had captured an untold number of Spanish 
soldiers on Bonaire that had been sent to spy on the island. Stuyvesant and his council weighed 
several options as to what to do with the captured Spanish spies. Custom would have the Dutch 
imprison the troops until they could be used to gain an additional advantage, but “the food 
supply would hardly allow them” to be kept on the island. On the other hand, he feared that if he 
returned the spies, they would inform the Spanish of the Company’s dire situation on the island 
and prompt an attack.103 Weak, undernourished, and with several troops spread across nearby 
islands searching for food, Stuyvesant knew he could not hold off a full-out Spanish attack. As a 
result, he retained the spies and while it is unclear exactly when the Spanish were finally dealt 
with, they were still on the island as late as December of 1643.104 To feed an ever growing 
population, the Company became even more reliant upon indigenous peoples for life sustaining 
food. 
 On August 20, 1643, Stuyvesant drew up a set of orders to secure Indian support. Under 
the pretext of intelligence gathering, Stuyvesant dispatched a ship to Aruba in order “to maintain 
good intelligence with the Indians…[and] find out about the condition of the island and the 
Natives.”105 The severe drought and impending famine on Curaçao, however, suggests 
Stuyvesant’s secondary motivation might have been more pressing. “In addition there are some 
Indians from there living on this island, who still have some children and wives there, and others 
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have some livestock such as male and female goats and sheep.”106 As early as 1641, the 
Caquetios of Curaçao had demanded their families be transferred to Curaçao in order to be 
reunited with them and to ensure their safety in light of increasing Spanish attacks on Aruba. 
While Stuyvesant found the transfer of the Caquetios and their cattle “not only advisable but also 
necessary and beneficial for this island…in order to be of service to us in time of need,” he 
initially delayed the final decision to do so.107 It was only after the drought had set in by August 
of 1643 that Stuyvesant began to see the additional population, but perhaps more tellingly their 
cattle, as “a benefit to this island.”108 He then granted the Native request that their families and 
livestock be transported to Curaçao.   
 The Caquetios’ acts of resistance might have played an equally important role in securing 
the transfer of their families back to Curaçao. At the end of March 1643, Stuyvesant and his 
Council learned that Natives on Curaçao, Aruba, and Bonaire had begun riding “into the 
countryside” against the Company’s orders. Additionally, when Company leaders sent Natives 
into the interior on official business they took “too much time” before they returned, “playing 
among themselves at riding the horse and ruining the animals.”109 While knowing the Caquetios’ 
exact intentions is impossible, they may have used non-violent measures of foot-dragging and 
non-compliance in an attempt to force Dutch commanders to give in to their demands. In 
responses to these acts of resistance, Stuyvesant ordered the Caquetios to return and delegated a 
Company official to oversee the Natives by daily riding into the interior to “keep watch” over 
them.110  
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 Conditions on Curaçao continued to deteriorate throughout the remainder of 1643. By 
September, the storehouses contained “bread, stockfish, and oil,” that the quartermaster 
estimated would not “last us more than two to three weeks at best” and “beans, vinegar, and meat 
for two months at most.”111 Near mid-October, the storehouses lay in a “grave state…with no 
more than two rations of beans, vinegar, and fish” and the drought had killed a significant 
portion of the island’s livestock. As a result, it was impossible for the Dutch to “maintain the 
garrison solely with meat.”112 Brief relief came when three ships arrived sometime between 
October 15 and December 5 carrying enough food for “10 to 12 months at best.”113  
 Curaçao’s socio-political dynamics changed remarkably during the drought. In 1641, the 
Heren XIX declared Curaçao a collection point for slaves captured from enemy vessels.114 The 
island's African slave population subsequently increased as did the Company's need to find 
subsistence with which to feed them. In June of 1643, the Company’s daily dwindling food 
supplies prompted officials to recall the “Negroes who are still on the island of Bonnairo” in 
order to “employ them here [Curaçao] in the gardens and in other Company service.”115 By 
August 1643, the enslaved Africans were “busy preparing gardens in the countryside.”116 No 
longer would the Company have to rely solely upon the indigenous population; they had found 
instead a new, more reliant and pliant source of labor in African slaves.    
 Newly-filled storehouses, however, did not allow Stuyvesant to let his guard down for 
long. In January 1644, he decided to launch an attack on the nearby Spanish-held island of St. 
Martin. Stuyvesant’s reasons for attacking the island were two-fold. He desired access to the 
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island’s salt pans, which he believed “more accessible than any other in this region” and thus 
made the island a preferred trading destination. But perhaps more importantly, he wanted to 
prevent the English or French from taking the island and believed that if such an event occurred 
“the Company would suffer considerable damage from the duties and claims” lost as a result.117 
The attack which took place between March 22 and April 16 ultimately proved disastrous.118 
While causalities on both sides were nominal, a Spanish shot hit Stuyvesant’s right leg. The 
damage to his leg required an immediate amputation. This temporarily ended Stuyvesant’s 
command over Curaçao and gave him the sobriquet “peg-leg Stuyvesant.” Following the 
amputation he returned to the Dutch Republic to recover. Back in the Republic he did not remain 
silent. During his recovery he petitioned the Heren XIX heavily to consolidate Dutch efforts in 
the West Indies under a single directorship – a position for which he was uniquely qualified and 
received in 1647. 
 Before returning to the Republic to heal, however, Stuyvesant presided over one final 
crisis. Over the first few days of April, 450 denizens of the Dutch West India Company under the 
command of David Wiltschut unexpectedly landed on Curaçao from Maranhão. Stuyvesant 
worried the newly arrived soldiers would continue to diminish Curaçao’s own precarious food 
supply. Stuyvesant ultimately ordered the soldiers to New Netherland where they could “perform 
some service there against the Indians.”119 “The soldiers,” declared a May 26, 1644 resolution, 
“can be used against the rebelling Indians in New Netherland.”120 New Netherland, just like 
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Brazil and Curaçao, was experiencing its own indigenous resistance known alternatively as the 
Wappinger War or Kieft’s War (1643-1645).  
 By the time the worst of the drought had passed, Dutch dependency on indigenous peoples 
had given way to a new dependency on the forced capture, shipment, and enslavement of African 
peoples.121 This is itself a reflection of Curaçao’s changing purpose. No longer viable as a source 
of salt or place of permanent Dutch settlement, Curaçao became a slave-trading port.122 
Following the end of the drought, Stuyvesant wrote the Amsterdam Chamber while recovering 
from his amputation to petition that “Curaçao should be employed for the benefit of the slave 
trade.”123 By the 1650s, Curaçao had indeed become the center for the Dutch Atlantic slave 
trade.124 Indigenous peoples, however, did not vanish. Instead, the Caribbean world's indigenous 
peoples became enmeshed in the burgeoning Dutch slave trade – acting as lesser-known 
characters in the larger story of African slavery.125  
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The Dutch West India eventually ceded Brazil and New Netherland to its European competitors, 
but Curaçao remained firmly in the Company’s control. Today, Curaçao is still considered a 
constituent country of the Kingdom of the Netherlands – though it gained full autonomy in 2010 
with the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles. In the aftermath of the Caquetios’ resistance 
movement and the three-year drought that plagued the island’s Dutch colonists, the Dutch West 
India Company worked to transform the island into a strategic port in the growing trans-Atlantic 
slave trade.126 The signing of the Peace of Munster in 1648 marked a significant turning point for 
the now independent Dutch Republic and its colonies, including Curaçao. The Peace Treaty that 
ended the Dutch Revolt against Spain meant the Republic no longer required Curaçao as a naval 
base and instead could unleash the island’s economic potential.  
 The role of Curaçao in the trans-Atlantic slave trade was solidified in 1662 when the 
Spanish reinstated the asiento de negroes and the Dutch received a subcontract to transport 
African slaves across the Atlantic. The asiento was a monopoly contract granted to a prominent 
individual in exchange for a fee paid to the Spanish royal government that allowed individuals to 
“sell licenses entitling the holder to bring slaves into the Spanish colonies according to specific 
contract.”127 The asiento was occasionally suspended and during these periods transactions were 
conducted via the sale of individual licenses, although the sale of slaves at any time was also 
conducted illegally through smuggling and illicit trade. Historian Johannes Postma has divided 
the asiento system into three periods. Before 1640, the Portuguese controlled the trade and after 
1713 the English controlled the trade. During the interim, the trade was divided between various 
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competitive European traders including the Dutch. And, it was during this period that Curaçao 
emerged as a strategic trade port. Prior to the reinstatement of the asiento in 1662, the Dutch 
involved themselves in the slave trade mostly by intercepting and capturing Portuguese slaving 
vessel and through smuggling operations between Curaçao and the Spanish Main.  
 As Curaçao’s role in the slave trade increased, the value the Company placed on the 
Caquetios and the relative importance of the Caquetios to the Company diminished. In 1655, 
Peter Stuyvesant sent instructions from New Netherland that reiterated his earlier orders 
forbidding Company servants from destroying, despoiling, or robbing the Natives’ gardens or 
treating them unfairly or fraudulently.128 Additionally, Stuyvesant insisted that Curaçao’s 
indigenous peoples were distinct from enslaved Africans, despite the similarity in the services 
they rendered. He instructed the vice-director of Curaçao, his friend Matthias Beck, that “he shall 
not treat the natives of the island severely as slaves or in an unchristianlike manner, but through 
appropriate persuasion and promises encourage them to perform service, particularly in cutting 
dyewod, transporting bundles of branches…, driving the horses, maintaining and cleaning the 
wells, and other ordinary services conformable to what they have been accustomed to do.”129 
Throughout the 1650s, Natives continued to perform various services for the Company. They 
carried water, slaughtered cattle, and worked alongside African slaves cutting dyewood and 
constructing gantries to be used in what remained of the Company’s salt operations on the 
island.130  
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 In 1657, Matthias Beck, in a passing reference to the island’s earlier Spanish period, wrote 
that “the Indians, who were then here in numbers, supported themselves with the cattle, just as 
the few do who are now still with us here.” Beck’s primary concern in referencing the 
diminished Native population was with what appeared to be yet another “lean period” on the 
island.131 Two years earlier, hopes of the island’s latent agricultural potential abounded. More 
land than ever before had been cultivated and freemen and Company servants alike believed that 
“if the Lord God is please to grant His blessing and the rains continue just as they began early in 
the month of November, then we shall have no scarcity of grain or beans.” Yet, they feared that 
“if the rain ceases early…then we apprehend that the produce, which is presently green and 
beautiful, shall never fully ripen. Therefore everything depends solely on the mercy and blessing 
of the Lord.”132 Their fears became a reality the following year. The rains ceased and the 
Company’s magazine returned to a “sober state.” While the Company waited for relief from 
patria or New Netherland, the Company’s “Negroes and many others living in the countryside” 
who depended on the island’s own productivity “in order to live,” were left hungry due to the 
“poor growth and because the fruits of the country were not very successful here on the island 
this year.”133  
 Matthias Beck summarized the state of Curaçao’s agriculture potential and the necessity of 
Company leaders to rethink their purposes for the island in 1657.  
 
Concerning the advancement and promotion of agriculture: Every attempt is being made for as much as we 
have the opportunity and means to do so; however, whoever is informing your honors that in these warm 
lands considerable produce can be grown during dry years by planting the same near places and spots 
where there are wells so that they can be watered or otherwise made wet from them when rain is scarce, is 
giving your honors very bad information and is demonstrating that he has little knowledge of what is 
required for the complete growth of produce in these warm lands, because it is impossible for crops to 
reach perfection in this country without rain from above. It is true that in marshy grounds, which are not to 
be found at all on Curaçao but which I have seen planted in Brasil, that they yielded produce during the dry 
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or summer season; however, on dry ground which is common here on Curaçao, no produce, which can be 
of any consideration for helping the garrison here, can be obtained without rains.134  
  
 When the asiento trade began to pickup after 1662, the Company, despite Beck’s warning, 
encouraged the cultivation of new plantations in order to decrease its reliance on imports from 
abroad. Eight or nine estates were established to grow maize for the island’s slaves. However, 
none were ever very successful. The Company continued to rely upon imported subsistence 
goods and in 1704, Jacob Beck, the newly appointed director on the island, suggested the 
plantations be sold off. Three years later he succeeded in selling at least five of them.135 
 The future success of Curaçao required the constant support of the Company. It would take 
more than dyewood and salt, however, to cover such expense. The 1662 asiento, together with 
the continuation of smuggling operations with the Spanish-American mainland, provided the 
necessary impetus and potential profits for the Company to continue their investment. 
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Part IV: New Netherland, 1621-1664 
 
“We have already stated that the cause of the population of New Netherland was the 
liberty to trade with the Indians. We shall now prove that it also is the cause of its ruin…” 
- Anonymous, Journal of New Netherland, 16471 
 
“Whereas the Company has to bear heavy expenses both for the erection of fortification 
and the maintenance of soldiers and sailors, Therefore we have resolved to levy some 
contributions either in peltries, maize or wampum from the Indians residing hereabout, 
whom we have hitherto protected against their enemies and if there be any tribe, who will 
not willingly consent to contribute, we shall endeavor to induce them do to so by the 
most suitable means.” - Resolution to Exact a Tribute from the Indians, September 15, 
16392  
 
View of New Amsterdam. Johannes Vingboons, 1665. 
National Archives of the Netherlands, The Hague  
Foreign Map Collection 4.VELH: inv. nr. 619.14 
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10. An Introduction to New Netherland 
The colony of New Netherland stood in sharp contrast to the Company’s endeavors elsewhere in 
the Atlantic. In North America, the Company attempted to fulfill the premise of Article Two of 
the 1621 charter: to “promote the settlement of fertile and uninhabited districts.” Willem 
Usselincx had long advocated for the establishment of an agricultural colony and identified the 
Hudson Valley as a prime candidate for agricultural development.3 To be successful, however, 
an agricultural settlement necessitated undisputed land and an amendable climate. During the 
1630s and 1640s, New Netherland had neither.  
 Private traders had started trading in New Netherland shortly after Henry Hudson sailed up 
his namesake river in 1609.  The Company’s 1621 charter automatically transferred this right to 
the Company writ-large. Yet, while the Company maintained absolute control over trade, they 
preferred to transfer the ownership of New Netherland to its original Amsterdam overseers.4  
 New Netherland’s primary purpose soon became the subject of heated debate back in the 
Dutch Republic. A “trade faction” doubted New Netherland’s long-term profitability and argued 
the Company should focus on encouraging private traders that would operate within the 
Company’s monopoly. Private traders, this faction argued, could best exploit the region’s rich 
beaver and otter pelt trade. Such an arrangement would incentivize private traders, limit the 
Company’s long-term expenses, and produce short-term profits. In opposition, pro-settlement 
critics pointed to the trade faction’s myopic vision and how a trade focus would leave the colony 
vulnerable to Indian and English attacks. This “colonization faction” favored free trade and 
settlement. They argued that startup expenses would be high, but the Company could recoup 
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these costs and earn a return on their investment over time. Additionally, they argued, this plan 
would establish New Netherland as an agricultural colony capable of producing enough grain 
and timber to decrease Dutch dependence on the Baltic trade and even supply Company colonies 
in the Caribbean and Brazil. Over the course of New Netherland’s relatively short existence 
(1614-1667, 1673-74) both sides won small victories. However, in general, the colony’s 
character slowly transformed from its earlier role as a fur-trading colony to a settlement colony.5  
 The territory of New Netherland stretched from the Delmarva Peninsula (present-day 
Delaware and eastern shore of Maryland) to as far north as present-day Cape Cod and was 
pinned in by earlier English colonial claims to the north and south. Three prominent rivers 
flowed throughout the territory. The Zuydtrivier (South River, present-day Delaware River), the 
Noort-Rivier (North River, present-day Hudson River), and the Varsche rivier (Fresh River, 
present-day Connecticut River). The West India Company constructed two defensive forts along 
the Hudson River that gradually took on the character of trade and commerce centers. Fort 
Amsterdam, constructed in 1625, lay at the mouth of the Hudson River at the tip of Manhattan 
and roughly 150 miles north was Fort Orange, constructed in 1624.   
 Mounting pressure from nearby England’s colonies forced New Netherland’s gradual 
transition from a trade to settlement colony. In 1622, the English sent Ambassador Sir Dudley 
Carlton to The Hague to protest the Company’s activities in regions the English claimed based 
on the right of prior discovery. In response, the States General moved to establish a large 
population to exert its power in the Hudson Valley and used their seat on the Heren XIX to urge 
the Company to promote colonization. In January 1624, the Eendracht departed from the island 
                                                            




of Texel for New Netherland carrying the colony’s first colonists.6 Six additional ships followed 
within the year. The settlement campaign came at great expense to the Company as the cost of 
transportation, provisions, and goods rose to an estimated 100,000 guilders between 1624 to 
1625.     
 The Amsterdam commissioners appointed a colonial director, who was advised by a 
council of colonists, to ensure the colony’s effectiveness, profitability, and agricultural growth. 
Together, these individuals directed New Netherland’s daily affairs including interactions with 
the region’s indigenous groups. New Netherland’s directors also dictated where colonists could 
establish their farms and what crops they would grow. Farmers were then obligated to cultivate 
the appointed fields for at least six years in order to retain control of them. Additionally, the 
Company granted farmers freedom to trade on their land but forced them to sell all pelts to the 
Company at established prices.7  
 The Company’s debt obligations for New Netherland continued to rise during the 1620s 
sparking continuous debates over how best to address the colony’s financial ills. It seemed that 
New Netherland’s fur trade simply could not cover the costs of Company-sponsored settlement. 
The Amsterdam chamber’s two warring factions came to an agreement in 1629 to take the cost 
burden of colonization off the shoulders of the Company. They contrived a patroon-system in 
which private investors (patroons) could establish a private colony (patroonship) in New 
Netherland. Patroons took on several obligations that were aimed at increasing the colony’s 
population. They were financially responsible for promoting and populating the regions entrusted 
to them and were required to recruit at least fifty individuals above the age of fifteen. In 
exchange, patroons could choose from any available land in the colony except for Manhattan 
                                                            
6 Jaap Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland, 30. 
7 Den Heijer, Geschiedenis van de WIC, 80. 
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Island as long as they adequately compensated the indigenous inhabitants. Patroons also received 
the right to govern their colonies and were granted trading rights in all things except in places 
where the Company already had an established agent (commies). The 1629 agreement also 
slightly loosened the Company’s grip on the fur trade. Colonists and patroon’s agents residing in 
the patroonships could trade for furs, though the Company assessed a one-guilder duty on every 
pelt obtained in this manner. Colonists who risked settlement received a ten-year tax exemption. 
In the end, only six private investors made an attempt to establish patroonships in New 
Netherland and only one, Killiaen Van Rensselaer, found success.8 
 Some of the earliest known hostilities between New Netherland’s colonists and Hudson 
Valley Natives emanated from land acquisitions following the 1629 Freedoms and Exemptions 
Act. The patroon-system sparked a wave of expansion overseen by then-director Wouter Van 
Twiller. Private individuals and Natives generally worked out purchase agreements and then 
appeared before the colony’s administrative council to formalize and finalize the transaction. 
Extreme weather events compounded disagreements over the meaning of land purchases and led 
to conflicts with indigenous groups that within three years’ time had halted the colony’s 
expansion.  
 New Netherland’s settlement coincided with a pattern of extreme weather. Tree ring 
samples suggest the Hudson Valley experienced drought conditions between 1627 and 1630 as 
well as 1635 and 1636.9 These droughts caused tensions between colonists and Natives as 
agricultural fields become increasingly important for survival. The absence of detailed records 
during this early period of Dutch settlement in New Netherland precludes a causative analysis, 
                                                            
8 Den Heijer, Geschiedenis van de WIC, 80-81; Meuwese, Brothers in Arms, 48-49. 
9 For drought records, see Neil Pederson et al., “Is an Epic Pluvial Masking the Water Insecurity of the Greater 
New York City Region?,” 1339–54; “Grid Point 267,” Data Set, North American Drought Atlas. 
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but the frequency, level, and range of hostilities that erupted across the colony between settlers 
and Natives in the early 1630s suggests more than simple correlation. 
 The earliest land transactions from Native to Dutch hands reflect a tendency to establish 
settlements in close proximity to New Amsterdam and foreshadowed later colonial conflicts. 
Wouter Van Twiller, the colony’s fifth director, purchased Noten Eylant (Nut Island and later 
Governor’s Island) in 1637 for two axe heads, a string of beads, and some iron nails. In the 
surrounding years, colonists and Company officials purchased lands in present-day Brooklyn, 
Staten Island, and the Jersey City area then known as Pavonia. In 1633, the Raritan attacked 
Company traders in Pavonia on multiple occasions. The documentary record is silent on the 
causes of these violent events but perhaps the Raritan had been especially hard hit by drought 
and in response tried to protect valuable agricultural and hunting grounds. These hostilities came 
to an end the following year when the Raritan and Company leaders brokered a peace deal. 
Regardless, the events induced the owner of Pavonia, Michael Pauw, to sell his land back to the 
Company in 1635.10  
 The bulk of New Netherland’s commercial fur trade activity took place at Fort Orange, 
approximately 150 miles north of New Amsterdam along the Hudson River. The Company 
initially conducted the majority of its fur trade with the Mahican who resided on the eastern 
shores of the Hudson River’s northern banks and who, in turn, traded with tribes even further 
north along the St. Lawrence River. The Mahican’s access to furs ensured such favorable trade 
relations with the Dutch that they became military allies on at least one occasion. In 1626, the 
Mahican convinced the Dutch commissary in Fort Orange to join forces against the Mohawk. 
Despite the Company’s policy of neutrality concerning Indian disputes, Commissary Daniel van 
                                                            
10 Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1960), 45-46. 
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Krieckenbeeck’s assurance of success convinced him the alliance would be advantageous. His 
decision had deadly consequences. En route to attack the Mohawk, he along with six colonists 
and a Mahican war party fell into a Mohawk ambush. Three colonists were killed and three 
escaped. The Company quickly moved to repair their relationship with the Mohawk. An itinerant 
trader named Pieter Barentsen negotiated on behalf of the Company and reached a quick 
settlement with the Mohawk who, having walked away from the assault unscathed, readily 
accepted the Company’s apology. This was a fortuitous resolution. Between 1628 and 1629, the 
Mohawk dealt the Mahican a devastating blow after several decades of hostilities and as a result, 
the Mohawk gradually replaced the Mahican as the Company’s primary trading partner at Fort 
Orange.11 
 Fort Orange’s trade focus began to shift following the 1629 Freedoms and Exemptions Act. 
Just as more agricultural communities developed around New Amsterdam and Manhattan Island, 
so too did farmers begin to arrive and cultivate the area around Fort Orange. Killiaen Van 
Rensselaer, the only patroon to establish a successful patroonship, purchased lands on either side 
of the Hudson River near Fort Orange and named the area Rensselaerswyck, although he 
managed his lands from across the Atlantic and never actually visited the colony. Part of his 
success owed to his ability to negotiate a deal with the colony’s then-director Wouter Van 
Twiller. Van Twiller happened be Van Rensselaer’s nephew and had been appointed in large part 
through the concerted efforts of his uncle. The deal allowed Rensselaer’s tenants to trade cash 
crops to the Company in exchange for much needed foodstuffs. While this activity surely 
                                                            
11 Ibid., 46-48. For a counterargument to the “Beaver War” interpretation of Iroquois hostilities against the 
Mahican and French that emphasizes the Iroquois’ traditional mourning war practices and territorial defense rather 
than market economics, see: José António Brandão, “Your Fyre Shall Burn No More”: Iroquois Policy toward New 
France and Its Native Allies to 1701 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1997). 
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violated the Company’s monopoly, it seemed that no party – private, Native, or Company – 
found much reason to quarrel over the illicit trade.12  
 Hostilities erupted between the Mohawk and Company employees in Fort Orange in 1633, 
the same year as similar hostilities occurred near New Amsterdam. The root of the hostilities, 
based on a 1634 deposition of former New Netherland director Bastiaen Jansz Crol taken in 
Amsterdam, lay with the appointment of Hans Jorissen Hontom to the position of commissary of 
Fort Orange in 1633. Hontom, according to the deposition, had at an earlier point kidnapped a 
Mohawk leader and then killed him despite having received the demanded ransom. 
Saggodryochta, the head chief of the Mohawk, identified Crol during a trade in 1633 and was so 
incensed by his presence that he refused to complete the transaction. Soon afterwards, the 
Mohawk set fire to a Company yacht, threatened to kill Crol if they saw him again, and then 
killed “all the cattle in the neighborhood of Fort Orange.” Nothing came of the threat on Crol’s 
life as he died in an unrelated incident a few months later.13  
 The Company also expanded their trading presence eastward and between 1632 and 1633 
constructed the House of Good Hope – a trading post near Hartford. This area hosted some of the 
earliest Dutch traders in the Americas and at least one of these traders planted an early seed of 
distrust between the local Mattabesec tribe and the Dutch. In 1622, an unknown European trader 
kidnapped and held a Mattabesec leader for ransom. The trader released the leader after receiving 
payment. While the Company expelled the trader upon hearing news of the transgressions and 
replaced him with the more diplomatic Pieter Barentsen, the tribe retained animosity towards the 
Dutch going forward and pulled them into a protracted war with the nearby Pequot and English. 
                                                            
12 Trelease, Indian Affairs, 49-50. 
13 Ibid., 51. 
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This conflict came to an end in 1635 when the Pequot ceded their land in the area to the English, 
but erupted once again in 1637 during the infamous Pequot War.14  
 Swanendael, a patroonship founded by Samuel Godyn along the Delaware River in 1629, 
rounded out New Netherland’s major agricultural claims. Approximately thirty individuals bent 
on farming settled into the region in April 1631. The settlers benefited from the fur trade for 
about two years before the Company sent a commissary to break up the trade and claim a portion 
for themselves. Early Dutch traders had negotiated with the Delawares and established Fort 
Nassau in 1624 to facilitate trade, but disappointing returns caused them to abandon the fort two 
year later. Susquehannas, western enemies of the Delawares, gradually laid claim to the region 
and renewed transactions with the Dutch in 1633.15  
 Swanendael was not immune to Indian hostilities. In 1632, just a year after the first 
colonists arrived, a group of Natives attacked the colony. David Pietersen de Vries recounted the 
alleged massacre after hearing details of the events from the neighboring Nanticokes in 
December 1632. According to the Nanticokes, one of the Indians had taken a piece of tin painted 
with the arms of Holland. Another group, seeing the colonist’s outrage, took it upon themselves 
to seek revenge and murdered the alleged thief. The Dutch were aghast upon hearing the news 
and told the killers that they only wished to reprimand the responsible party. The murdered 
Native’s kinsmen demanded revenge after hearing about the events. Under the pretense of trade – 
the Natives carried a good quantity of bear skins – they entered a trade house and killed two men 
                                                            
14 Ibid., 55-56. The classic text on the Pequot War is Cave, The Pequot War. For an examination of the role of 
the Dutch in the Pequot War, see Mark Meuwese, “The Dutch Connection: New Netherland, the Pequots, and the 
Puritans in Southern New England, 1620–1638,” Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 9, no. 2 
(2011): 295–323. 
15 Trelease, Indian Affairs, 56-57. 
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and their dog. Godyn had reached a breaking point. In 1635, he sold his patroonship back to the 
Company after Natives attacked his colony and Company officials ended trade opportunities.16  
 The 1629 Freedoms and Exemptions Act was supposed to increase New Netherland’s 
population through the innovative, feudal-like patroon-system. Yet, more than anything, it 
catalyzed a string of hostilities between local indigenous groups and rogue Company officials 
like Daniel van Krieckenbeeck and Hans Jorissen Hontom. The foggy details surrounding the 
outbreaks of violence around Pavonia (1633), Fort Orange (1633), Swanendael (1632), and to 
some extent the House of Good Hope (1635) suggest a correlation between the colony’s 
settlement expansion plans and a prolonged drought episode throughout the Hudson Valley 
between 1627 and 1636. Notably, only one of the six attempted patroonships, Rensselaerswyck, 
succeeded during this period. Most patroonships failed as farmers found more profits from 
trading furs than growing crops. What had originated as a plan to increase the colony’s 
population instead incited deadly events that cautioned people away from moving to the colony. 
In 1628, approximately 270 individuals lived in New Netherland. Over the next decade, the 
population increased by a meager 750 – spread out over a region stretching from present-day 
Delaware, across the Hudson Valley, and all the way to Hartford, Connecticut.17 Something had 
to change if the Company wanted to maintain its hold on the region against English and 
indigenous threats.  
 The Company enacted two measures to save the imperiled colony, though neither 
succeeded. First, they appointed a new director to oversee the colony in 1638. Willem Kieft, like 
many of his predecessors, had no colonial experience, administrative or otherwise. Instead, he 
                                                            
16 Ibid., 57. For De Vries’ account of the Swanendael attack, see David Pietersz de Vries, Voyages from 
Holland to America, A.D. 1632 to 1644, trans. Henry Cruse Murphy (New York, NY, 1853), 33-35. 
17 Trelease, Indian Affairs, 58; Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland, 32. 
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received the position through family connections. Kieft was born in Amsterdam in 1597, spent 
his youth serving as a merchant in France, and apparently never traveled outside Europe before 
his appointment as director. The Company officially recalled the previous director, Wouter van 
Twiller, for failing to promote unity amongst New Netherland’s colonists and Company 
employees, though his alleged drinking problem probably did not help his case.18 David de Vries, 
a prominent trader who hoped to replace van Twiller, was quite displeased with the Company’s 
choice of Kieft. De Vries derided the Company’s nepotistic tendencies in his account of the 
colony’s history. “We were surprised that the West India Company would send such fools into 
this country…In the East Indies, no one was appointed governor, unless he had first had long 
service, and was found to be fit for it…but the West India Company sent…as superior officers, 
persons who never had command in their lives.”19 Adriaen van der Donck reiterated De Vries’s 
criticisms several years later, bemoaning that “officers were chosen more from favor and 
friendship than merit.” Nepotistic policies often resulted in inept leaders like Willem Kieft. The 
Company finally heeded De Vries’ and Van der Donck’s warnings in 1645 when they appointed 
Peter Stuyvesant to replace Kieft after putting up with nearly a decade of his disastrous 
command.20  
 A new Freedoms and Exemptions Act passed in 1640 marked the second major change for 
New Netherland. Under the new act the Company granted private merchants trading rights after 
they paid the Company a recognition fee. Johannes de Laet floated the idea of replacing the 
original 1629 Act in 1638, but the States General rejected his plans for not doing enough to 
                                                            
18 Van Twiller served from April 1633 - December 1637. Jape Jacobs contends that the paucity of records 
regarding van Twiller except an account by David de Vries has skewed the historical interpretation. De Vries had 
been vying to replace van Twiller and took out his anger, according to Jacobs, in writing negatively about van 
Twiller, see: Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland, 68. 
19 David de Vries, “Excerpt from Korte Historiael,” 1655, Narratives of New Netherland, 191 
20 Jacobs, New Netherland, 63-64; Van der Donck, “The Representation of New Netherland,” 1650, Narratives 
of New Netherland, 348. 
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stimulate the colony’s demographic and economic growth. The revised 1640 plan passed thanks 
in large measure to the Company’s cessation of its fur trade monopoly.21  
 The new Freedoms and Exemptions Act and growing population also inspired a new wave 
of patroons to try to establish small patroonships. Yet, just as had happened in the early 1630s, 
most of these new endeavors failed. Meyndert Meyndertsz van Keeren established Achter Kol, a 
colony located between the North and Hackensack Rivers, in 1641, but Indian attacks two years 
later destroyed the settlement. Multiple other patroons came and went, but all were ultimately 
abandoned.22  
 Kieft’s appointment and the new Freedoms and Exemptions Act marked a shift in the 
character and purpose of New Netherland. Commercial trade interests gave way to agrarian 
settlement, and the Company’s commercial and administrative authority subsided as the colony’s 
private population increased. Colonial officials deployed in New Netherland adapted to the new 
circumstances as well. Instead of returning home to the Dutch Republic after their contractual 
terms expired, many opted instead to become free citizens and try their hand at farming in New 
Netherland.23 New Netherland’s inexperienced director and growing population, however, soon 
came into conflict with the Hudson Valley’s increasingly oppressed indigenous population. And 
by 1639, tensions and small skirmishes between the two groups erupted. 
                                                            
21 Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland, 72-73. 
22 For example, Cornelis Melijn started a patroonship on Staten Island in 1641, but despite growing in size to 
approximately ninety people spread across eleven farms, the settlers abandoned the patroonship after a 1655 Indian 
attack left fifteen colonists dead. The string of failed patroonships ultimately convinced the Company to abandon the 
experiment and ultimately inspired the decision to end the system of patroonships completely in 1659, see: Jacobs, 
The Colony of New Netherland, 73. 
23 Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland, 76; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 60. 
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11. The Climatological Origins of Colonial Violence 
By the end of 1645, New Netherland teetered on a precipice of decline. Director Willem Kieft, in 
charge of the colony since 1638, had driven his citizenry through a disastrous six-year conflict 
with local Munsee groups.24 Today known alternatively as Kieft’s War, the Dutch-Munsee War, 
or the Wappinger War, the war left dozens of colonists and nearly one thousand Natives dead. 
Colonists left in droves fearing continued escalation and perhaps another deadly conflict with an 
emerging Algonquian alliance. The colony’s Amsterdam stakeholders frantically worried how to 
secure, or perhaps more realistically rescue, their hemorrhaging investment.  
 Historians trying to explain the war’s causes have pointed to a 1639 decision by Director 
Kieft to impose a tax payable in peltries, wampum or maize on the region’s indigenous peoples.25 
Kieft justified his tribute demand by claiming the Natives should help pay for expenses the 
Company accrued in their protection.26 According to most historians, Kieft’s tribute demand 
acted as a tipping point in what was already a deteriorating relationship between local indigenous 
tribes and their new Dutch neighbors. Recent research by historical climatologists allows 
historians a closer, nuanced understanding of the climatological context in which this episode of 
colonial violence took place. Extreme weather events, mainly in the form of cold winters and 
drought-ridden summers, help explain Kieft’s timing and specific demands – demands that 
exacerbated the formative tensions of Kieft’s War that historians have pointed to in the past.  
 Kieft’s tribute demand and the ensuing war took place within the context of two extreme 
weather events. The demand itself came on the heels of a prolonged drought lasting from 1630 to 
                                                            
24 Though the war is usually presented as lasting from 1643 to 1645, which represents the height of Dutch and 
native tension, conflict had begun as early as 1639. 
25 “Resolution to Exact a Tribute from the Indians,” September 15, 1639, DRCHNY XIII, 6. 
26 Much of the written record was destroyed after the war when on September 27, 1647 the ship Princes Amelia 
carrying both records of the conflict and its main protagonist, Director Willem Kieft, sunk off the coast of Wales. 
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at least 1636, while the war itself, which can be dated from 1641 to 1645, overlapped with 
extremely cold and long-lasting winters. Extreme weather and its impacts struck colonists and 
indigenous peoples alike. Drought and cold winters led to decreased growing seasons, crop 
failures, hunger, and malnourishment. As a result, the impact of epidemic diseases increased, 
protection and competition over scarce food resources intensified, trade relations became 
strained, and conflicts ensued. Putting the unfolding tensions between local indigenous tribes and 
New Netherlanders into an ecological context aids in understanding Dutch-Native relations and 
explains how Kieft’s levy sparked a deadly conflict. 
 The climatological context surrounding Kieft’s War also raises questions about European 
dependency on Natives. Ordinances and edicts forbidding European colonists from plundering 
indigenous fields have often been interpreted as evidence of European reliance on indigenous 
food sources. But to what extent were indigenous peoples able to circumvent the ecological 
implications of extreme drought and long winters? Had they developed resilience strategies and 
adaptive capacities capacious enough to meet both their own needs and the needs of desperate, 
hungry colonists? The extremes to which indigenous populations went to protect their harvests 
suggests that while Europeans might have desired Native assistance, Natives were not able or 
willing to stretch their own limited supplies to meet European needs. 
 Keift’s War followed closely on the heels of the Pequot War and mirrors closely that 
brutally violent episode in English-Native relations. In Katherine Grandjean’s ecological 
interpretation of that event, she explains how hunger and competition over scarce food resources 
help explain the violent acts that took place between 1636 and 1638. The Pequot War, she writes, 
“arrived in a season of want” brought on by environmental distresses during the mid-1630s, most 
notably a strong hurricane that ravished crops in 1635. This is not, however, a story of 
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environmental determinism. Colonial processes and responses also had a role to play. Thousands 
of new colonists arrived amidst this period of scarcity, putting additional stresses on limited food 
provisions. Desperate ploys to acquire Indian corn – corn that both the English and the Pequots 
needed to survive – led to conflict, violence, and the infamous Mystic massacre.  
 Strong similarities exist between the Pequot War and Kieft’s War. Both conflicts took place 
within the context of environmental distress, crop failures, and poor harvest yields that led to 
desperate ploys to acquire Indian maize, isolated episodes of violence that escalated into war, 
and a violent conclusion marked by an indigenous massacre. Even the participants in these two 
stories overlap. English colonists John Winthrop and Anne Hutchinson appear in both stories and 
John Underhill, the leader behind the Mystic River massacre, was hired by the Company and 
would once again surround an indigenous village only to massacre its inhabitants and torch their 
homes.27  
 Dutch explorers and colonists arrived in the Hudson Valley amid the region’s coldest and 
driest period in the last 500 years.28 Historical climatologists have argued that there have never 
been more episodes of drought in the Hudson Valley than when the Dutch West India Company 
tried to lay claim to what is now New York. The longest of these episodes, a continent-wide 
megadrought, lasted from 1555 to 1577 and came on the heels of a three-year drought that ended 
only a decade earlier (1543-1545). The sixteenth century, however, appears lush compared to the 
                                                            
27 Grandjean also argues that food scarcity was additionally exacerbated by awkward communication 
throughout the colony and with England that inhibited proper provisioning, see: Grandjean, “New World Tempests,” 
75–100. Alison Games has offered a similar interpretation of the Jamestown massacre of 1622, arguing that “an 
important role in terror and conflicts” acting as “a salvation (for the starving), a peril (for fearful English) and an 
opportunity (for patient attackers),” see: Games, “Violence on the Fringes,” 522. 
28 Neil Pederson et al., “Is an Epic Pluvial Masking the Water Insecurity of the Greater New York City 
Region?,” 1348.  This was not the first period of extended drought conditions for the region. Corresponding to the 
classic Medieval Warm Period time frame, roughly 900-1300 AD, a long-term period of drought struck the Hudson 
Valley and much of North America, see: Pederson et al., “Medieval Warming, Little Ice Age, and European Impact 
on the Environment during the Last Millennium in the Lower Hudson Valley, New York, USA,” 245. 
 
 198 
seventeenth century. After 1630, just six years after the Company formally established New 
Netherland, a series of six drought episodes hit the Hudson Valley before the century’s close. 
Five of these rank amongst the region’s top ten worst droughts since 1531.29  
 Drought conditions are not readily apparent in seventeenth-century descriptions of New 
Netherland. Adriaen Van der Donck’s Description of New Netherland, the most well-known and 
frequently cited source regarding New Netherland, is no exception. Van der Donck spoke at 
much length about New Netherland’s “equable,” “mild,” and “salubrious,” climate declaring that 
“on account of its wholesome climate…the country [New Netherland] has much to commend it,” 
but rarely did he speak of drought. “Sea wind, a northerly breeze, or a shower,” according to Van 
der Donck, tempered the hottest parts of summer. Winters were harsher than expected “owing to 
the keen air, sharp and penetrating, though always dry when the wind is from the north. Respite 
could come “even in the depth of winter” if the wind came from the south, “mild and warm 
weather” prevailed so as to make it feel like spring.” Humidity was “seldom oppressive” nor did 
it continue for long. The only indication Van der Donck gave of potential drought episodes 
followed a lavish accounting: “[T]here is plenty of rain in season, more in some years than in 
others.”30 This passive account is by no means a reigning endorsement or corroboration of the 
intensive droughts several climate scientists have suggested. Van der Donck spoke more directly 
of a drought in his description of the colony included in the overtly promotional pamphlet 
                                                            
29 The five droughts listed occurred between 1630-1636; 1647-1651; 1661-1667; 1685-1692; 1697-1700, see 
supplemental table 3 in Neil Pederson et al., “Is an Epic Pluvial Masking the Water Insecurity of the Greater New 
York City Region?,” Journal of Climate 26, no. 4 (February 2013): 1339–54. Extremely wet periods or pluvial 
events could inflict just as much damage as drought, but only one such episode occurred in the seventeenth century 
(1672-1680), see: supplemental table 4 in Neil Pederson et al., “Is an Epic Pluvial Masking the Water Insecurity of 
the Greater New York City Region?,” Journal of Climate 26, no. 4 (February 2013): 1339–54. 
30 Van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, 2, 38, 64-65. 
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“Representation of New Netherland” published in 1650, but Van der Donck left the exact date of 
this drought unclear.31  
 Three reasons help explain the descriptive exclusion and ambiguity of drought conditions 
by Van der Donck. First, Van der Donck wrote as a booster for what was at that time a fledgling 
colony. Pressure by English colonization in the south, but especially from burgeoning New 
England to the north, forced the West India Company to boost New Netherland’s population. 
With a vested financial interest himself, Van der Donck needed the colony to succeed and thus 
wrote with bias to promote the colony. Drought would have deterred rather than motivate 
Netherlanders to commit to a trans-Atlantic journey. Second, Van der Donck did not reside in 
New Netherland during the worst of the region’s drought episodes. He arrived to New 
Netherland in 1641 right between two of the worst droughts of the seventeenth century and 
returned to the Netherlands in 1649. So while his Description was published in 1655, Van der 
Donck observed at most only two years of New Netherland’s drought conditions. Thus it makes 
sense that Van der Donck hinted at some variability in precipitation but in general found the 
climate agreeable. Finally, this land was a new and foreign one to newly arrived immigrants. 
Extreme weather events would most likely have gone unnoticed or were perhaps simply 
understood as typical given recently arrived observers’ lack of historical contextualization.  
 Historians have relied heavily upon the limited written record provided by individuals like 
Adriaen Van der Donck to paint a picture of the Hudson Valley’s climate and geography for the 
entirety of the New Netherland’s short existence. Paleoclimatological sources such as tree rings 
can bring balance and nuance to these limited and unreliable written sources. In the case of New 
Netherland, drought conditions that are revealed by tree rings, although perhaps not understood 
                                                            
31 Van der Donck, “The Representation of New Netherland,” 1650, Narratives of New Netherland, 299. 
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by colonists, help explain the failure of early agricultural pursuits as well as the violent war 
between the Company and local indigenous groups during the 1640s.  
 While drought marked New Netherland’s summers, bitterly cold temperatures prevailed 
during the region’s winters. New Netherland did not escape the Little Ice Age’s colder 
temperatures. Specific evidence for long-term temperature decreases comes from written records 
and from palynological studies. These studies reveal an increase in spruce (Picea), hemlock 
(Tsuga), and beech (Fagus) tree species, all of which prefer cooler climates.32 La Niña cooling 
might have also been at play. Recent El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) event reconstructions 
establish several La Niña events during New Netherland’s short existence including the years 
1637 to 1639, 1654, 1658, and 1663.33 La Niña events have been correlated to colder and wetter 
winters in the Northeast, especially in later winter beginning around February. 
 Unlike drought, colonists took note of frigid winters. Johan de Laet, adhering to the time’s 
understanding of a direct relationship between latitude and climate, still took notice of the 
colony’s difficult winter climate. “It is a good deal colder there than it ought to be according to 
the latitude; it freezes and snows severely in winter so that often there is a strong drift of ice in 
the river.”34 The Delaware River froze in 1633 while in 1642 the Hudson River near 
Rensselaerswijck froze over as early as November 25.35 The Hudson continued to freeze over the 
next several winters and left Company ships ice-locked. Johannes Megapolensis, who arrived at 
Fort Orange in August 1642 to serve as its preacher, had already experienced several harsh 
winters by the time he published his account of the region and its Native inhabitants in 1644. 
                                                            
32 Pederson et al., “Medieval Warming, Little Ice Age, and European Impact on the Environment during the 
Last Millennium in the Lower Hudson Valley, New York, USA,” 246. 
33 Gergis and Fowler, “A History of Enso Events Since A.D. 1525: Implications for Future Climate Change,” 
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34 Johan de Laet, “Excerpts from the New World,” 1625, 1630, Narratives of New Netherland, 50. 
35 Charles T. Gehring, ed., Correspondence, 1647-1653, trans. Charles T. Gehring, vol. XI, New Netherland 
Documents Series (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), x. 
 
 201 
First simply stating that the “winters are very cold,” he later elaborated on how quickly and 
surely the winter snap arrived, freezing rivers over in a single night.36 Further south, English 
colonists remarked on two separate occasions that the Chesapeake Bay had nearly froze over, 
first during the winter of 1641 to 1642 and then again in 1645 to 1646. In 1642, John Winthrop, 
relying upon information obtained from local indigenous peoples, relayed that “The frost was so 
great and continual this winter that all the Bay was frozen over, so much and so long, as the like, 
by the Indians’ relation, had not been so these forty years.”37  
 Extreme weather’s grasp reached beyond Europeans and struck indigenous peoples as well. 
Dozens of indigenous groups dwelled along the banks of the Delaware, Connecticut, and Hudson 
and beyond. In the north, west of the Fort Orange, resided the Iroquois nations. The Mohawks, 
whom the Dutch called ‘Maquas’ or ‘Mahakobaasen’ resided west of Fort Orange. Together with 
their fellow Iroquois nations the Oneidas, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca, known collectively by 
the Dutch as ‘Sinnekens,’ the Mohawks’ influence stretched as far west as Lake Erie. The 
Mohawks had only recently established their supremacy along the Hudson River. The Mahicans, 
known to the Dutch as ‘Mahikanders,’ had lived on both sides of the river prior to the 
seventeenth century but lost control of the western bank following the 1628 Mohawk-Mahican 
War.38 After their loss, the Mahicans dwelled solely to the east of the river. Further south near 
Manhattan dwelled several Lenape tribes including the Esopus, Wappinger, Tappan, Manhatan, 
Raritan, Canarsee, and other Munsee-speaking tribes.39 Closer to the Delaware River were 
several smaller Unami-speaking tribes. Finally, around the Susquehanna River lived the 
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Susquehannocks who the Dutch referred to as the ‘Minquas.’40 While the Dutch at times made 
distinctions between these various groups, typically their records made little distinction and 
referred to indigenous peoples not by their tribal names but simply as Indianen (Indians) or more 
frequently wilden (wild ones).41   
 Trade with Natives marked the earliest years of Dutch-indigenous relations in the Hudson 
Valley after Henry Hudson’s 1609 voyage revealed the extent and possibility of such a trade. 
“[T]he beaver,” Van Der Donck explained, “is the main reason and the source of the means for 
the initial settlement of this fine country by Europeans.”42 Fur trading occurred either near Fort 
Amsterdam on Manhattan or further north around present-day Albany either at Fort Nassau or 
later Fort Orange. The Mohawk in the north and the Munsee in the south hunted and trapped 
beavers during the winter when the animal’s shiny and much-sought after guard hair was at its 
fullest. The price traders were willing to pay for these pelts increased if Indians had worn them 
for some time. Wearing the furs allowed the fur time to absorb the bear grease with which 
Natives typically covered themselves. Then, from spring through summer, the Mohawks traveled 
to Fort Nassau and later Fort Orange or Beverwijck and the Munsee to near-by Fort Amsterdam. 
Both groups traded beaver as well as otter, marten, and fox furs in exchange for an assortment of 
European goods including arms, gunpowder, shot, textiles, alcohol, knives, axes, kettles, adzes, 
and beads.43  
                                                            
40 Jacobs, New Netherland, 22-23. 
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Netherland, 22. The meaning and purpose behind certain word choices used to describe indigenous peoples has 
recently gained the attention of several scholars included Susanah Shaw Romney, see: Russell Shorto, Interview 
with Susanah Romney, Intimate Networks and the 17th-Century Atlantic, New Netherland Praatjes by the New 
Netherland Institute, Podcast Audio, October 13, 2015. 
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 Little is known about Dutch-Native trade relations prior to the official chartering of the 
West India Company in 1621. However, the establishment of Fort Nassau on Castle (now 
Westerlo) Island near present-day Albany in 1614 or 1615 suggests trade with the Mohawk 
initially caught the attention of early private traders. After a freshet damaged Fort Nassau in 
1617, however, it was decided not to rebuild the structure, since the “nation there was somewhat 
discontented, and not easy to live with.” Instead, the traders decided try their luck further east 
where they intended to “plant a colony among the Maikans [Mahicans].”44  
 The Upper Hudson remained the center of fur trade throughout the Dutch Republic’s 
colonial presence in North America, but some trade did take place with the Munsee further south 
in Fort Amsterdam near the mouth of the Hudson. In addition to limited trade in furs, the Munsee 
quickly emerged as the Company’s primary suppliers of wampum. Wampum acted as a universal 
currency in the Northeast. Mahicans, Mohawks, Hurons, Algonquins, and Montagnais all 
accepted these strings or belts of whelk and clam beads. The Munsee and other Long Island 
Natives manufactured wampum. As traders realized wampum’s importance, the Munsee began 
specializing in providing traders with the currency and spent less time trapping. Dutch traders 
then used Munsee-manufactured wampum to conduct trade with the Mohawk and Mahican.45  
 The Munsee’s importance to Company traders thus rested squarely on the Munsee’s ability 
to provide them with furs and more importantly wampum for the beaver trade. By the 1640s, 
however, the Munsee’s capacity to fulfill these demands had reached a breaking point. Company 
officials and New Netherland colonists alike began to describe the Munsee, according to 
historian Paul Otto, “as useless (or bad Indians) because they could no longer offer the Dutch 
                                                            
44 Nicolaes van Wassenaer, “Excerpt from Historisch Verhael,” 1624-1630, Narratives of New Netherland, 67. 
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furs, agricultural products, or other utilitarian items.”46 Without something to offer Dutch 
colonists, the Munsee lost their negotiating leverage and became vulnerable to abuse.47  
 Multiple factors led to the beaver trade’s decline. Historians have pointed to overhunting, 
inter-tribal warfare, French entrance into the trade, and changes in European fashion as primary 
causes.48 If overhunting was the cause, the extirpation of the lower Hudson’s beaver population 
would have had significant ecological implications. Fewer beavers would have translated to 
fewer beaver dams and water impoundments. In response, the ecosystem would have adjusted to 
drier wetland conditions. Nearby forests would have shifted from supporting wet to dry habitat 
communities; species diversity would have shifted with a decline in wet habitat-dependent 
amphibians, birds, and possibly certain mammals; and ecological productivity and species 
richness would have declined.49 Reciprocally, overhunting might have impacted Dutch 
agricultural pursuits as well. Two biologists, after examining the impact of temperature, 
precipitation, and beaver activity on the availability of open water in boreal forest wetlands in 
east-central Alberta, concluded that beavers have the ability to mitigate drought conditions 
through the construction of beaver dams. Their conclusions indicate that beaver activity and 
active beaver lodges accounted for 80% of open water area availability. An active beaver 
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population, whether during wet or dry periods, can led to a 9-fold increase in open water 
availability compared to periods without an active beaver presence.50  
 Colonists and Natives responded to the shifting ecological, political, and commercial 
situation in diverse ways. Anthropologist and ethnohistorian William Starna posits that “the rapid 
depletion of furs on the coast and in the lower Hudson Valley” led Munsee and Mahicans to sell 
their land. He goes as far to say that the purchase of Manhattan Island by the Dutch in 1626 
might be an early indication of beaver scarcity.51 Paul Otto argues that a decline in the Munsee’s 
beaver supply resulted in a shift in the hub of the beaver trade from the lower to upper Hudson. 
Otto argues, though, that this did not eliminate the Munsee from the beaver trade. Instead, they 
might have emerged as middlemen in the trade, using their “proximity to rivers and 
waterways…to facilitate trade between the Dutch and the Susquehannocks and other interior 
tribes.” More importantly, the Munsee ramped up wampum production “to guarantee themselves 
a place within the newly developed European trade network.”52 As the Munsee increased 
wampum production, however, anthropologist Lynn Ceci argues they would have lost focus on 
their seasonal subsistence strategies, created permanent year-round settlements, and became 
“more dependent on their trading partners for food and other goods.” A situation that if true, 
would have been disastrous for the Munsee during times of drought, crop failure, dearth, famine, 
and disease.53  
                                                            
50 Glynnis A. Hood and Suzanne E. Bayley, “Beaver (Castor Canadensis) Mitigate the Effects of Climate on the 
Area of Open Water in Boreal Wetlands in Western Canada,” Biological Conservation 141, no. 2 (February 2008): 
556–67. 
51 William A. Starna, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” in Explorers, Fortunes and Love 
Letters, 30. 
52 Otto, Dutch-Munsee Encounter, 67-68. 
53 The number of beaver and otter skins shipped to the Netherlands steadily increased between 1624 (4,700); 
1628 (7,685); and 1635 (16,304). The prices garnered for skins rose as well from 5.77 to 8.21 guilders between 1624 
and 1635, see: Trelease, Indian Affairs, 43. For a more in-depth look at New Netherland’s growing fur trade, see: 
Jacobs, New Netherland, 198-201. 
 
 206 
 Early Dutch traders in New Netherland who focused heavily on trade relied upon 
indigenous generosity to satisfy their hungry stomachs. While records from early traders are no 
longer extant, later testimony by indigenous groups in response to the 1639 levy imposition 
confirms that traders required indigenous food assistance from the start. A pamphlet, later 
published in the Netherlands, recounts an exchange between the New Netherland council and 
leaders of surrounding indigenous groups. During the conversation indigenous leaders laid out 
numerous reasons for why they “did not consider themselves bound to contribute” the goods 
Kieft demanded. Amongst their explanations was a provocative and telling question. “Have we 
not, then, Swannekens (Netherlanders), when you first came here, and had no mochols (ships), 
furnished you victuals for two winters through, when, without that, you must have perished with 
hunger?”54 Even when ships regularly arrived in port and more farmers committed to settling in 
the colony, Netherlanders continued to rely upon indigenous peoples for help. Indeed, Dutch 
colonist’s reliance upon indigenous subsistence support was a rather common occurrence with 
colonists regularly supplementing their crops with maize from Indians.55 In 1628, the Reverend 
Jonas Michaëlius complained about the scant rations available in the colony, remarking that he 
would have to pass through the winter “without butter and other necessities” while the provisions 
which arrived by boat were “all hard stale food.” Recourse from these depravities, he explained, 
could only be come by trading “knives, bead, and the like” with local indigenous groups who 
could provide “proper wares.”56 Adriaen Van der Donck reiterated the Company’s dependency on 
indigenous food stuffs upon his arrival to New Netherland in 1641 stating that the Natives “raise 
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so much corn and green beans that we purchase these from them in fully laden yachts and 
sloops.”57 
 The Company worried about the colony’s reliance on indigenous peoples, however, and 
made a concerted effort to promote agricultural production. Initially, all agricultural production 
in New Netherland fell under the domain of the West India Company. The Company instructed 
Director Willem Verhulst before his departure from Amsterdam in early 1625 to “give each 
family as much land as they can properly cultivate.”58 Before departing, colonists themselves 
pledged to “plant and sow on the lands allotted to them such products and crops as the 
Commander and his Council shall order, without making any change therein for any private 
reason.” Failure to live up to this pledge would result in a punishment to be determined by the 
colony’s Council.59  
 Early contracts between farmers and the Company set terms to promote agricultural 
production but tended to favor the Company’s financial well-being over a farmer’s prosperity. 
These contracts stipulated that the Company would retain ownership of all lands with colonists 
acting as tenants. The Company additionally provided farm buildings, tools, and livestock. In 
return, farmers paid a yearly rent of one hundred guilders plus eighty pounds of butter. At the end 
of the contract, farmers were required to return all property to the Company. This included the 
land, buildings, tools, and the original quantity of livestock granted to the tenant. Any additional 
livestock that may have been birthed during the contract period would remain with the tenant.60 
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Farmers were also obligated to pay several taxes. A general tax of ten stivers per morgen of land 
and one guilder for each head of cattle was imposed on all farmers but was considered “so 
moderate that neither the English nor others can reasonably complain against it.”61 Less favored 
was the biblically-derived tienden (tenths) which was used to pay costs associated with the 
establishment of the church including the salary of the minister.62  
 Most families planted and cultivated a small kitchen garden in addition to the larger farm 
plots dedicated to grains and corn. Though, archeological records suggest these farmers planted 
very little in their gardens. Of the numerous European vegetables available to colonists in the 
first half of the seventeenth century only cabbage, turnip, kale, and mustard can be conclusively 
found in New Netherland gardens with the additional possibility of cauliflower. In addition to 
European-imported seeds, families planted a variety of indigenous plants including fruits, 
berries, and squash/pumpkin plus several indigenous medicinal herbs including amaranth, 
lambsquarters, pokeweed, pumpkin/squash, and strawberries. Colonists also planted medicinal 
herbs of both European and North American origins including purslane (Portulaca sp.), bedstraw 
(Galium sp.), and knotweed (Polygonum sp.).63 Additionally, colonists regularly planted fruit 
trees including apples, peach, and cherry near their homes.  
 In 1629, the Company took yet another step to promote agriculture through the 
introduction of the patroon-system. This system was approved as part of the 1629 Freedoms and 
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Exemptions Act, itself a compromise between New Netherland’s trade and settlement factions. 
The act maintained the Company’s trade monopoly on fur in order to appease the trade faction, 
but allowed the settlement faction to promote the colonization of New Netherland, albeit at the 
faction’s own expense. It stipulated that any land within the confines of New Netherland 
including land bought legally from indigenous peoples could be bought and established as a 
patroonship, with the noted exception of Manhattan Island which the Company retained as a 
trade center. Once patroons purchased land they had to establish a colony of at least fifty people, 
all at least fifteen years of age, within four years. Of these individuals, at least one quarter had to 
be settled in New Netherland within a year.64 Due to the “scantiness of the population,” 
according to Amsterdam-based chronicler Nicolaes van Wassenaer, the purpose of the 1629 
Freedoms and Exemptions was to increase the colony’s population and agricultural abundance.65  
 The farmers who risked the trans-Atlantic journey soon ran into troubles outside their 
control. Hints of trouble with New Netherland’s agricultural production began as early as 1628. 
Nicolaes Van Wassenaer compiled reports from New Netherland back in the Republic and 
lamented that despite a successful winter grain crop that year, the summer grain “ripened before 
it was half grown in consequence of the excessive heat,” thus leaving it “very light.” Wassenaer 
continued by assuring his readers that this was only a minor problem since “the cattle sent thither 
have thriven well, and everything promises increase.”66 Wassenaer’s hope of promise would be 
short lived.  
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 As a six-year drought struck New Netherland beginning in 1630, the colony’s agricultural 
production dropped precipitously.67 According to Reverend Jonas Michaëlius, who had earlier 
complained of poor provisions, the chief cause of this decline rested with a lack of “horses and 
cows, and industrious workers for the building of houses and forts.” Man and animal together, he 
argued, could “make our farming more profitable.” Company directors echoed Michaëlius’s 
bitter complaints. They added new stipulations to Company contracts that compelled farmers to 
tend their crops “diligently and industriously…in order that the Company may annually receive a 
good quantity of grain…[that] being the Company’s principal object herein.”68 Farmers’ 
diligence and industry or the lack thereof, however, could not compensate for drought’s far-
reaching impacts.   
 The Company, unaware of the drought’s severity, addressed poor yields in multiple ways. 
First, they tried to wrest more grain by exerting pressure on Manhattan’s tenant farmers. For 
example, Jan van Vorst’s farm contract stipulated he “sow every year as much grain as he and his 
man will be able to conveniently manage.”69 Second, when these efforts failed, the Company 
turned to farmers further north to provide grain to hungry colonists on Manhattan. Farms further 
north along the Hudson River benefited from regular flooding that deposited fertile river clay 
that made for exceptional soil. As a result of this difference in fertility, at least as early as 1638, 
those in Manhattan received yearly grain deliveries from the patroonship of Rensselaerswijck. 
This might have worked temporarily, but crop failures soon struck northern farmers as well. 
Third, the Company could at times receive relief from ships arriving from patria. The same ship 
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caravan that escorted Willem Kieft to New Netherland in March of 1638 also carried a bevy of 
foodstuffs. While provisions from the Republic provided a temporary morale boast, provisioning 
ships arrived sporadically and could not be counted upon.70  
 The Company also tried to provide farmers financial relief by temporarily suspending the 
collection of tenths. On June 24, 1638, the Director and Council of New Netherland passed an 
ordinance that granted new farmers a ten-year suspension of tenths in response to continued 
petitions by colonists desiring to cultivate the land.71 If the case of Wouter Van Twiller, former 
director of New Netherland and owner of one of Manhattan’s largest and most productive farms, 
is any indication, the Company’s decision to exempt new farmers from tenths was due to the 
inability of current tenants to pay. In a contract dating to May 24, 1642, Wouter van Twiller’s 
past debts to the Company dating back to 1638 were nullified and an additional exemption was 
granted until the end of his lease in 1645.72 Even this long-term relief, however, could not 
compensate for the impact of repetitive drought.  
 Tax relief did little to raise farmers’ spirits or dispel their worries and many chose to leave 
New Netherland and return to the Republic. The years 1632 to 1638 witnessed a mass exodus of 
Company farmers. When Kieft himself arrived in March 1638, a total of five farms had already 
been abandoned. Van Rensselaer, one of New Netherland’s most successful patroons, 
immediately went to work inventorying and purchasing Company farms on Manhattan so that he 
could send any surplus inventory north in support of his patroon. Within five years nearly every 
Company official and farmer on Manhattan had sold their animals to Van Rensselaer. Van 
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Rensselaer himself saw his actions as merciful. By purchasing Manhattanites land, he freed them 
from what in his estimation was poor soil so that they could pursue better land elsewhere.73  
 Drought, poor soil fertility, and the opportunity to sell out to patroons wrought havoc on 
Manhattan’s productivity. The island’s livestock inventory plummeted between 1630 and 1639. 
Records indicate that in 1630 there were 60 cows and 47 horses on Manhattan. By 1639, these 
figures had dropped to 30 cattle and six horses.74 Despite the Company’s efforts to promote and 
transform New Netherland from a trade colony to settlement colony, extreme weather hampered 
their attempts. Drought precluded the growing number of New Netherland’s farmers from 
reaping grains from the soil and led to famine conditions. By the end of the 1630s, Dutch 
colonists, just like the Dutch traders who preceded them, turned to indigenous peoples for 
subsistence assistance.75   
 Company leaders turned to nearby indigenous groups, first on a contractual basis and later 
by means of forced tributes, to feed New Netherland’s colonists. Between September 20 and 
November 20, 1639, New Netherland’s governing council granted David Provost the right to 
trade with the Indians for 500 schepels of maize on behalf of Govert Lockemans.76 To protect the 
Company’s trade interests, however, Provost had to agree to offer a lower price for the maize 
than the Company. This ensured that Natives would continue to trade directly with the Company 
itself due to the Company’s more favorable trade terms. This contract indicates two important 
situations in New Netherland around 1639. First, the rather large sum of maize requested by 
Provost suggests that the colony was not producing enough maize to support itself. Secondly, the 
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willingness of the Company to pay more for the same goods also suggests that they were in a less 
powerful trade position. Lowering the price paid for maize might have offended the Company’s 
Native trade partners and left the Company without necessary foodstuffs.77  
 Another indication of Dutch dependency on indigenous peoples for maize arose early in 
November of 1640. Appearing before the Council, Abraham Planc, Cornelis Lambersen Cool, 
and George Rappaelje testified to having violated a 1639 Company policy that required all 
traders to accept no less than 12 schepels of maize from indigenous peoples in exchange for one 
coat of duffel. The defendants, however, pled guilty to accepting only 10 and 11 schepels in a 
trade. As punishment, the Council required the three men to comply with the ordinance and/or 
pay the stated fine of 100 florins for violating the ordinance. While a hefty penalty, the court 
appears to have gone easy on the defendants. The original ordinance stipulated that anyone 
caught in violation would also have to forfeit their privilege to trade for life.78 Regardless, the 
case highlights the Company’s dependence on indigenous maize and the lengths they were 
willing to go to prosecute those who violated the Company’s established trade prices.   
 New Netherland’s failed agricultural pursuits, catalyzed by prolonged drought conditions, 
not only threatened the longevity of the colony but also placed Dutch Brazil and the Company’s 
Caribbean colonies in peril. Several Company leaders so strongly believed in New Netherland’s 
agricultural potential that they fervently held to the notion that it could act as a provisioning 
colony for the Company’s Atlantic holdings. The reality was a far cry from this aspiration. New 
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Netherland never exported grain to the Dutch Republic or Dutch Brazil and only once, in 1654, 
sent corn to Curaçao.79  
 Indigenous peoples in the Hudson Valley, in contrast to newly-arrived Dutch colonists, had 
developed a variety of subsistence strategies that allowed them to survive earlier extreme 
weather events. These strategies, however, could not protect them against the dual threat of 
climate and colonialism. The Munsees and Mahicans, located south of the Cohoes Falls, tended 
to live in small, seasonal camps near rivers and relied heavily upon seasonal fish runs and 
foraging to supplement their diets. According to archaeologist James Bradley, over the course of 
“hundreds, even thousands of years,” the Mahican established a seasonal subsistence pattern 
based on “a keen awareness of when and where essential resources were available.” In the 
spring, Mahicans moved to sites along the Hudson or its tributaries and used nets, spears, and 
weirs to catch alewives, shad, and sturgeon. The blossoming of spring allowed them to forage 
wild plants while recently flooded plains could be planted with maize, beans, and squash. During 
the summer, the Mahican fished and tended crops. Autumn was consumed by the harvesting and 
winter storage of planted and wild crops, hunting of summer-fattened game, fishing, and the 
collection of nuts. When winter hit, the Mahican abandoned their river encampments and moved 
to interior sites located near ponds and marshes. There, they survived on their winter storage, ice 
fishing, and hunting deer, bear, beaver, otters, and turtles.80   
 Adriaen van der Donck detailed the agricultural and foraging strategies of the Hudson 
Valley’s indigenous populations. He recounted a discussion with some local Natives in which he 
                                                            
79 Jacobs, New Netherland, 216; Folkerts, “The Failure of West India Company Farming on the Island of 
Manhattan,” 182. 
80 James W. Bradley, Before Albany: An Archaeology of Native-Dutch Relations in the Capital Region 1600-




learned that they had made use of some land that now appeared as a young forest nearly twenty-
five or twenty-six years earlier. The Natives assured Van der Donck that “you will do well, it is 
very good land and bears grain in great quantity.” The Dutch also adapted a Native practice of 
bush burning. Van der Donck described how each fall the Indians burned woods, plains, and 
marshlands in order to facilitate hunting, thin out the forest, clear old deadwood, and increase the 
game.81 “Fish and meat of every kind,” Van der Donck recounted, constituted the Native’s typical 
fare. Maize, or “Turkish wheat” as the Dutch called it, was pounded into grits that could be used 
to make bread or could be added to meat to make a broth. More commonly, though, the Natives 
used corn to make sappaen, a much-consumed porridge. Van der Donck, amazed at its 
importance, remarked “that rarely a day passes without their eating it…and one can hardly ever 
enter an Indian dwelling that this porridge is not being eaten or prepared.” Natives also brought 
along “parched meal made of roasted corn” when hunting or on long journeys.82 Women planted 
maize each spring along with assorted beans, pumpkins, and squash in unfenced, unmanured, 
and relatively untended plots. Elderly and young men alike took to fishing in the spring and early 
summer with the young and later elderly switching their energy to hunting come fall and winter. 
Natives used traps, arrows, and guns to hunt and kill bears and wolves but most importantly deer 
that they killed “in great numbers in the coastal areas and near riverbanks, where most of the 
Christians live.”83 The seasonal subsistence patterns of the Mahican and Munsee could support 
approximately two to three thousand Mahican and perhaps as many as twelve thousand 
Munsee.84  
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 The Mohawk, located further north, relied more heavily upon cultivated crops and 
hunting.85 Their subsistence strategies appear to have been sufficient to protect them from the 
worst of the drought between 1630 and 1636. Harmen van den Bogaert, who traveled amongst 
the Mohawk and Oneida during the winter of 1634-1635, indicated that the Mohawk had stored 
plenty of vegetables. Just three days into his voyage, Van den Bogaert and his guides came to 
Onekagoncka, near present-day Auriesville and the west mouth of Schoharie Creek. There, they 
found “the houses were full of corn that they call onersti, and we saw maize; yes, in some of the 
houses more than 300 bushels.” The chief of the village, Adriochten, welcomed Van den Bogaert 
and treated him to a meal of venison, pumpkins, and beans.86 While the Company suffered the 
worst of drought and harvest failure, the Mohawk appeared to have stockpiled ample supplies to 
weather the drought. 
 Extent records are less clear about the ability of the Munsee to withstand the drought of 
1630 to 1636. While the Munsee most likely relied upon fish and game during the drought, Van 
der Donck’s indication that the Natives relied heavily upon a maize-based porridge to 
supplement their typical diets suggests that a threat to the limited quantities of maize available to 
the Munsee would have put additional stress on an already weakened population. If the Munsee 
followed the pattern of other wampum-producing groups who shifted their subsistence strategies 
to rely more on horticulture to support their specialization in wampum production, they would 
have been more heavily hit by the 1630s’ drought. Maize required a long, frost-free growing 
season, warm summers, and moderate rainfall. The extreme weather events New Netherland 
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experienced during this period – drought followed by extreme winters – could have pushed the 
Munsee to the edge of their subsistence capacity and perhaps to violence in an effort to protect 
their lives, livelihood, and crops.  
 If drought impacted the Munsee’s agricultural productivity it would have left a large 
percentage of the population malnourished and vulnerable to epidemic diseases. This might have 
been the case in 1633 when smallpox struck the Hudson Valley.87 Estimates suggest the Mohawk 
lost upwards of 60% of their population during this period. Harmen Meyndertsz van den 
Bogaert, who visited the Mohawk in 1634 to discuss the beaver trade, had to meet with 
Adriochten, the most principle chief, about a quarter mile from the main Mohawk camp, 
“because many Indians here in the castle had died of smallpox.”88 Drought induced-
malnourishment and colonial violence potentially increased this death toll. Textual evidence is 
unclear about the reach of this particular epidemic and its impact on the Munsee. However, the 
collective toll of epidemic diseases on the Hudson Valley’s indigenous populations is clear. 
Natives had told Van der Donck that since European’s arrival, “their numbers have dwindled 
owing to smallpox and other causes to the extent that there is now barely one for every ten.” Van 
der Donck himself met at least one smallpox survivor who was left blinded by cataracts.89  
 The societal toll experienced by smallpox survivors went beyond individual blindness. 
Epidemic-induced population loss could cause decreased fertility rates, disruptions in societal 
and political processes due to the loss of influential members, ruptures in kinship relations and 
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mourning war rituals, and spiritual crises.90 Population loss would have also continued to 
exacerbate an on-going food crisis. This was a vicious circle. Drought would have exacerbated 
rates of malnourishment and death which in turn would have exacerbated the impacts of drought. 
Routine subsistence tasks, according to William Starna, would have been disrupted, subsistence 
knowledge could have been lost, and access to land now deemed by the Dutch as vacant would 
have been decreased. There is some indication that the Munsee responded to their increasingly 
precarious position via village concentration and a renewed focus on cultural retention, but with 
fewer members with less access to natural resources, it is no wonder that the Dutch began to 
perceive the Munsee as “useless” allies.91  
 European-introduced livestock posed yet another threat to Native crops. Virginia DeJohn 
Anderson deftly detailed the ways in which European livestock, left to roam in New England and 
the Chesapeake, led to strife and conflict between English colonists and indigenous peoples.92 
Drought conditions only exacerbated these tense livestock-induced situations in New Netherland. 
The Dutch allowed their livestock to roam free so they could forage in nearby woods. Livestock 
also roamed into indigenous peoples’ gardens. Dutch leaders, however, did not condone the 
destruction of Native gardens by European’s livestock and at least on one occasion took steps to 
prevent future damages. In May 1640, Native’s began to complain “that their Corn hills are 
trampled under foot and uprooted by Hogs and other Cattle, and consequently great damage is 
done when the Maize is growing.” In response, Company leaders passed an ordinance 
prohibiting livestock destruction. They ordered farmers whose “lands lie contiguous to Indian 
plantations…to take due care of their Horses, Cows, Hogs, Goats and Sheep, and prevent them, 
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by fences or otherwise, damaging the corn of the Indians.”93 Anyone who failed to do so would 
be required to pay for the damages and incur a fee.94 
 The Council saw a direct relation between damage to Native gardens and the colony’s own 
survival. If too much was damaged, the Council declared, it would follow “that the Maize will be 
dear at the time of the Harvest and our good people [will] suffer want,” since the Natives would 
be “incited to remove and to entertain feelings of hatred against our Nation.”95 The Council was 
partially correct in their foresight. Hudson Valley’s indigenous peoples did entertain feelings of 
hatred toward the Company, but those feelings began to simmer over a decade of bad weather, 
disease epidemics, and colonial tiffs. They were finally ignited by Kieft’s compulsory tribute 
demand. 
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12. Kieft’s War 
Director Willem Kieft’s decision to impose a levy upon the Hudson Valley’s indigenous 
population payable in maize, wampum ignited a war.96 Whether war was Kieft’s intention is open 
to debate. Scholars have argued that Kieft based his levy on European war-time practices and 
that he believed the Munsee were subjugated peoples who needed to bend to Dutch power.97 
However, from a climatological perspective the levy can be seen in part as a response to New 
Netherland’s drought-induced agricultural crisis. Kieft, who perceived the Munsee’s declining 
importance to the Company, attempted to drain the last bit of resources he could from the 
Munsee in an effort to feed a hungry colony.  
 The Munsee realized their declining importance in the eyes of the Dutch and initially tried 
to maintain their relevancy to the Company by selling land and wampum. The misinterpretation 
of land sales has often been forwarded as another causative factor in the opening salvos of 
Kieft’s War. Company demand for land, however, was itself spurred by the colony’s changing 
trade policies. In August 1638, the Company proposed a new scheme aimed at increasing the 
Company’s bottom line. The decision was a response to pressures from the States General 
regarding the overwhelming financial losses incurred by the Company in the maintenance of 
New Netherland. Given the level of illicit trade in the colony, the Company agreed to end its 
trade monopoly and allowed anyone who was “permitted to ship goods to New Netherland, to 
trade directly with the Indians, and to export peltry to Europe on their own accounts.”98 The aim 
of the act was two-fold. Opening up trade would spur an increase in population and trade and, in 
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turn, the Company would receive a custom duty on all privately traded goods. The 1640 
Freedoms and Exemptions Act did double the colony’s population to 1,600, though several 
individuals only temporarily stayed and returned to the Dutch Republic after making a quick 
profit. A plan to limit trade only to residents was proposed in response, but was not passed until 
March 1648.  
 In 1639, Kieft launched a massive land-grab campaign in order to accommodate the new 
settlers. He purchased a large tract of land from the Rockaway Indians on Long Island that 
extended from shore to shore. Next, he purchased the remaining available lands in the Brooklyn 
area.99 The purchase agreement for the Rockaway land included a stipulation that permitted the 
Rockaway groups to remain on their lands and “plant corn, fish, hunt and make a living there as 
well as they can.”100 Kieft, it seems, perceived the Natives as more reliable agricultural 
producers than recently-arrived European colonists.  
 The Munsee, especially bands located on Long Island Sound and in close proximity to 
white and purple seashells, also tried to maintain their relevancy by supplying traders with 
wampum. Wampum remained the currency of exchange between the Dutch and indigenous 
traders near Fort Orange in the north.101 However, over the course of the war, corn emerged as a 
more important trade good for the Dutch compared to wampum. Corn’s scarcity and wampum’s 
abundance ensured that the former had more real value than the later. Before and during Kieft’s 
War, both Dutch and indigenous officials freely offered wampum as payment for wrongs 
committed, but typically demanded corn, instead.  
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 Kieft’s War officially began in September of 1643 after Kieft formally declared a state of 
war against “hostile” Natives.102 Skirmishes, however, began several years earlier after Kieft 
issued his tribute demand on September 15, 1639.103 The first of these skirmishes occurred in 
May 1640. Raritans, presumably anticipating the disintegration of trade relations, attempted to 
stave off Dutch intrusions through a botched attempt to capture a Company sloop that came to 
trade with them each spring. Shortly after their failed plot, colonists began to spread 
unsubstantiated rumors that the Raritan had killed livestock belonging to David de Vries and 
butchered several pigs in the care of an African slave. The Raritan denied these rumors and 
argued that the animals were killed by Company soldiers who, en route to the South River, 
“came ashore on Staten Island to cut wood and haul water, and then at the same time stole the 
hogs, and charged the act upon the innocent Indians.”104 
 Kieft refused to let the actions and rumors surrounding the Raritan go unpunished, but 
what began as a diplomatic mission quickly turned deadly. On July 16, 1640, after the Natives 
refused Kieft’s initial requests that the guilty parties be turned over, Kieft dispatched 80 men to 
the Raritan village. Secretary Cornelis van Tienhoven led the expedition but failed to reach an 
accord with the Raritan. The Raritan refused to turn over those responsible and instead promised 
to exact punishment on the guilty individuals themselves. Van Tienhoven relented, but his men 
refused to leave empty handed. After Van Tienhoven protested his soldiers’ truculent demands, 
he departed. When he had traveled about a mile, his men opened fire, killed several Indians, 
burned their homes, and captured and brutally tortured the sachem’s brother. Van Tienhoven 
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attempted to deescalate the situate and offered the soldiers eighty fathoms of wampum if they 
released their prisoner.105  
 Ulrich Leopold and Jan Thomassen, later recounting these events to an Amsterdam notary, 
interpreted the skirmish as a response to Kieft’s tribute. The two men testified that Kieft began a 
war with the Natives in September 1640 after he demanded that the Natives give him a schepel 
of maize each.106 They continued that the Natives themselves took revenge the following 
summer.107 During the summer of 1641, the Raritans exacted their revenge by killing four of De 
Vries’s laborers (one Dutch and three English) and setting fire to his house and farm. Afterwards, 
the Raritan told a Indian who worked on De Vries’s farm that they had “come to fight [the 
colonists] on account of [the Company’s] men; that we had before come and treated them badly 
on account of the swine, that there had been laid to their charge what they were not guilty of.”108  
Horror quickly spread amongst the colonists.109  
 In the midst of 1640’s autumn harvest, David de Vries set sail aboard his sloop for Tappan. 
Upon disembarking, De Vries found another sloop belonging to the Company that he claimed 
had been sent “for the purpose of levying a contribution from the Indian Christians, of a quantity 
of corn.” Interestingly, De Vries makes no mention of wampum or fur, the other two acceptable 
goods in Kieft’s demands. De Vries himself had traveled across the Hudson “in order to trade for 
maize or Indian corn.” After De Vries had clarified that he wished not to exact a tribute, but 
instead trade cloth for corn, the Tappan responded that they could not help him. The Tappan did 
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suggest, though, that “should the Company’s sloop in the mean time get away, they would then 
trade” with De Vries. The Tappan explained to De Vries that they were appalled by Kieft’s 
arrogance, believing “he must be a very mean fellow to come to live in this country without 
being invited by them, and now wish to compel them to give him their corn for nothing.” Corn 
that “they had not raised…in great abundance.” The limited amount of corn they had, one 
explained, owed to the fact that generally a chief determined the amount of corn, but this year 
only two women had planted corn and had only planted enough “for their own necessities, and to 
barter some with us for cloth.” While it is unclear why the chief had not directed the corn 
planting and why so few had planted corn, De Vries concluded, “this affair began to cause much 
dissatisfaction among the savages.”110   
 Kieft’s later responses to the Raritan skirmish and the Tappan’s refusal to pay tribute 
illustrate the importance, value, and scarcity of corn compared to wampum during this period. In 
order to protect the colony’s small population, Kieft and the Council decided to encourage 
alliances with friendly Natives who could guard against guerrilla attacks on the colony’s farms. 
To entice their support, Kieft offered “ten fathoms of Wampum for each head…and 20 fathoms 
of Wampum for every head of the indians who have most barbarously murdered our people on 
Staten Island.”111 Reading these various events together – Kieft’s continuous demand for corn 
and quick offer of wampum – suggests that corn was scarce while wampum was abundant. This 
would become a common refrain throughout the five-year conflict. Wampum did retain some 
value, though, and at least a few indigenous groups took up Kieft’s offer. In early November, the 
leader of the Tankiteke, Pacham, brought “a dead hand hanging on a stick” to New Amsterdam 
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and declared it belonged to “the chief who had killed or shot…our men on Staten Island.” These 
actions brought the conflict between the New Netherlanders and Raritans to a standstill.112  
 In the midst of the Raritan conflict, yet another conflict erupted. This time between the 
Dutch and the Wickquasgeck (alt. Wecquaesgeek) who lived just north of the Harlem River, in 
what is now Westchester, New York. Sometime in August 1641, a young Wickquasgeck man 
arrived at the home of Claes Smits Rademaker, a wheelwright residing along the Wickquasgeck 
Trail near Deutels Bay (present-day Turtle’s Bay in the East River).113  The Wickquasgeck 
knocked on Rademaker’s door and engaged him under the pretense of trading some beaver pelts 
for duffel cloth. Rademaker agreed and as he went to unlock his chest containing the cloth, the 
Wickquasgeck grabbed a nearby axe and struck Rademaker in the back of the neck. The 
Wickquasgeck then, according to David de Vries, “stole all the goods and ran off.”114  
 Kieft sent an envoy to the Wickquasgeck to inquire about the causes of Rademaker’s death 
and request the surrender of the alleged murderer. The Wickquasgeck refused to hand over the 
perpetrator but did tell the envoy his purposes in killing Rademaker. Some fifteen to twenty years 
prior, the Wickquasgeck recounted, when the Dutch had first arrived, the perpetrator and his 
uncle had approached some Dutchmen in order to trade some beaver. The Dutchmen refused to 
trade and instead seized the Wickquasgeck’s uncle’s beavers and then killed him. At a young age, 
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the Wickquasgeck resolved that, “when he should group up, he would revenge that deed upon the 
Dutch, and since then he had seen no better chance to do so than with this Claes Rademaker.”115  
 The cause of Claes Smits’ death had little connection to extreme weather conditions or 
food scarcity, but the colony’s response clearly did. Kieft called a meeting of the citizenry to 
elect representatives who could discuss a proper response and ensure a certain level of public 
support going forward. By November 1641, this elected council, known as the Twelve Men, 
unanimously agreed that something should be done to punish the responsible party but agreed to 
continue “friendly relations,” especially in regard to the “maize trade.” They disagreed about 
how to achieve both goals. Ultimately, the Twelve Men delayed action until after the corn harvest 
“for the sake and security of our lives and cattle.”116  
 Kieft anxiously sought to exact revenge despite the Twelve Men’s cautionary advice for 
patience. On November 1, 1641, Kieft requested the Twelve Men’s permission to attack. They 
denied the request and again counseled patience. As the harsh winter of 1641-1642 set in, a tense 
and short-lived peace fell upon the Hudson Valley. In January 1642, with snow presumably still 
on the ground and ice floating along the Hudson River, Kieft again requested permission to 
attack. This time the Twelve Men agreed and charged Kieft with making the necessary 
preparations. In March, as the warmth of spring thawed New Netherland’s frosted fields, Ensign 
Hendrick van Dyck set out with eighty men to exact revenge. The expedition left under the cover 
of darkness in hopes of winning the element of surprise but got lost in the dense woods of the 
seventeenth-century Hudson Valley. It was not, however, a complete loss. The Wickquasgeck 
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heard about the attempted attack and traveled to New Amsterdam later that spring in order to 
broker a peace deal with the Dutch.117  
 In the midst of tentative peace with the Raritan and Wickquasgeck, yet another conflict 
emerged, this time with the Hackensack. The Hackensack resided on the west side of the Hudson 
River near present-day Newark. In 1641, Meyndert Meyndertz established a colony known as 
Pavonia in the vicinity of the Hackensack. This was done despite objections from Kieft and 
without consent of the Hackensack, although the land had been purchased years prior. In addition 
to a disputed land deal, the Hackensack bore additional grievances. Pavonia settlers allowed their 
livestock to trample the Hackensack’s corn fields and illegally sold watered-down brandy to the 
Natives. One particularly aggrieved Hackensack, supposedly the sachem’s son, who had been 
intoxicated by the Dutch and then robbed, retaliated by killing Gerrit Jansz van Vorst, a Dutch 
colonist, while he thatched his roof. The Hackensack’s leaders quickly moved to atone the 
murder and offered Van Vorst’s widow one to two hundred fathom of wampum. Kieft rejected 
the offer and demanded the Hackensack surrender the culprit. Why Kieft refused to accept the 
wampum is unclear. It might indicate Kieft’s insistence that the Hackensack follow European 
jurisprudence, but it might also demonstrate the limited value placed on wampum during this 
period. If the original 1639 tribute was really intended to increase the colonists’ supply of 
wampum it is doubtful that Kieft would have refused the wampum outright. But as a result of 
Kieft’s refusal, the matter remained unresolved. The Hackensack refused to turn over the alleged 
murderer and instead cast the blame on settlers who illegally sold alcohol to Natives.118  
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 Fear and anxiety spread through New Netherland as snow fell and skirmishes continued 
during the winter of 1642-1643. The Council reported in February that the Raritan, 
Wickquasgeck, and Hackensack, despite “all the friendship and kindness shown them” had 
continued to “wantonly kill many goats, hogs, cows and horses…and murdered…seven innocent 
men.”119 Providentially, the colonists believed, God had brought punishment upon the 
Wickquasgeck. The Mahican, desiring to renew trade relations with the Dutch, attacked the 
Wickquasgeck, killed seventeen, and captured many women and children. Those who managed 
to escape “fled through a deep snow” in order to seek refuge amongst the Dutch.120  
 Nefariously, Kieft granted the refugees respite. For two weeks, the Company allowed the 
Wickquasgeck to rest unmolested. Upon returning to their homes, however, the Mahican once 
again attacked the Wickquasgeck. This time, the Wickquasgeck sought refuge at Corlaer's Hook 
on Manhattan and amongst the Hackensack across the Hudson. Several colonists realized the 
potential for revenge and petitioned Kieft “to attack the Indians as enemies, whilst God hatefully 
[sic] delivered them into our hands.”121 Kieft agreed. After several weeks of planning, the 
Company launched two simultaneous assaults on the night of February 25 – one at Corlaer's 
Hook and the other at Pavonia. Over the next few days, an estimated eleven indigenous groups 
retaliated by “burning, looting, and murdering throughout the countryside.” The Netherlander’s 
bloody and vengeful attacks left somewhere between 80 and 120 dead and an additional 30 
captured but failed to scare the Natives into submission.122 Instead, the Company’s attacks 
incited additional, independent, and unsanctioned attacks against local indigenous groups.123  
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 The successful attacks on the Wickquasgeck and Hackensack encouraged colonists on 
Long Island to launch a similar assault. On February 27, 1643, they requested permission “to 
ruin and conquer” the Canarsee Indians with whom they shared the island. The Council denied 
their request, but stipulated that “in case they [Natives] evince a hostile disposition, every man 
must do his best to defend himself.” Several colonists were encouraged by the Council’s stated 
denial but implied approval and “attempted secretly with two waggons [sic] to steal maize from 
these Indians.” The Canarsee defended themselves and protected their desperately needed corn 
reserve following six years of drought and now a shorter, climate-induced growing season. Three 
Canarsee were shot and killed during the scuffle. In retaliation, the Canarsee set fire to two 
houses near Fort Amsterdam later calling from afar, “Be ye our friends? Ye are mere corn 
stealers.”124  
 Spring’s arrival ushered in a period of peace. The Dutch and the Natives understood the 
importance of spring as an end to the hunting season and the beginning of the planting season. If 
warfare continued, corn might go unplanted and any sprouts that sprung might be destroyed. 
Without a successful harvest, both sides faced malnourishment, famine, and potentially death. 
The Dutch signed peace or at least truce agreements with the Long Island bands as well as the 
Hackensack in March and April, respectively.125   
 Peace, however, would last only as long as corn was in the ground. Anticipating the 
autumn harvest, several younger members of the mainland tribes began to agitate for war and 
revenge. Their leaders tried to delay a conflagration until after the harvest and alerted the Dutch 
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of a potential rogue attack. Kieft ordered a meeting with the leader of the truculent young men 
and ordered him to kill those “who wished to engage in a war with the [Dutch].” In exchange, 
Kieft offered him two hundred fathoms of [wampum].” Not surprisingly, the leader refused to 
kill his friends. He did, however, suggest that they might be willing to do so if Kieft had been 
willing to pay “richly for the murder.”126 Once again Kieft offered, and Natives refused, the 
payment of wampum to prevent future atrocities.  
 Kieft’s War reached a tipping point on August 7, 1643, when the Wappinger who resided 
further north on the Hudson’s east side and had never before engaged in hostilities with the 
Dutch, fired the opening salvos of another Dutch-Indigenous conflict. The Wappinger had been 
provoked by Pacham, the same Tankiteke leader who had earlier brought Kieft the hand of the 
Raritan responsible for killing several Dutch colonists on Staten Island. Pacham had been 
traveling throughout the lower Hudson Valley, moving from village to village, in an effort to 
create a pan-Indian alliance that could collectively defeat the Dutch presence. Pacham 
successfully persuaded the Wappinger to join the effort. They killed or captured twelve colonists 
by attacking several boats that regularly traveled between Fort Orange and New Amsterdam.127  
 The pan-Indian alliance soon grew to include at least seven indigenous groups including 
the Wickquasgeck and Hackensack. Collectively, the pan-Indian alliance resumed hostilities later 
that fall after corn had ripened and been stored away. The Wickquasgeck attacked several 
families near New Rochelle and killed eighteen individuals including the infamous Anne 
Hutchinson who had been exiled from New England in 1638. The Hackensack attacked the 
bowery at Newark Bay on September 17. While those present escaped before being attacked, the 
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bowery itself was destroyed. In October, the Tappan set fire to a farmhouse and several other 
houses near Pavonia. By year’s end, nearly every Munsee band, except for the Long Island 
groups, were at war with the Dutch.128  
 Extreme weather, failed harvests, and repeated attacks by indigenous groups had weakened 
the Dutch presence in the lower Hudson River Valley by 1643. Farmers throughout the colony 
had abandoned their settlements and multiple families, fearing for their lives, left the colony 
completely. David de Vries, whose farm had twice been destroyed by Indian attacks, was 
amongst those leaving. The departures decreased the Company’s force to about fifty to sixty able 
soldiers and 250 colonists. In contrast, the growing pan-Indian force stitched together by Pacham 
reached close to 1,500 warriors.129  
 Kieft worked frantically to grow the Company’s force. In addition to reaching out to the 
Republic and New England for material support and receiving corn and fodder from New Haven 
to replace what the Natives destroyed, Kieft called for the formation of another advisory council. 
Kieft had disbanded the Twelve Men the year before over political disagreements, but with 
increasing hostilities, he once again sought the counsel of the citizenry. The resulting board, 
known as the Eight Men, met on September 15, 1643 and resolved to wage war against all 
hostile indigenous groups except for the Long Island bands. Recruits were rounded up, Dutch 
and English colonists and Company employees were armed and trained, and Captain John 
Underhill, the leader of the English attack on the Pequot village at Mystic River in May 1637, 
was enlisted to lead them all.130  
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 The Dutch concentrated their efforts during the fall on improving their diminishing food 
supplies. One of the Eight Men forwarded a proposal to unload a ship laden with provisions that 
had been destined for Curaçao. In December, a Company expedition surveyed Staten Island and, 
after finding the local inhabitants had fled, stole four hundred bushels of corn and burned 
whatever they could not carry before returning to Manhattan. Two additional colonists, Barent 
Jansz and Hans Jansen, at around the same time requested permission to “take from Long Island 
some maize belonging to the Indians.” They canoed across the Hudson, but upon landing they 
“heard Indians, wherefore they did not bring back any maize.” Roelandt Hackbort testified to the 
same tune later upon his return to The Hague and declared that Kieft had sent them to retrieve 
any corn that had been left in the fields after the Indian harvest. Kieft, however, denied the 
accusation that he had anything to do with the provocation of the Long Island Natives who had 
maintained peace with the Dutch up to this point.131 
 Throughout the late fall of 1643 and early winter of 1644, Kieft’s military advisors directed 
their attacks primarily upon the Wickquasgeck. Company men only engaged enemies when it 
was clear they had the element of surprise or a superior force. And while the Dutch inflicted a 
few casualties upon the Wickquasgeck and at one point found and burned a sizable quantity of 
their winter corn supply, the Wickquasgeck eluded Dutch attacks at almost every turn.132  
 The Dutch grew frustrated at their failed attacks upon the Wickquasgeek and turned their 
attention toward the Canarsee on Long Island in February 1644. The Dutch believed that 
Penhawitz and his Canarsee band were at least partially responsible for a new round of killings 
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and burnings on the island. An attacking force of 120 men split into two groups, engaged the 
Canarsee in at least two skirmishes, and killed about 120 Munsee.  
 The Company dealt the pan-Indian alliance a fatal blow the following month. In March 
1644, Underhill and 130 men headed to modern-day Stamford, Connecticut to suppress the 
Tankiteke, the leaders of the pan-Indian movement.133 The cold, snowy winter of 1643-1644 held 
its grip on the lower Hudson Valley long into March. When Underhill and his men landed their 
three yachts at Greenwich the “great snow and storm” forced them to hunker down and pass the 
night there. The next morning, they marched over snow-covered hills and at times the slippery, 
stony hills required that they crawl hand-over-foot. That night, when they were within a league 
of the Indian encampment, they were given two hours to sleep, but “the men could not 
afterwards rest in consequence of the cold.” At 10 o’clock, under a full moon, the order was 
given to push forward with the attack. What befell the Munsee that night bears startling 
similarity to the events of Fort Mystic.134 Underhill and his men surrounded the encampment, 
descended upon the Munsee, and killed any who dared leave their homes. Nearly 180 Munsee 
were killed in the initial assault. Those Munsee remaining in their homes began to shoot arrows 
through holes. In response, Sergeant Major Van der Hil ordered the huts be set ablaze. The 
flames engulfed between five and seven hundred men, women, and children.135 
 Indigenous groups continued a limited campaign against New Netherland into the spring of 
1644. They focused most of their attacks against the colony’s remaining livestock. The Council, 
in response, passed an ordinance at the end of March to construct a common pasture complete 
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with fence and palisade for protection. Anyone who helped in the construction of the fence could 
use the clearing to protect their remaining livestock from Indian attacks.136  
 The Dutch show of force against the Tankiteke and the arrival of the spring planting season 
ushered in a conclusion to this round of hostilities. On April 6, Kieft and four indigenous groups 
met near Pound Ridge and agreed to end hostilities. A little over a week and a half later, a similar 
peace was made with several Long Island groups. The Canarsee, Rockaway, Raritan, 
Hackensack, Wickquasgeck, Wappinger, and other local groups, however, were not interested in 
peace. As soon as their maize had been harvested and stored, “they began to murder our people 
[and]…continually rove around in parties, night and day,…killing our people not a thousand 
paces from the Fort.”137 
 The war’s toll weighed heavy on all groups by the summer of 1644. Colonists had never 
fully recovered from the earlier drought episodes and combined with the on-going war, many 
simply packed up and left. In 1644, the farms “lie fallow and waste; our dwellings and other 
buildings are burnt; not a handful can be planted or sown this fall on all the abandoned places.” 
So few farmers remained and those who did were so fearful of being attacked that “the crop, 
which God the Lord permitted to come forth during the past summer, remains on the field, as 
well as the hay, standing and rotting in divers places; whilst we poor people have not been able 
to obtain a single man for our defense.” In a letter to the West India Company the Eight Men 
complained that the Indians were left free to catch fish unmolested while colonists dared not 
“move a foot to fetch a stick of fire wood without an escort.”138   
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 Kieft’s desperation for food in 1644 made itself evident in his response to a petition by 
eleven Company slaves who sought their freedom after eighteen or nineteen years of service. The 
slaves argued that they had served the Company long enough and could not support their 
families while remaining enslaved. Kieft agreed to set them free, but only under three conditions. 
First, each person would be required to pay the Company thirty schepels of maize, grain, or other 
agricultural products and a pig valued at twenty guilders each year for the rest of their lives. If 
they failed to do so, they would be returned to the Company’s service. Second, if the Company 
ever required their service in the future, they would be obligated to return to service. And finally, 
their born and unborn children would be bound to the Company’s service. While these conditions 
have perplexed scholars in the past, the ongoing drought and food scarcity can partly account for 
Kieft’s unprecedented move.139  
 The colonists felt a mild relief when the Blauwen Haen arrived from Curaçao in July 1644, 
carrying at least 130 soldiers who had earlier been forced out of Maranhão. The colony’s leaders 
made grand plans to put the recently-arrived soldiers to use in destroying the Natives’ crops so as 
to strip them of their winter supply. The plan, however, was never put into effect. Instead, the 
Eight Men and Kieft passed the summer bitterly fighting over financial matters and ultimate 
responsibility for the colony’s precarious position.140  
 The Company’s Board of Directors entered into a series of discussion regarding New 
Netherland’s future after hearing news and complaints about the war.141 In December, they 
decided that the best course of action was to recall Director Willem Kieft, require him to testify 
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and justify his actions, and replace him with a new director. They stated Kieft’s replacement must 
be “endowed with sufficient qualities to promote, on the one side, the interests of the Company 
and the welfare of the Commonalty, and to maintain, on the other, good correspondence with the 
neighboring people, and especially with the Indians.”142 They would find such a suitable 
replacement in Peter Stuyvesant, although he would not arrive to New Netherland for another 
two years.143  
 Peace arrived in the spring and summer of 1645. In April, several unnamed indigenous 
groups arrived at New Amsterdam ready to bring an end to hostilities. In August, after Kieft 
returned from a treaty mission at Fort Orange, several additional local groups made moves 
towards a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In late August, Kieft and representatives from the 
Hackensack, Tappan, Canarsee, and Wappinger along with mediators and ambassadors from the 
Mohawk and Mahican nations, gathered at Fort Amsterdam and agreed to end hostilities.144 The 
colony announced a day of thanksgiving in early September to celebrate the “long desired peace” 
with the Natives.145 It seemed, at last, that peace prevailed. 
 Kieft remained in New Netherland until Stuyvesant’s arrival in May 1647. Upon 
Stuyvesant’s arrival, Kieft and many of the soldiers who had been forced out of Maranhão three 
years earlier boarded the Princes Amelia and headed back to the Netherlands. Though, many 
never reached home as most drowned after the boat crashed off the coast of Wales in September 
1647.146  
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 Extreme weather catalyzed and exacerbated, though did not cause, the violence of Kieft’s 
War. Instead, extreme weather events created a situation that beckoned human responses. Kieft, 
an inexperienced director who was appointed as a result of nepotism, proved unwilling to learn 
or participate in Munsee traditions of diplomacy and chose to respond to the mounting 
subsistence crisis with demands and violence. Indigenous leaders attempted to respond through 
traditional means and methods of diplomacy. They offered wampum to right wrongs and relied 
upon their own jurisprudence to punish rogue members. Yet, because of Kieft’s insistence on 





Peter Stuyvesant’s arrival to New Netherland ushered in a period of growth and prosperity. New 
colonists arrived, settlers purchased additional Native land, and the colony’s character firmly 
shifted from a place of trade to a home for settlement. Yet, even the infamous Peter Stuyvesant 
could not control the weather or the consequences of colonists’ desire for more Indian land. 
Extreme weather and land disputes continued to plague the Hudson Valley throughout the mid-
seventeenth century and catalyzed several additional conflicts with indigenous peoples. In 1655 
and again between 1659 and 1663, the colony fell into episodes of colonial violence. 
 Climate reconstructions for the Hudson Valley suggest that New Netherland’s weather 
continued to fluctuate between extremes following the end of Kieft’s War. Drought struck the 
colony again between 1647 and 1651 as well as between 1661 and 1667.147 The years 1648, 
1649, 1661, and 1662 were especially dry.148 Cold La Niña conditions possibly returned in 1654 
and 1663.149  
 The drought of 1647-1651 led to tense relations between Natives and colonists. In 1647, 
the Company once again suspended the collection of tenths. Then in 1649 and again in 1653, 
poor harvests led the colony’s administrators to ban grain exports, the use of grains in bread 
backed for Natives, and grain’s use for brewing beer.150 At least on one occasion, the decreased 
grain supply led colonists to revert to their old habit of stealing maize from their indigenous 
neighbors.151  
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 On September 15, 1655, a conflict erupted between Dutch colonists and several allied 
Native groups including members of the Susquehannock, Wappinger, and Esopus. The origins of 
the conflict have been traced to colonist Hendrick Van Dijck’s alleged murder of an Indian 
woman. Van Dijck shot the woman after he found her trespassing upon his orchard and picking 
peaches earlier that year. The conflict came to be known as the “Peach War” in reference to the 
alleged incident. The woman’s murder prompted a contingent of nearly one-thousand Natives to 
attack New Amsterdam. The colony was especially vulnerable at the time. Most of the colony’s 
soldiers were traveling south to subdue a rogue Swedish colony. The Natives arrived under the 
pretext of searching for “Northern Indians,” but quickly targeted and wounded the alleged 
murderer Van Dijck. By the end of what became a three-day attack, 50 to 100 colonists were 
dead and 100 captured, nine to twelve thousand bushels of grain were set ablaze, five to six 
hundred cattle killed, and countless farms and settlements burned and evacuated at Pavonia and 
Staten Island.  
 Diplomatic negotiations to restore peace began shortly after. Dutch leaders and 
representatives from various River Indian groups including the Hackensack, Massapequas, 
Matinecocks, Secatogues, Merricks, Rockaways, and Canarsees were eager to bring an end to the 
hostilities. Everyone feared a repeat of Kieft’s War. Three additional colonists were killed, 
though, before hostilities came to a close in 1657. The final peace treaty called for an exchange 
of presents and prisoners between the Dutch and various Native groups involved.152     
 The Peach War followed the especially cold La Niña winter of 1654-1655. Apparently, that 
winter the Hudson’s ice floes had enough force to knock down Fort New Amsterdam’s wooden 
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palisades. We know this because the Company later punished colonist Hendrick Jansen Grever 
for illegally hauling off the palisades to use as fire wood. The Lord’s High Councilors, in 
determining punishment for Grever’s offense, took pity on him and lessened their punishment 
owing to the “sharp and bitter cold” and complete consumption of wood in the Guard House.153 
This was an especially harsh winter. January’s cold temperatures froze numerous rivers including 
the East River and left nearly all roads snow packed which made it “hardly possible to travel 
anywhere by water or land.”154 Additional textual sources suggest farmers probably experienced 
a poor harvest in 1655 and possibly in 1654. In both years, Stuyvesant and his Council convinced 
the Company’s directors to suspend the collection of tenths.155  
 Better weather prevailed during the Peach War itself. Although, stable weather holds its 
own detrimental potential. During the war, Natives targeted a small colony on Staten Island 
established by Godard van Reede as a patroonship in 1641. While management and ownership of 
the patroonship changed hands on several occasions, by 1655 the colony had increased to about 
ninety people spread out across eleven farms. The influx of settlers and farmers in the region – 
all of which were seduced by promises of agricultural fertility – encroached on Indian lands. In 
response, Natives attacked and completely ruined the colony in order to curb its growth. Several 
colonists escaped the attack by fleeing to Manhattan, but fifteen were killed. None, however, 
would return.156  
 Two final conflicts took place further north on the Hudson between newly-settled colonists 
and the Esopus. The First and Second Esopus Wars (1658-1660; 1662-1664) played out half-way 
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between Manhattan and Fort Orange.157 The Dutch deemed the Esopus’ land as “splendid 
country” and fertile enough to “feed the whole of New Netherland.”158 The conflicts’ causes have 
been traced to the establishment of Dutch farms, cultural misunderstandings regarding land 
contracts, increased trade in alcohol, and a desire to trade cloth with the Esopus in exchange for 
maize and wild game. Colonists first began purchasing land in this fertile region in 1653 
following news of a peace treaty between the Iroquois and the French. The peace treaty might 
have assuaged colonists’ fears of hostilities, but the reality of European transgressions on Native 
land became apparent in 1658.  
 During the spring of 1658, several dozen colonists, who had left the region in 1655 in fear 
that the Peach War might spread north, returned to Esopus to resume farming. Within weeks of 
their return, an intoxicated Native killed one of the settlers, attacked several livestock, and set 
fire to two farm houses.159 Stuyvesant hastily rode to the region to oversee a peaceful resolution 
to the conflict. He brought along fifty to sixty soldiers as a precautionary measure. When he 
arrived, he denied the settlers’ requests for war, urged them to create a more compact settlement 
so as not to infringe upon Native land, and offered them Company resources to do so. The 
colonists did as told and began construction of a new fort they named Wiltwijck (Indian Town). 
During meetings with Native leaders, Stuyvesant threatened war but cautioned peace. He urged 
the Esopus to sell their land and move inland so as to avoid future conflict. The Esopus agreed to 
the sale but requested an exchange of gifts as per their diplomatic traditions. Stuyvesant agreed 
to the exchange and received approval from the Company to do so, but by May 1659, the Esopus 
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had not received the promised gifts rendering the compromise and sale of land mute in their 
minds.160  
 A second round of hostilities began in September after colonists began moving into the 
newly completed fort of Wiltwijck. A group of Esopus had received a bottle of brandy for a day’s 
labor in the fields of Thomas Chambers and had retreated into the woods near Wiltwijck to enjoy 
it. When the gathering’s noise reached a level audible to nearby colonists, Jacob Jansen Stoll 
decided to intervene to break up the Natives. Upon reaching the group, now numbering only five, 
the colonists opened fire, killed one Native, and took another captive. Over the next twenty-three 
days, five-hundred Natives responded to the unwarranted attack by attacking the village at 
Wiltwijck, killing livestock, and burning buildings.161 
 News of the attack reach New Amsterdam in late September just as additional news arrived 
that a group of settlers had been attacked and killed by Raritan and Navasink warriors at Maspeth 
(located across the East River from Manhattan).162 Stuyvesant juggled which threat to respond to 
and decided to organize a force of 150 Dutch, English, and Long Island Natives to respond to the 
unfolding crisis in Esopus. When they arrived, they found the Esopus had retreated a day and a 
half earlier. Diplomatic negotiations began over the winter with both sides unwilling to attack 
during the difficult winter season. The Company’s indigenous allies reported that the Esopus 
were waiting to attack until they could organize a sizable pan-Indian alliance. Stuyvesant 
believed this news justified a war, but wanted to wait until spring when supply ships were 
expected to arrive. “There is no question,” Stuyvesant declared, “that if the countrymen in a new 
country cannot plough, sow and harvest without being molested, or the citizen and trader may 
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not travel unhindered on streams and rivers, they will both leave and transport themselves to 
such a government and dwelling places, where they shall be better protected.”163 In the interim, 
Dutch-indigenous trade in venison, corn, and other provisions in exchange for wampum 
continued.164  
 Stuyvesant’s primary reasons to delay a formal declaration of war rested on his need for 
additional supplies. He was not alone in his precautions. Cornelis van Ruyven, secretary of the 
province, wanted to wait on declaring war until after the August and September harvests. 
Stuyvesant wanted to wait until horses, money, and African slaves that might be used as laborers 
or soldiers during a war could be sent up from Curaçao.165 In the meantime, the Council 
established peace agreements with various local indigenous groups including western Long 
Island groups, the Hackensack, Nyack, Haverstraw, Wecquaesgeek, and other River Indians in 
order to ensure their loyalty or neutrality during a war.166     
 The peace agreements had the effect of isolating the Esopus.167 In March, through a 
Wappinger intermediary, the Esopus signaled their desire for peace. The Dutch, however, 
accused the Esopus of false pretense and believed they were trying to seduce the Dutch into a 
false sense of security in order to stage a surprise attack. On March 24, 1660, after declaring a 
day of fasting, prayer, and meditation, Stuyvesant declared war on the Esopus.168  
 Ensign Dirk Smith organized the brunt of Dutch attacks on the Esopus while headquartered 
in Wiltwijck. During the spring, he ordered several raids that left many Esopus dead or captured, 
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provisions destroyed, and the Esopus desirous of a new round of peace talks.169 Stuyvesant 
would not hear of peace, though. Instead, he sent eleven of the captured Esopus to Curaçao as 
slaves. He only agreed to peace talks after news arrived that one of the Company’s raids had 
killed Preuwamakan, the most prominent Esopus leader.  
 Peace talks began in June with Oratamin, the Hackensack leader, and other Native leaders 
who petitioned on behalf of the Esopus. A delegation of Dutch, Mohawk, Mahican, 
Susquehanna, Catskill, Wappinger, Hackensack, and Esopus leaders and representatives hashed 
out the final terms between July 14 and 15, 1660. Stuyvesant demanded that the Esopus remove 
themselves from the region, return any prisoners, maintain peace, and surrender a large amount 
of corn to the Company for damages incurred during the conflict.170 The other Native leaders 
agreed to act as surety for the Esopus and pledged themselves to the Dutch if any future 
hostilities erupted.171 Finally, Stuyvesant refused to return the Esopus enslaved in Curaçao. He 
wanted to hold them there until the Esopus showed their willingness to obey the Dutch. 
Stuyvesant’s decision to hold several Esopus captive as slaves in Curaçao irritated the Esopus 
who had agreed to all of Stuyvesant’s demands. During the summer of 1661, Esopus and 
Iroquois diplomats urged Stuyvesant to return them. In 1662, Stuyvesant finally agreed to return 
two of the nine.172   
 European settlers in Wiltwijck, after nearly two years without incident and perhaps naïve 
about the anger boiling within nearby Esopus peoples, decided to branch out and establish a new 
                                                            
169 Ibid. 
170 “Letter from Peter Stuyvesant to Ensign Smith,” December 11, 1659, DRCHNY XIII, 128-129. Stuyvesant 
also demanded that the Company “show them [the Indians] much kindness. His motive appears to be an effort to 
maintain trade relations, including trade in food. Ensign Smith wrote that “I speak fair to them that they shall bring 
us some venison or maize, buy they bring us little and our storehouse is not well provided with bacon and meat for 
70 men, but we hope, that with a change of the weather we shall receive sufficient victuals,” see: “Letter from 
Ensign Smith at Esopus to Vice-Director Lamontagne at Fort Orange,” February 5, 1660, DRCHNY XIII, 135. 
171 Grumet, The Munsee Indians, 75; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 158-159. 
172 Grumet, The Munsee Indians, 76-77. 
 
 245 
village during the spring of 1662. They called the settlement Nieuwdorp – literally “new 
village.” In response, the Esopus threatened the villagers in the spring of 1663 and then directly 
attacked both settlements on June 7, 1663. During the attacks, Nieuwdorp was destroyed, 
Wiltwijck was nearly burnt away, twenty settlers were killed, and forty-five more were captured.  
 Stuyvesant responded swiftly. He asked Mohawk and Mahican intermediaries to negotiate 
for the settlers’ release, met with Lower River peoples to ensure their neutrality, and sent a 
sizable force of settlers and Natives under the command of Marten Kregier to defend the settlers. 
When the force arrived and found the supposed center of the Esopus force abandoned, they spent 
several days setting fire to crops and provisions before torching everything. Kregier retreated to 
Wiltwijck and from there sent out several patrols to locate the Esopus. Early in September, a 
patrol located a newly constructed Esopus fort. The Netherlanders managed a surprise attack. 
They burned what they could, captured nineteen and killed thirty Natives, and liberated twenty-
three settlers. The attack brought the Esopus to their heels and they quickly agreed to a truce. In 
the following months, a few isolated attacks left a few settlers dead, but all sides agreed to abide 
by the truce. Both sides hammered out a final peace treaty on May 15, 1664.173   
 The Esopus Wars can be directly attributed to Dutch incursion on Native land and alcohol-
induced violence, but the wars were not free of ecological or climatological contexts. On several 
occasions, the Dutch remarked that heavy winds, floods, and high water thwarted their efforts to 
attack and pursue fleeing Esopus.174 During the winter of 1660-1661, a case of smallpox broke 
out in New Amsterdam. Indigenous couriers, carrying news of the epidemic north to Fort Orange 
in January, also inadvertently carried the virus. The resulting outbreak devastated the 
Susquehannocks. A separate outbreak erupted amongst lower Delaware River Natives in 1663, 
                                                            
173 Ibid., 77-78. 
174 Trelease, Indian Affairs, 153, 158. 
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spread northward, reached the Susquehannocks once again, and from there spread to the Seneca 
and other Iroquois further west.175 Just as during Kieft’s War, extreme weather did not cause the 
Esopus Wars but instead exacerbated the impact of war and its attacks on people, livestock, and 
crops.  
 Stuyvesant, in his 1662 Thanksgiving Proclamation, deftly summarized the collective 
experiences of those who called New Netherland home.176 
 
[God] has chastised us in some instances with pestilence and hitherto unknown fevers and diseases; again 
with sudden heavy rains and floods of water in the summer, by which the promising harvest was rendered 
unfruitful to the inhabitants; again by severe drought, by reason of which the fruits of the field were greatly 
injured and nearly cut off; and also by other trials. But at the same time, as a merciful and compassionate 
Father, he has remembered his loving kindness in the midst of judgements, blessing this province in 
general, and many of its inhabitants in particular…Among these may be numbered…the healing and 
removal of the…unusual diseases and fevers, the continuation of peace and quietness amid so many 
enemies with the prevailing rumors of new commotions and violence, and the renewed supply of a good 
and fruitful harvest.177 
 
God’s favor, however, would not last forever. Less than two years after Stuyvesant’s 
Proclamation, on September 8, 1664, he would be forced to cede the colony to the English. 
Though the colony would retain its Dutch character for decades to come and many argue it is still 
shaped by its Dutch past, New Netherland slowly gave way to New York.178  
 
 
                                                            
175 Grumet, The Munsee Indians, 79. 
176 Trelease, Indian Affairs, 148-150. 
177 “Proclamation of Peter Stuyvesant appointing a Day of Thanksgiving, Fasting and Prayer for March 15, 
1662,” January 26, 1662, Ecclesiastical Records, State of New York I, 516-518. 
178 The Netherlands would once again claim temporary hold of the colony in 1673-1674, though they would 
officially cede New Netherland back to the English in exchange for Surinam in 1674 at the Treaty of Westminster. 
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Part V: Conclusion 
 
“From Jakarta of yore began the victory; From the conquered Recife the defeat” - C.R. 
Boxer1 
                                                            
1 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 245. 
 
 248 
14. The Decline of the Dutch West India Company 
The effects of climate changes and extreme weather events rippled throughout the seventeenth 
century’s increasingly global trade networks. The Dutch Empire was no exception. Its formation 
created a vast network of people, policies, and practices to govern a vast overseas empire that 
stretched from the Dutch East India Company in Jakarta to the Dutch West India Company in 
Brazil. Expectations and doubts surrounded the Dutch West India Company at its inception, but 
by 1645, the Company’s grand ambitions began to crumble in the face of financial insolvency 
exacerbated by extreme weather and indigenous resistance.  
 The Dutch West India Company had fallen into financial disarray as early as the 1640s 
when they eagerly pushed to expand their American footprint and increased their involvement in 
the African slave trade. Profit gained at the expense of African slaves, however, could not pull 
the Dutch West India Company out of bankruptcy.2 In 1674, the States General dissolved the 
Company and formed a new company, shed of its predecessor’s debts and unprofitable purposes. 
The First Dutch West India Company had been established as an administrative unit for overseas 
trade colonies and had been deeded the war-making powers of a state. In contrast, the Second 
Company shed its predecessor’s administrative, settlement, and military responsibilities and 
instead focused on the commercial enterprises of the slave trade and commodities like gold and 
ivory.3     
 The 1640s marked a significant watershed moment in the history of Dutch colonialism in 
the Americas. This decade marked the Company’s territorial zenith.4 Over the next two decades 
                                                            
2 Postma, Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 36. 
3 Den Heijer, “The West African Trade of the Dutch West India Company, 1674-1740,” in Riches from Atlantic 
Commerce, 141-142. For an overview of goods traded between the Dutch Republic and West Africa, see pp. 151-
159. The Second West India Company management structure was also reorganized. The board was reduced from 19 
to 10 and the number of directors for each chamber was cut in half, see: Henk den Heijer, “The Dutch West India 
Company,” 99-100. 
4 Knaap et al., Oorlogen Overzee, 288. 
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the Company lost its trade, settlement, and plantation colonies and shifted focus towards the 
prioritization of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This transition culminated in the 1674 dissolution 
of the First West India Company and its replacement with the Second West India Company. 
 Scholars have offered a variety of economic interpretations to explain the decline of the 
First West India Company and the origins of the Second West India Company. Historian 
Jonathan Israel dated the beginning of the Company’s decline to as early as 1641. According to 
his analysis, the 1641 truce between the Netherlands and Portugal that came as a result of 
Portugal’s revolt against Spain forced the Company to cease its territorial expansion in Brazil. 
The Company’s share prices temporarily increased following the news of Portugal’s success 
against Spain, but fell as news of truce negotiations spread. The truce also brought an end to the 
Company’s campaign to wrench the sugar trade away from a Portuguese monopoly. The 
Company downsized its naval fleet and dismissed most of its troops in 1641 as a cost-savings 
measure. The renewal of Portuguese competition pushed sugar prices and the Company’s share 
prices down. The Portuguese Planters’ Revolt (1645-1654) dealt a final blow to the Company’s 
share prices. By 1646, the Company’s shares were trading at 37% of their nominal value, by 
1650 they were down to 14%, and by 1654 they were worth practically nothing. This led Israel to 
conclude that “the year 1646 stands out as a turning-point in the Company’s assessment of its 
role in the Dutch world-trading system. It was then that the directors accepted the transformation 
of the Company from a trading war-machine into a non-belligerent commercial organization 
content to supply the colonies of other powers and relying for protection of its own modest 
assortment of territories on the States General.”5  
                                                            
5 Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 167-170. For share prices, see: Jan De Vries and Ad van der Woude, 
The First Modern Economy, 402. 
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 Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude have placed the demise of the Company more squarely 
upon Company mismanagement and poor financial oversight. Their assessment suggests the 
Company’s decisions in 1638 and 1648 to liberalize Atlantic trade – first opening trade to 
shareholders willing to pay a fee to the Company and then later to anyone willing to pay the fees 
– substantially decreased the percentage of trade goods the Company could capture. The 
Planters’ Revolt then compounded the losses incurred through this liberal trade policy. 
Portuguese planters racked up approximately 5 million guilders of debt by purchasing slaves on 
credit from the Company and private traders prior to the war. These debts went largely unpaid 
and the only restitution came in 1661 as part of a compensation plan laid out by the Dutch 
Republic that allowed Portugal to keep the Company’s lost territories in Brazil.6    
 Henk den Heijer has identified an additional financial constraint that led to the Company’s 
demise. The high debts incurred over the Company’s early years together with outstanding debt 
obligations owed to the Company by outlying provinces to the tune of 6.5 million guilders 
required the Company to enter into risky financial funding mechanisms. The Company issued 
bonds and took out expensive maritime insurance policies known as bottomry to finance 
overseas voyages. Bottomry lending involved taking an advance from a lender to outfit a ship. In 
the event of a shipwreck, the lender would lose his investment, but upon a successful return 
voyage, the directors had to pay back the initial loan and interest as high as 50%. While this 
worked as short-term financing solution it led to long-term indebtedness.7  
 In Mark Meuwese’s estimation, the foremost scholar of Dutch-indigenous relations in the 
Americas, the decline of the Company rests once again with the Company itself. Meuwese’s 
                                                            
6 Ibid., 401-402. 
7 Henk den Heijer, “The Dutch West India Company,” 97-100. For financial compensation, see: Meuwese, 
Brothers in Arms, 47. 
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central argument is that the Company’s successes were the result of positive diplomatic relations 
and military alliances with the Native peoples of the Americas. Yet, Meuwese ultimately 
concludes that Company mismanagement and public pressures in the Republic led to the loss of 
Brazil and to the Company’s demise. The Company’s financial situation prevented them from 
sending desperately needed troop reinforcements to Brazil and the conflict motivated wealthy 
Amsterdam investors and merchants to call for an end to hostilities and the renewal of trade with 
Portugal.8  
 The bulk of these interpretations have rested on Eurocentric and economic interpretations. 
From this perspective, the onus of the Company’s failure is placed on its structural and financial 
woes. While recognizing the importance of these issues, examining events in the Americas 
through an indigenous and climatological lens reveals that the failures of sound fiscal 
responsibility at home reached across the Atlantic and had profound effects on the ability of 
Company servants to respond to internal threats.9 The inability of the Company to provide steady 
supplies to the colonies together with extreme weather events left Company magazines in sober 
states and their conquest vulnerable to attack. In many ways, the inability of the Company to 
respond to these attacks led to its eventual demise.  
 The Company’s 1623 “Grand Design,” despite its fits and starts, marched Company forces 
across the Americas until 1641 when climate-induced indigenous resistance movements halted 
the Company’s advances. The attacks of the Brasilianen on Maranhão beginning in 1642 
eventually pushed the Company to abandon that region in 1644, incited a colony-wide revolt, 
and forced the Company’s full retreat from Brazil in 1654. In the Hudson Valley, four conflicts 
between the region’s Native and European inhabitants (Kieft’s War, the Peach, and the two 
                                                            
8 Meuwese, Brothers in Arms, 43-48. 
9 For poor Company management in the Netherlands, see: Boxer, The Dutch Brazil, 175. 
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Esopus Wars) continually threatened the settlement colony until an English invasion in 1664 
forced Peter Stuyvesant to cede the colony. And the Company came close to losing Curaçao to 
the Spanish during a prolonged drought and an indigenous resistance movement between 1637 
and 1644. 
 Despite seventeenth-century perceptions that the Company would meet little indigenous 
resistance in the Americas due to declining Native populations, the Dutch in fact met indigenous 
resistance on multiple occasions in multiple locations.10 And the impact of these resistance 
movements was great. The cumulative climate-induced indigenous resistance movements thus 
posed an existential, ideological, and financial threat to the Dutch Republic’s future in the 
Americas. The indigenous resistance movements in Dutch Brazil, Curaçao, and New Netherland 
– all the consequence of extreme weather events, individual and institutional responses, and poor 
provisioning – ultimately altered the Company’s plans for the Americas. By the 1660s, the 
Company was well on its way to becoming a dominate player in the trans-Atlantic slave trade.  
 The Company’s involvement in the African slave trade began shortly after it was initially 
chartered and decades before receiving the 1662 asiento contract. Private merchants had visited 
West Africa as early as the 1590s and small companies were subsequently created to facilitate 
trade with Africa.11 The Company’s acquisition of northern Brazil in 1630 ignited Dutch interest 
in the slave trade. The large sugar plantations of Brazil, initially established by the Portuguese, 
required a vast supply of cheap labor that the region’s Native population could not fulfill and the 
Company’s policies forbid. The demand for African labor and the Company’s involvement in the 
                                                            
10 Jaap Jacobs and L. H. Roper, The Worlds of the Seventeenth-Century Hudson Valley (Albany, New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2014), 7-8. 
11 Postma, Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 16. 
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slave trade increased the following decade when sugar cultivation spread outwards onto various 
Caribbean islands.12 
 The Company’s first forays into the trade occurred between 1625 and 1637 when it 
captured several Portuguese forts in the Senegambia region and established trading factories 
along the Gold Coast.13 The Company then went on to capture São Jorge da Mina (Elmina), 
Angola, and São Tomé as part of its “Grand Design” between 1637 and 1642. The Portuguese, 
however, succeeded in recapturing Angola and São Tomé in 1648 leaving the Dutch embedded in 
the Gold Coast alone. Despite these territorial losses, the Company continued to involve itself as 
a middleman in the slave trade.  
 Curaçao emerged as a key entrepôt in the Company’s slave trade operations. By 1713, the 
Company had shipped 62,500 slaves to the Spanish-American mainland by way of Curaçao.14 
Slaves first arrived to the island in the sixteenth century during its Spanish occupation, but Dutch 
records make no mention of any slaves still living on the island at the time of the Spanish-Dutch 
transition in 1634. The fate of earlier slaves is unclear, but most of the remaining slaves were 
probably taken to the Spanish-American mainland prior to the Company’s takeover. Slaves, 
however, did find themselves back on the island shortly thereafter. The means by which they 
were forcibly placed on the island varied. Some were accompanied by Sephardic Jews who 
intended to make a home on the island while others arrived as a result of Dutch privateering and 
the seizure of Iberian vessels. Regardless of the means by which they arrived, by the 1640s at 
least forty slaves lived on Curaçao. The island’s directors, including Van Walbeeck, Tolck, and 
Stuyvesant, all petitioned for shipments of slaves to the island during their tenures. It was not, 
                                                            
12 Ibid., 4-5. 
13 Den Heijer, “The West African Trade,” 141. 
14 This accounted for 39.9% of the total slaves imported by the Dutch into the Americas, see: Den Heijer, “The 
West African Trade,” 161. 
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however, until the 1650s that the Company seized on Curaçao’s geographical advantages and 
established it as a slave trade port.15  
 In contrast to Curaçao, slightly fewer slaves (60,800 or 38.8%) found themselves destined 
for Dutch Suriname between 1674 and 1740.16 The Dutch formally received Suriname from the 
English in 1667 during the Treaty of Breda in which the Dutch Republic officially recognized the 
earlier English conquest over New Netherland in 1664. The Dutch Republic had grand plans for 
Suriname after losing so much of their American enterprise in the preceding decades. As 
historian Wim Klooster describes it, Suriname was “the last convulsions of Dutch Atlantic 
ambitions.”17 The winning of Suriname from its indigenous peoples, however, proved difficult. 
In 1678, despite over a decade of peace, war broke out between the Dutch and an allied force of 
Arawak and Carib Natives. The Dutch governor of Suriname, Johannes Heinsius, succeeded in 
putting an end to the conflict by turning the traditional Native enemies, now allies, back against 
one another and selling many captured Natives into slavery. What caused the conflict is still 
unclear, although renewed interest in Suriname by historians such as Suze Zijlstra will certainly 
bring clarity to the conflict’s origins. As the story unfolds, close attention should be paid to the 
conflict’s climatological context. In 1679, Heinsius complained frequently about the hot days and 
cold nights that caused much unpleasantness, additionally remarking that such heavy rains had 
not been seen in twenty years.18   
                                                            
15 Rupert, Creolization and Contraband, 63-66. The growing presence of African slaves on Curaçao led to the 
formation of a creole society on the island as well as two slave uprisings (1750-1751 and 1785), see: Hartog, 
Curaçao, 119, 125. 
16 The other Dutch colonies in the Guianas received 6,450 slaves (4.1%). An additional 16,150 slaves whose 
whereabouts are less-well documented were probably shipped directly to the Spanish-American mainland. For 
numbers and percentages, see: Den Heijer, “The West African Trade,” 161. 
17 Klooster quoted in Alison Games, “The Atlantic Framework of 17th-Century Colonization,” in The 
Caribbean: A History of the Region and Its Peoples, ed. Stephan Palmié and Francisco A. Scarano (Chicago and 
London, University of Chicago Press, 2011), 200. 
18 “Letter from Johannes Heinsius,” March 24, 1679, ZA, inv. nr. 2035.317/318. 
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 While the vast majority of ships leaving West Africa sailed towards the circum-Caribbean, 
a few did arrive in New Netherland beginning soon after the colony’s establishment. Though, the 
bulk of slaves only began arriving after Kieft’s War ended in 1645 and as the colony transitioned 
from a trading post to a settlement colony.19 In 1654, the Witte Paert (White Horse) arrived in 
New Netherland with an unspecified number of slaves onboard. In 1664, the Gideon, another 
Company ship, arrived carrying 290 slaves. Additional slaves arrived via Curaçao after 1658, 
though the numbers were marginal compared to those arriving in the circum-Caribbean. Private 
individuals seemed to have little interest in or little money to purchase slaves. Based on a 1665 
New York taxation list, only 30 of the 254 individuals listed owned slaves.20 The majority of 
New Netherlands’ slaves belonged to the Company itself and completed menial tasks including 
building and repairing forts, chopping wood, cultivating land, and harvesting crops. New 
Netherlanders, however, often complained about the inferior disposition of slaves who 
disembarked in their colony in comparison to slaves destined for the Caribbean.21 
 The transition from the First to Second Dutch West India Company is marked by its 
increasing reliance upon African slaves. The Americas’ declining Native population, the result of 
European disease and violence, has often been portrayed as the prime mover of this transition. 
Indigenous resistance movements and extreme weather events, however, also played a part.  
                                                            
19 Jacobs, New Netherland, 328. 
20 Ibid., 380-382. 
21 Ibid., 380-382; Postma, Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 25. For more on African slaves in New 
Netherland, see: Romney, New Netherland Connections, 191-244. 
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15. Global Comparisons 
The three indigenous resistances movements at the core of this work took place in the Americas. 
Extreme weather events, however, struck regions across the globe during the 1630s and 1640s. 
Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Americas all experienced extreme 
weather events that caused crop failures, famine, and societal instability. Violent conflict 
emerged as a common theme in nearly every case. The context of each case, however, was 
unique. Extreme weather events expressed themselves in varying forms. Cultural, economic, 
political, and agro-ecological conditions facilitated the responses of individuals. Accordingly, 
Dutch-indigenous conflicts were unique compared to other colonial enterprises that formed in the 
early modern Atlantic and across the globe. Yet, in other ways, local repercussions of the 
seventeenth century’s extreme weather, regardless of how it expressed itself, showed striking 
global similarities as communities and individuals fought over scarce subsistence resources, 
battled hunger, and resisted newly-arriving migrants whether they be Manchu in China or slave-
traders in Africa or Europeans in the Americas. 
 Throughout Eurasia, from Ireland in the West to China in the East, the seventeenth century 
witnessed an unprecedented level and frequency of state breakdown, popular revolt, and 
violence. Historians have long debated the causes of this “general crisis.”22 This debate, which 
can be traced as far back as the 1950s, splintered in the 1950s as various proponents fought for 
their specific schools of thought. Each side ascribed and interpreted the ills of the seventeenth 
century to a bevy of causes: political, economic, or social. Each interpretation sough to 
understand how Europe and the West rose to such prominence beginning in the late seventeenth 
                                                            
22 For an introduction to this debate, see: J. H. Elliott, “The General Crisis in Retrospect: A Debate Without 
End,” in Early Modern Europe: From Crisis to Stability, ed. Philip Benedict and Myron P. Guttman (Newark, 
Delware: University of Delaware Press, 2005), 31-51. 
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century and throughout the eighteenth.23 Most recently, Geoffrey Parker used the growing 
preponderance of historical climate data to place this “age of crisis” within a climatological 
framework of sporadic, episodic, and long-lasting extreme weather events.24  
 Most prominently in Europe, the early seventeenth century bore witness to the Thirty 
Years’ War (1618-1648) that split Europe roughly between Catholic and Protestant forces. Spain, 
in control of the Iberian Peninsula under a dynastic union of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns 
(1580-1640), found itself the primary target at the center of the Thirty Years’ War. As such, it 
tried desperately and often ruthlessly to defend an empire that included the Iberian Peninsula, the 
city-states of Lombardy, Naples, and Sicily in Italy, and its colonies in the Americas, 
Philippines, Asia, and Africa. 
 The Thirty Years’ War also absorbed the waning years of the Dutch Revolt (1568-1648). 
Over time, though, the struggle between Spain and the burgeoning Republic increasingly focused 
on the Americas. The Dutch West India Company temporarily seized Portuguese-claimed Bahia 
from 1624 to 1625, gained control of Brazil from 1630 to 1654, later seized São Jorge de Minha 
in West Africa, and blockaded Portuguese ships from entering Goa, India. The Dutch Republic 
often justified these actions by proclaiming themselves the liberators of America’s indigenous 
populations against shared Spanish foes. Yet, in reality the Dutch continued a ruthless colonial 
policy towards indigenous peoples first begun by preceding European powers.25  
 For Spain’s part, defending itself against multiple fronts in Europe and the Americas 
required a steady stream of resources, wealth, and people. Unfortunately for Spain’s Philip IV 
and his chief minister Don Gaspar de Guzmán, count of Olivares, extreme weather struck just as 
                                                            
23 For a review of General Crisis literature, see Jonathan Dewald, “Crisis, Chronology, and the Shape of 
European Social History,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 4 (October 1, 2008): 1031–52. 
24 Parker, Global Crisis; Parker, “Crisis and Catastrophe,” 1053-1079. 
25 Parker, Global Crisis, 264; Benjamin Schmidt, Innocence Abroad. 
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they worked to assemble and maintain a steady flow of men and supplies. Seville, Spain 
drowned under record-breaking water levels between 1626 and 1627 and drought parched the 
Iberian Peninsula’s soils between 1630 and 1631. Bad weather then led to wide-spread food 
shortages, spikes in wheat prices, precipitous drops in tithes, as well as famine, hunger, death, 
and rebellion.26 Despite the wide-spread climate-induced shortages, Olivares refused to let up his 
demands on Spaniards and Portuguese for taxes, personnel, and food rationing. The demands 
weighted heavy on the Portuguese and by the end of the summer of 1637, approximately 60 
places in southern Portugal were in open rebellion of the Spanish crown. Olivares quickly 
suspended several new taxes and nothing much came of the rebellions.27 The rebellions did, 
however, provide context and motivation for Portugal’s ongoing struggle to cast off the Spanish 
Crown – a struggle that begin in earnest in 1640 and ended successfully in 1668 thanks in large 
measure to the climate-induced vulnerabilities within Spain, its overstretched military, and 
popular revolts throughout Spain.  
 Olivares demanded similar concessions from the people of Catalonia. Here too, however, 
climate had stretched vulnerable populations to the edge. Catalonia had suffered a paltry harvest 
in 1639, followed by a year of drought “so intense that the authorities declared a special holiday 
to allow the entire population to make a pilgrimage to a local shrine to pray for water – one of 
only four such occasions recorded in the past five centuries.”28 Unrelenting, Olivares continued 
to press. Olivares needed food and board for his troops and compelled the people of Catalonia to 
provide. The situation came to a head on April 30, 1640, after peasants in the hamlet of Santa 
Coloma de Farners refused to comply and locked several royal officials into a local inn before 
                                                            
26 Parker, Global Crisis, 254-257. 
27 Ibid., 257-264 
28 Ibid., 267. 
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setting it ablaze. Tensions quickly escalated and spread throughout the region, inciting rebellions 
in dozens of towns, and culminating with a siege in Barcelona. In many cities, revolting peasants 
ransacked royal officials’ homes and burned churches to the ground.29 Seven years later another 
series of revolts, known as the “Green Banner” revolts (1647-52), broke out after another failed 
harvest and spread throughout Andalusia in southern Spain.30  
 The Iberian example demonstrates the explosive power of bad policy mixed with climate-
induced subsistence shortages. Drought cycles throughout the Iberian Peninsula weakened 
Spain’s army as well as the resolve and commitment of its subjects. Olivares and by extension 
Philip IV failed to respond to the desperate pleas of peasants and instead steeled their resolve to 
defend Spain’s vast global empire against foreign and domestic threats. Extreme weather, in 
other words, was not deterministic. Rather, it was Spain’s response to extreme weather that 
created a violent and rebellious state. 
 Spain was not alone in experiencing extreme weather and political upheavals during the 
1630s and 1640s. High tax demands to pay for foreign wars set off a string of peasant revolts in 
France between 1630 and 1653. A wet winter and stormy spring exacerbated the Croquets Revolt 
(1636). In Lower Normandy, salt-workers murdered dozens of tax collectors after receiving news 
of a renewed salt monopoly.31 Russia went through the Russo-Polish war (1632-1634) and then a 
slew of Cossack uprisings (1630, 1635, 1637-38). In England, the Stuart Monarchy bore the 
weight of rebellion abroad including the Scottish Revolution (1637-1651) and Irish Rebellion 
(1641-1653) as well as at home during the English Civil War (1641-1646). The events in 
England were preceded by extreme weather events including floods (1629), harvest failures 
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(1630), cold summers (1632), stormy springs (1633), drought (1634, 1636-37), and brutally cold, 
Thames-freezing winters (1635).32 In Anatolia, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and on the other 
side of Eurasia, China was in the midst of a burgeoning, wide-spread crisis catalyzed by 
deteriorating weather.33 
 The transition from the Ming to Qing dynasty in China in 1644 exemplifies the role of 
human agency in the midst of shifting climate and extreme weather events in catalyzing long-
lasting societal changes. Trouble for the Ming Dynasty began as early as 1615 when news of 
disaster, death, and starvation spread throughout China. Manchu living north of the Great Wall 
on the steppes of central Asia and surviving on a mixed economy steeped in trade, war booty, 
and agricultural production experienced similar climate-induced troubles. In 1618, the Manchu, 
led by Nurhaci (1559-1626), decided to alleviate their troubles by invading the province of 
Liaodong, known for its wheat and millet production. Their efforts were rewarded with a short 
boom in agricultural produce, but intense global cooling beginning in 1620 drove a steep and 
long-lasting increase in rice prices.  
 Concomitantly, the Ming faced a local uprising that required the reassignment of troops 
first deployed to stave off Manchurian invasions in the north. The White Lotus, a Buddhist sect 
in the Shandong province, challenged the Ming dynasty in 1622. Leaders of the movement 
declared a new imperial dynasty and, perhaps more tellingly, cut off the flow of rice along the 
Grand Canal – a move that created food shortages in Beijing. The Ming succeeding in crushing 
the growing rebellion, but it came at the cost of China’s control of Liaodong.  
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 The impact of extreme weather is ultimately tied to the ability and willingness of 
governments and societies to respond to climate’s threats. In 1627, this power came to rest in the 
hands of the 16-year-old Chongzhen, who ascended to the throne after his half-brother, the 
Tianqi emperor, died. The optimistically ambitious and naïve Chongzhen emperor quickly went 
to work to solve what historian Geoffrey Parker has identified as three of Ming China’s central 
problems: an inadequate fiscal system, a weak military, and an ineffective imperial leadership. 
Chongzhen ultimately proved unable to overcome the deeply ingrained factions that divided the 
bureaucracy and instead created additional discord. It was into this political instability that 
extreme weather descended.  
 The first signs of prolonged climatic instability emerged in 1628 when drought struck the 
provinces of Shaanxi and Shanxi followed the next year by similar drought conditions in 
Manchuria. Heavy snow then fell back-to-back in the Guangxi and Guangdong provinces in 
1633 and 1634, followed by extreme cold in 1636. The worst drought recorded in five centuries 
desiccated the growing fields of northern China in 1640. Crops then failed in 1633, 1634, 1635, 
1638, and 1640.34 Subsequent famines devastated Chinese subjects in 1636, 1637, 1639, and 
1640. Petitions demanded relief from roaming bandits, hunger, and high taxes, but relief never 
came. The Ming dynasty diverted its resources to the north in order to curtail the Manchu’s 
advances.  
 The Manchu’s Great Enterprise, led by Hong Taji began in 1627 to challenge Chinese 
supremacy but by the 1630s the Manchus’ desperate need for food drove the invasions. Cool and 
                                                            
34 Parker, Global Crisis, 125; Brooke, Climate Change and the Course of Global History, 439. The drier 
conditions that correlate to the “Ming Drought” in China during the years 1636, 1637, 1639, and 1640 seem to be 
consistent with La Niña conditions which, according to historical climatologists Hui Gao and Song Yang, tend to 
occur during winter months, see: Hui Gao and Song Yang, “A Severe Drought Event in Northern China in Winter 
2008–2009 and the Possible Influences of La Niña and Tibetan Plateau,” Journal of Geophysical Research 114, no. 
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wet weather in Manchuria ruined harvests during the 1630s and left Hong Taji with little 
alternative but to seek relief via invasion – a resilience strategy in its own right. Hong Taji 
ordered raids into both China and Korea, but neither delivered more than short term relief. 
Rapidly eroding conditions in Ming China, however, created a moment of opportunity for the 
Manchu to seize complete control over their southern enemies. In China, high taxes, diminished 
silver supply, Japanese trade restrictions, and the threat of Manchu invasion exacerbated climate-
induced harvest failures by the early 1640s. Collectively, these factors fostered ill will towards 
the Chongzheng emperor and made China vulnerable to internal revolt. China’s citizenry 
expressed their discontent in rent strikes, food riots, and the formation of roving bandits. Li 
Zicheng, a disenchanted former official of the courier service, now known as the Dashing Prince, 
emerged as a formidable leader of the roving bandits and moved quickly to form a new, separate 
state (Da Shun). 
 The Chongzheng emperor was hemmed in. He faced an internal threat from the Dashing 
Prince in the south and an external threat from the Manchu in the north. In response to both, the 
Chongzheng emperor placed his fate in the hands of General Wu Sangui who commanded 
China’s only formidable army. The emperor decided to recall the army from the Great Wall and 
regroup in Beijing to defend the capital at all costs. Wu’s army did not move fast enough. On 
April 23, 1644, Li Zicheng’s army stood at the doors of Beijing, a capital city defended by an 
unpaid, unfed, and weak militia. Chongzheng realized he had little hope of succeeding against 
Zicheng’s army and so retired to the palace garden, wrote a short epitaph, and hanged himself.  
 In the aftermath of Chongzheng’s suicide, China experienced continued political and 
societal instability due in part to changing climate. Li consolidated control over China into the 
short-lived Shun dynasty but failed to defeat the combined forces of Wu. Wu had retreated north 
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to the Great Wall to lead the last remnants of the Ming dynasty and the Grand Army of the 
Manchu, with whom Wu was forced to ally. The combined force of Wu and the Manchu 
defeated Li’s army in 1644 and thereafter quickly went about establishing a short-lived shared 
dynasty. The Manchu soon consolidated their power, took full control of China, and established 
the Qing dynasty in 1644.35  
 Droughts and harsh winters alone did not cause the fall of the Ming dynasty nor the rise of 
the Qing dynasty. However, extreme weather did catalyze the movements and motives that 
ended with the Ming-Qing transition. Harvest failures throughout East Asia between 1630 and 
1641, resulted in starvation and famine that led Manchu and Chinese farmers to deploy the 
resilience strategies available to them to demand and acquire much needed famine relief. The 
Manchu chose to respond to changing climate by invading China. Chinese farmers and 
intellectuals chose to participate in food riots, rent strikes, or the army of Li Zicheng. Both cases 
resulted in unprecedented violence.  
 China and Manchuria were not alone in Asia when it came to experiencing societal 
disruptions in the 1630s and 1640s. They were joined by Japan and India. In Japan, “the largest 
rural rebellion in modern Japanese history broke out on the southern island of Kyushu” between 
1637 and 1638 following several years of below average harvests.36 In India, foreshadowing the 
devastating famine associated with an 1877-1879 El Niño event, monsoon failures in 1628, 1629, 
1630, and 1631 led to drought, starvation, and a famine that left nearly one million dead in the 
Ahmadnagar district alone. Politically, drought and famine, at least in the estimation of Richard 
Grove and John Chappell, destabilized the Mughal empire and might have catalyzed the rise of 
                                                            
35 Parker, Global Crisis, ch. 5. 
36 For Japan, see Parker, Global Crisis, xxii. 
 
 264 
the Marathas.37 Strikingly similar turns of events were unfolding a half-world away in the 
Americas. 
 Strong parallels exist between climate, colonialism, and conflict outside the realms of the 
Dutch Atlantic.38 Similar to how shifting trade alliances, disease epidemics, Indian confinement 
to mission villages, and forced labor drove Dutch-indigenous conflict, they also drove violent 
episodes between indigenous peoples and the English and Spanish. “Cold spells, droughts, and 
storms…wrought particular havoc on English planting,” according to historian Katherine 
Grandjean, and led to “rather poisonous effects on English encounters with Indians.” Grandjean 
adds that “food scarcity directly preceded much of the violence that characterized English 
colonization.” The impacts of these three horsemen were nearly universal in the Americas. 
Extreme weather shaped not just indigenous peoples’ encounters with the English, but nearly all 
Europeans with whom they interacted. In New Spain, repeated Apache raids struck Christian 
mission communities between 1629 and 1641, attacks that corresponded with drought-induced 
famines and a lethal smallpox epidemic.39 And in New England, extreme weather and colonial 
violence went hand-in-hand during the Pequot War (1636-1638).40  
 The Pequot War offers the best comparison for understanding the events that later unfolded 
in New Netherland due to its geographic proximity, climatic similarities, shared cast of 
characters, and extent of violence. At Fort Mystic, hundreds of Pequot men, women, and 
children were killed after their encampment was surrounded by combined force of English 
soldiers under the command of Captain’s John Mason and John Underhill and a cadre of 
                                                            
37 For seventeenth-century India, see: Grove and Chappell, El Niño: History and Crisis, 15; for nineteenth-
century India, see: Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts. 
38 Parker, Global Crisis, ch. 15; Brooke, Climate Change, 429-438. 
39 Parker, Global Crisis, 463. 
40 Grandjean, “New World Tempests: Environment, Scarcity, and the Coming of the Pequot War,” 75. 
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Narragansetts and Mohegans. In an attempt to understand the importance and lethal nature of this 
war, historians have offered explanations ranging from English greed for land to Puritan 
conceptions of savagery to the complicated trade relationship between the Pequot, English, and 
Dutch.41 According to Katherine Grandjean, however, extreme weather links the discovery of 
John Oldham’s corpse in the summer of 1636 and the devastating war that followed. Two factors 
explain the importance of Oldham’s death. First, the 1630s were difficult years for those living in 
New England. Wide-spread drought desiccated the agricultural fields of European colonists and 
Native Americans alike. In 1635, a strong hurricane followed by extreme frost and snow caused 
flash floods in New England, destroyed corn fields and homes, deteriorated already precarious 
weather conditions, and led to wide-spread food shortages. Secondly, Oldham was an important 
figure and played a crucial role in the provisioning of New England’s various settlements. 
Oldham shuttled scarce provisions between New England colonies and negotiated corn 
purchases with indigenous groups including the Narragansett. The Connecticut government 
response to Oldham’s death – he ordered an inventory of their corn supplies – is telling of the 
importance placed on Oldham’s role in securing provisions.42  
 Oldham’s death had been preceded a month early by the death of another English trader, 
William Hammond. A group of Natives killed Hammond while he was on a crucial food-supply 
run to Virginia and his boat, filled with goods he intended to trade for corn, shipwrecked on 
Long Island. Two years prior, yet another English trade, Captain John Stone, met a similar fate. 
These traders rendered services crucial to the survival of New England colonists. Hungry 
                                                            
41 Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Cave, The Pequot War; Mark Meuwese, “The Dutch Connection: New 
Netherland, the Pequots, and the Puritans in Southern New England, 1620–1638,” 295–323; Grandjean, “New 
World Tempests: Environment, Scarcity, and the Coming of the Pequot War,” 75–100. 
42 Grandjean, “New World Tempests: Environment, Scarcity, and the Coming of the Pequot War,” 84-90. 
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colonists interpreted their deaths as a direct attack on their survival. As a result, the colonists 
were willing to go to great lengths not necessarily to avenge these deaths, but rather to ensure 
their own survival.43  
 Corn, just as it would a few years later in New Netherland, emerged as a key weapon of the 
Pequot War. “Some English,” describes Grandjean, “clamored for Indian corn, whereas others 
burned and destroyed it with abandon. Corn was everywhere stolen, fired, or dug up…” And to 
the victors went the corn. The earliest skirmishes of both the Pequot War and Kieft’s War in 
New Netherland can be summarized as corn raids aimed at either stealing or plundering corn, 
depending on whether it could be transported. In August 1636, for example, an English force 
burned a large amount of corn on Block Island after realizing they could not bring it back with 
them. The logic of this action was simple. “If English colonists did not have enough to eat, the 
soldiers ensured that neither would the island’s Indians.”44  
 North America’s importance to Europe’s colonial empires palled in comparison to the 
riches that could be wrought from the soils of Latin America and the Caribbean. The latent 
potential of riches these soils held, however, were susceptible to long and short-term shifts in the 
Caribbean’s water availability. Shifts in the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), which 
drives rainfall distribution throughout the southern and western reaches of the circum-Caribbean 
including northeast Brazil, the ABC (Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao) islands, and much of Central 
America, manifested itself in significantly drier conditions throughout the circum-Caribbean 
beginning in the fifteenth century.45 There earlier drier conditions catalyzed the Mayan Collapse, 
but were just the beginning of a long-term shift to regionally-drier conditions.  
                                                            
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 92-94. 
45 The most common explanation for drier conditions in northeast Brazil during the Little Ice Age suggests 
responsibility lies with a southward shift of the ITCZ perhaps brought on by an increased meridional temperature 
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 Drought, harvest failures, famine, and disease outbreaks were a common occurrence in the 
north of Mexico between 1540 and the 1690s. Georgina Endfield has tied these crises to periods 
of indigenous revolt. Corn-damaging drought and pests immediately preceded revolts in 1615 
and a smallpox epidemic immediately preceded another revolt in 1645. Additional drought 
episodes and epidemics occurred in 1644, 1645, 1647, 1650, and 1652. Humans responded to 
each of these events via migration and conflict. In the 1670s, 1680s, and 1690s nomadic groups 
partially responded to drought, famine, and disease through increased raiding.46  
 The global conflicts of the 1630s and 1640s contextualize the indigenous resistance 
movements in Brazil, Curaçao, and the Hudson Valley. The climate-induced crises that struck 
the Dutch Atlantic were neither unique nor singular events. Indeed, this period was a pivot phase 
not just in climate history, but in global history as well.  
                                                            
gradient in the North Atlantic. During austral winter (June - August) the ITCZ moves northward bringing rain to 
South America’s northern coastline including Panama, northern Venezuela, and the ABC islands. During the boreal 
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northeast Brazil. However, recent research suggests this might not be the case and instead cites the South American 
Summer Monsoon (SASM) as the driver of dry conditions. The authors of this study argue “a high-intensity South 
American Summer Monsoon amplified the South Atlantic Subtropical Anticyclone, which could have limited the 
southward shift of the ITCZ, leading to drier conditions in northeast Brazil, whereas during the Northern 
Hemisphere summer the ITCZ was shifted to the south, probably due to cold conditions in the Northern 
Hemisphere,” see: Joao Claudio Cerqueira Viana et al., “A Late Holocene Paleoclimate Reconstruction from 
Boqueirao Lake Sediments, Northeastern Brazil,” Palaeogeography Palaeoclimatology Palaeoecology 415 (2014): 
117–26. For proxy evidence, see: Haug et al., “Southward Migration of the Intertropical Convergence Zone Through 
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Famines, and Emperors: El Niño and the Fate of Civilizations (New York: Basic Books, 2009), ch. 8. 
46 Georgina Endfield, Climate and Society in Colonial Mexico, 126-128; Parker, Global Crisis, 461-464. 
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16. Lessons from the Archives 
In March of 2015, while attending a dinner of the Netherland-American Foundation at the 
Razmataz restaurant in Amsterdam, I was asked after giving a brief overview of my research to 
past Fulbrighters, why my research mattered. This is a question that all historians are asked to 
answer on a regular occasion. From an historiographical perspective, my answer is that 
highlighting the climatological and indigenous contexts of the First Dutch West India 
Company’s collapse provides a more holistic understanding of colonial processes. Why, though, 
should a non-specialist or lay person care about a few small, geographically diffuse events that 
occurred some 400 years ago? I think the answer is simple. These indigenous resistance 
movements offer a cautionary tale of things to come. As the science of climate change becomes 
increasingly clear, nuanced, and alarming so do the physical manifestations of a warming Earth. 
Over the last several years that I have spent researching and writing, the signs are increasingly 
clear that something is amiss.  
 In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy struck Manhattan and its surrounding boroughs 
flooding subway tunnels, eroding sandy beaches, and leaving a path of devastation in its wake. 
California and much of the west experienced one of the worst droughts in recorded history. 
Beginning in 2013, each subsequent year’s average global temperature has surpassed the 
previous year’s. For people living on the Marshall Islands, a string of nearly 1,000 islands 
collected around 29 coral atolls, rising sea levels are an everyday reality. There, sea levels have 
risen about a foot over the last 30 years due to strong global trade winds. The flooding has 
resulted in the salinization of water supplies, the overflow of sewage systems, and destruction of 
property.47 Miami Beach, Florida, a small barrier island, has experienced increased flooding over 
                                                            
47 Coral Davenport and Josh Haner, “The Marshall Islands Are Disappearing,” The New York Times, December 
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the last decade and has launched a program to install pumps and build higher roads to combat 
rising waters.48 In January 2016, the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development announced a $48 million grant to relocate the inhabitants of Isle de Jean Charles in 
Louisiana, mostly members of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe, to the mainland. The move 
came as a result of rising sea levels that have diminished the total surface area of the island. 
Many have referred to these soon-to-be-relocated indigenous peoples the United States’ first 
‘climate refugees.’49 Historically, however, these are but the first modern climate refugees here 
in the Americas.  
 For most people in the developed world, extreme weather events like droughts and 
flooding manifest themselves as inconsequential or nuisance-inducing events. Few in the 
developed world, in other words, have yet experienced extreme weather and climate change as a 
long-term problem.50 In most cases, where climate rears its ugly head, the solution is to declare a 
state of natural disaster and throw money at the problem. However, in the developing world, 
most people lack the luxury of ignoring climate-induced ecological devastation. In 2011, Syria 
erupted as Arab Spring demonstrations raised questions about the country’s future. The resulting 
civil war has made Syria a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism. Many scholars have pointed to the 
role of climate in inciting this violence. Between 2006 and 2009, the country fell into a 
prolonged drought that forced 1.5 million farmers to leave their failing farms in search of jobs 
                                                            
48 Ben Kirtman and Climate Modeling Expert, “As Waters Rise, Miami Beach Builds Higher Streets And 
Political Willpower,” NPR.org, accessed June 6, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2016/05/10/476071206/as-waters-rise-
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49 Coral Davenport and Campbell Robertson, “Resettling the First American ‘Climate Refugees,’” The New 
York Times, May 2, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettling-the-first-american-climate-
refugees.html. 
50 Christian Parents documents several incidents of “climate-driven violence” in the modern age in Christian 
Parenti, Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence (New York: Nation Books, 2011). 
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and refuge in the country’s major cities.51 Once there, farmers and their families encountered 
refugees from Iraq who had also sought to leave behind a war-torn country. The ensuing 
problems of unemployment, civil war, and threats of Islamic fundamentalist launched an even 
greater refugee crisis. Thousands have since died after overcrowded boats filled with refugees 
seeking a better life in Europe capsized in the cold waters of the Mediterranean. 
 The Syrian Civil War and Refugee Crisis is but one example of the consequences of 
contemporary climate change. We are in the midst of an emerging crisis that will result in 
millions of additional climate refugees and bloody climate wars. The United Nations University 
Institute for Environment and Human Security estimates that approximately 50 million to 200 
million subsistence farmers, fisherman, and others living on the edge of survival will be 
displaced by 2050.52  
 Nearly 400 years ago short-term episodes of extreme weather and long-term climate 
changes altered ecosystems, induced droughts and floods, and encouraged peoples to migrate in 
search of more fertile regions. Alone, these events needed not be violent or deadly. What made 
them so were the choices made by the individuals and institutions involved. Today, we as a 
global society have a choice as to how to respond to the looming threat of climate change. The 
past can teach us something about the consequences of those decisions.  
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